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Abstract
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) are gaining popularity as a flexible and inexpensive
replacement for Ethernet-based infrastructures. As the use of mobile devices such as
smart phones and tablets is becoming ubiquitous, mobile clients should be guaranteed
uninterrupted connectivity and services as they move from one access point to another
within a WMN or between networks. To that end, we propose a novel security framework
that consists of a new architecture, trust models, and protocols to offer mobile clients
seamless and fast handovers in WMNs. The framework provides a dynamic, flexible,
resource-efficient, and secure platform for intra-network and inter-network handovers in
order to support real-time mobile applications in WMNs. In particular, we propose
solutions to the following problems: authentication, key management, and group key
management. We propose
(1) a suite of certificate-based authentication protocols that minimize the authentication
delay during handovers from one access point to another within a network (intra-
network authentication).
ii
(2) a suite of key distribution and authentication protocols that minimize the authenti-
cation delay during handovers from one network to another (inter-network authenti-
cation).
(3) a new implementation of group key management at the data link layer in order to
reduce the group key update latency from linear time (as currently done in IEEE
802.11 standards) to logarithmic time. This contributes towards minimizing the
latency of the handover process for mobile members in a multicast or broadcast
group.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless mesh networking is an emerging technology that supports many important
applications such as Internet access provisioning in rural areas, ad hoc networking for
emergency and disaster recovery, security surveillance, and information services in public
transportation systems [1]. The technology enables networking capability where wiring
or installing cables is difficult or expensive.
A WMN is dynamically self-organized and self-configured, with nodes in the network
automatically establishing and maintaining mesh connectivity among themselves. This
feature brings many benefits to WMNs such as low installation cost, large-scale deploy-
ment, fault-tolerance, and self-management. WMNs are gaining popularity as a promising
technology for ubiquitous high speed network access, not only for their significant cost
savings but also for their flexibility and resilience.
A wireless mesh network (WMN) consists of mesh clients and mesh points (MPs).
Mesh clients can be static (e.g., desktops, database servers) or mobile hosts (e.g., cellular
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phones, laptops, personal digital assistants [PDAs], tablets). The mesh points form a
wireless mesh backbone to provide multi-hop connectivity from one mesh client to another
or to the Internet. A subset of mesh points act as mesh access points (MAPs), connecting
mesh clients to the WMN. MAPs can be mobile or static. In the thesis we assume that
MAPs are mostly static, such as those used for Internet access provisioning in rural areas,
municipal and metropolitan networking, and security surveillance [2]. A small number of
mesh points work as gateways, connecting the WMN to the Internet. Figure 1.1 shows
an example of a WMN.
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: An example of a WMN
Mesh access points (MAPs) in a WMN are connected to other MAPs by one or more
radio (wireless) links. Given a network of n nodes arranged in a string topology (i.e., a
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straight line) and a carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA)-
based medium access control protocol such as IEEE 802.11, it has been shown through
experiments that the throughput degrades approximately to 1/n of the raw channel band-
width [3]. This experimental result implies that the longer a source-to-destination path
(in terms of the number of wireless hops), the high the probability that a packet sent
by the source to the destination will be lost or damaged. The path length thus has a
significant impact on the performance of existing security protocols used in WMNs as
will be discussed shortly.
In a WMN, a mobile device is connected to a MAP through a radio link. As a
mobile client moves away from a MAP, it switches its connectivity to another MAP.
This connectivity change involves a transition process called handover. When a mobile
client roams from one MAP to another MAP within the same network, an intra-network
handover takes place to provide the client with continued service. (In this dissertation, a
network is defined as a set of points or nodes interconnected by communication paths and
controlled by a single network operator. The term “networks” refers to different networks
controlled by different network operators.) A mobile client may also switch connectivity
from a MAP in one network to a MAP in another network, in which case an inter-network
handover is required.
A handover typically involves the following operations: mobility management, au-
thentication, authorization, key management, and accounting for billing purposes. If all
these operations are performed via multi-hop wireless communications (e.g., in wireless
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ad hoc networks such as WMNs), the handover latency may be unacceptably long, re-
sulting in lost connectivity and thus service interruption. On the other hand, the current
version of the wireless mesh networking standard IEEE 802.11s does not specify any
mechanisms to support fast handovers for mobile clients. For example, a mesh client has
to be authenticated by an authentication server via multi-hop wireless communications,
which may result in long delay, low reliability, and thus potential service interruption.
We propose a novel security framework that consists of a new architecture, trust
models, and protocols to enable seamless and fast handovers in WMNs. The framework
provide a dynamic, flexible, resource-efficient and secure platform for intra-network and
inter-network handovers in order to support real-time mobile applications in WMNs. In
particular, we propose solutions to the following problems: authentication, key manage-
ment, and group key management.
1.1 Motivations and Contributions of the Thesis
We propose the following secure and efficient solutions to support fast intra-network and
inter-network handovers in WMNs:
1. We propose a novel trust model and certificates to support mobile clients moving
from one MAP to another within a network. Based upon the proposed trust model,
we design a suite of certificate-based authentication protocols that minimize the
authentication delay during the handover process within a WMN in order to support
fast intra-network handovers.
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2. We design a new architecture, a trust model and certificates to support fast au-
thentication when a mobile client moves from one network to another. Based on
the proposed inter-network architecture, trust model and certificates, we propose
a suite of security protocols for authentication and key distribution to minimize
inter-network authentication latency.
3. We propose a new implementation of group key management at the data link layer
in order to reduce the key update latency from linear time (as currently done in the
IEEE 802.11s standard) to logarithmic time. This contributes towards minimizing
the latency of the handover process for members in a multicast or broadcast group.
Following sections detail the motivations and contributions of our work.
1.1.1 Efficient Authentication for Fast Intra-network Handovers in a Wire-
less Mesh Network
With the rapid growth of mobile services for handheld devices such as smart phones,
tablets and laptops, Internet connectivity anytime, anywhere has become a necessity in
every day life, business, education, and entertainment. While cellular networks effectively
handle the handover problem using signaling embedded in their low-level protocols, there
are currently no efficient, transparent handover solutions for IEEE 802.11-based wireless
networks. At the moment, these networks, even if they give the appearance of continuous
connectivity to mobile clients, provide connections that are in fact often interrupted when
a client transfers from one access point to the next, because the handover delay can be
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as long as several seconds [4]. For some applications (e.g. transferring files), this delay is
acceptable; however, it is far too long for real-time traffic such as interactive voice over
IP (VoIP) or video conferencing [5].
The current version of wireless mesh networking standards IEEE 802.11s does not
specify any mechanisms to support fast handovers for mobile clients. A mesh client has
to be authenticated by an authentication server via multi-hop wireless communications,
which may result in long delays, low reliability and thus potential service interruption. A
performance study of message transmission delay in IEEE 802.11-based mesh networks
by Srivatsa and Xie [7] shows that as the number of wireless hops between two routers
increases from one to five, the delay of a message between the routers increases from
0.15 seconds to 0.8 seconds. Since the authentication process involves several messages
(e.g., nine messages in the EAP-TLS protocol used by 802.11s), the handover latency
may be several seconds long, which is not acceptable for real-time applications such as
VoIP, newscast, and stock quote distributions.
Our work contributes towards extending the IEEE 802.11s standards to support fast
handovers in a wireless mesh network. In particular, we focus on fast authentication
during the handover process as well as during the initial login time. We propose a new
trust model and accompanying certificates, based upon which our proposed authentica-
tion protocols are designed. We develop certificate-based authentication protocols that
are resource-efficient and resilient to attacks. The authentication server does not need
to be involved in the handover authentication. Instead, a new mesh access point di-
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rectly authenticates a mobile client during the handover process using certificates issued
by the current access point. Numerical analysis and simulation results show that our
login authentication protocol improves the authentication latency of IEEE 802.11s, and
our handover authentication protocol supports fast authentication during the handover
process, which is lacking in IEEE 802.11s.
1.1.2 Efficient Authentication and Key Distribution for Fast Inter-Network
Handovers among Multiple Wireless Mesh Networks
The home-foreign-domain model [9] provides a key distribution method and an authen-
tication approach for inter-network handovers in the Global System for Mobile Commu-
nications (GSM) [10], Universal Mobile Telecommunication System [11], and mobile IP
networks [12]. The trust between a client and a foreign network is based on a bilateral
roaming agreement and real-time interactions between the client’s home network and the
foreign network. To access a foreign network, a client’s subscriber identity module (SIM)
card and the authentication center of the client’s home network are pre-installed with
a shared secret key K. The foreign network must communicate with the client’s home
network to obtain the shared key K in order to authenticate the mobile client.
In mobile IP and cellular networks, the client and the foreign base station (access
point) communicate via a one-hop wireless link. Furthermore, the communication be-
tween the foreign base station and the client’s home network is via high speed wired
connections. Therefore, the handover latency is acceptable in these networks.
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In wireless ad hoc networks such as WMNs, the connection between two access points
(or between an access point and its authentication server) could all be wireless and
through multiple hops. As mentioned above, the delivery latency of a message via a
five-hop wireless connection can be up to 0.8 seconds. Given several messages involved
in an authentication, the authentication latency incurred by the home-foreign domain
handover approach can be unacceptably long in a wireless ad hoc network.
The above limitation of the home-foreign domain handover approach necessitates he
development of a new security architecture and algorithms for handovers among multiple
WMNs. We propose a scalable system architecture, a new trust establishment model,
and certificates for inter-network handovers between WMNs. Our new architecture and
trust model do not require a mobile device to be bound to its home network. A mobile
client and a foreign network trust each other through via their respective certificates
issued by certificate agents. Thus, a foreign network does not need to communicate with
a client’s home network when authenticating a client, but instead verifies the validity of
an inter-network transfer certificate.
We propose a suite of fast authentication and key distribution protocols that are
resource-efficient and resilient to attacks for inter-network handovers. The authentica-
tion server of a foreign network does not need to be involved in the handover authenti-
cation process. Instead, a MAP in the foreign network directly authenticates a mobile
client, which avoids multi-hop wireless communications and thus minimizes the authen-
tication latency. Numerical analysis and simulation results show that our inter-network
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authentication and key distribution protocols significantly reduce the authentication la-
tency during the inter-network handover process compared with the home-foreign domain
authentication approach.
1.1.3 Efficient Group Key Management for Wireless Mesh Access Points
Multicast is a form of communication that delivers information from a source to a set
of destinations simultaneously in an efficient manner; the messages are delivered over
each link of the network only once and only duplicated at branch points, where the
links to the destinations split. Important applications of multicast include distribution
of financial data, billing records, software, newspapers, pay-per-view movies; audio/video
conferencing; distance learning; and distributed online games. Although multicast is
required to support many important applications, research on multicast in WMNs is still
in its infancy. We address one of the most essential issues of multicast in WMNs −
security. In particular, we focus on the issue of group key management in WMNs.
Given a multicast group, in order to ensure that only authorized users can access the
multicast data, the data are encrypted using a cryptographic key known as the group key.
The group key is known only to authenticated and authorized members of the multicast
group. Every time a membership change occurs, the group key must be changed to ensure
backward and forward secrecy. Backwards secrecy guarantees that a new user joining the
multicast group does not have access to any old keys. This ensures that a member cannot
decrypt messages sent before it joins the group. Forward secrecy requires that a member
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leaving the group does not have access to any future keys. This ensures that a member
cannot decrypt future messages after it leaves the group. Group key management refers
to the actions taken to update and distribute the group key upon members joining and
leaving a multicast group.
IEEE 802.11s, the wireless mesh network standard, employs the same security archi-
tecture as IEEE 802.11i, the standard specifying security mechanisms for wireless local
area networks (WLANs). In a WMN, a mesh access point (MAP) shares a pairwise key
with each mobile device it is connected to. In addition, the MAP shares a group key with
all the trusted mobile devices associated with the MAP so that it can send multicast and
broadcast data to this trusted group. When a client joins (or leaves) the WMNs, the
MAP has to update the group key to ensure backward (or forward) secrecy. The MAP
generates a new group key, encrypts it using the pairwise key the MAP shares with each
trusted member, and sends the new group key to the members one by one. Thus, the
communication cost of a group key update is O(n), where n is the number of associated
members. As the group size becomes large, the rekeying latency becomes unacceptable,
especially for real-time applications.
We apply the logical key hierarchy (LKH) [13] and one-way function tree (OFT) [14]
algorithms to group key management (GKM) at the data link layer to improve its rekeying
performance. Specifically, we incorporate the LKH and OFT algorithms into the GKM
operations of an access point and its associated mobile devices. We provide numerical
analysis that shows that the LKH and OFT algorithms reduce the rekeying latency in
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WMNs from linear time to logarithmic time. We also present simulation results obtained
from various network conditions under realistic settings that show that the LKH and OFT
algorithms dramatically improve the rekeying performance compared with the original
GKM operations of IEEE 802.11.
1.2 Thesis Organization
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. We provide a review of related work
in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we present a suite of authentication protocols that support
fast intra-network handovers in a WMN. In Chapter 4, we present a suite of new security
protocols to minimize the inter-network handover latency. In Chapter 5, we present a
new implementation of group key management at the data link layer to minimize the
key update latency. We conclude the thesis, and outline future research directions in
Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter begin with background information on wireless communication, followed by
a review of cryptographic techniques and security threats. We then provide a review of
security models and trust management in wireless networks, followed by an overview of
the IEEE 802.11i security standard. Lastly, we present a survey of security protocols for
intra-network and inter-network handovers, followed by a literature review of group key
management.
2.1 Overview of Wireless Communications
In this section, we provide an overview of wireless communications with an emphasis
on transmission and interference range, hidden terminal and exposed terminal problems,
medium access mechanisms and spread spectrum technologies.
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2.1.1 Transmission Range and Interference Range
Successful transmission and reception of a signal mainly depends on the transmission
range and the interference range [27]. Assuming a concentric dissemination, a transmis-
sion range constitutes the range where a signal can be correctly received. An interference
range is the range within which stations in receive mode can be “interfered with” by an
unrelated transmitter and thus suffer a loss of packets.
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Transmission range and interference range
Figure 2.1 shows an example of the transmission and interference ranges of a node
D where the solid line denotes its transmission range, and the dotted line depicts its
interference range. Assume that node D and E are within each other’s transmission
range and node F is between D’s transmission and interference range. If node E and
node F send packets at the same time to node D, node F can disturb the transmission
from node E to node D. The interference range of node D therefore includes all positions
of node F that can damage E’s packets being sent to node D.
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While the transmission range of a node mainly depends on its signal propagation
function, its interference range may not to be able to be foreseen, and depends on pa-
rameters such as signal strength or reflection, and may change frequently. This effect is
known from practical implementations on data transmission.
2.1.2 Hidden Terminal and Exposed Terminal Problems
In wireless communications, a channel represents a band of frequencies over which signals
are carried from sources to destinations. A radio antenna is capable of sending or receiving
signals on a specific channel. Wireless is a shared medium and wireless devices share the
same air space. This can lead to collisions if more than one device tries to send to the
same receiver on the same channel.
Consider the scenario with three wireless mobile devices, as shown in Figure 2.2. The
transmission range of A reaches B, but not C. The transmission range of C reaches B,
but not A. Finally, the transmission range of B reaches both A and C.
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: An example of hidden terminal problem
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In the scenario shown in Figure 2.2, A starts sending packets to B. C does not
receive this transmission. C also wants to send packets to B and senses the medium. The
medium appears to be free as A is out of C’s range and C cannot sense the packets being
sent from A to B. Hence, C also starts sending packets simultaneously to B, causing a
collision at B. A cannot detect this collision at B and continues with its transmission. A
is hidden from C and vice versa.
While hidden terminals may cause collisions, the following problem may cause un-
necessary delay. Assuming the same orientation as shown in Figure 2.2, consider the
situation that B sends packets to A and C wants to transmit data to some other wireless
mobile device outside the interference range of A and B. C senses the carrier and detects
that the carrier is busy (B’s signal). C postpones its transmission until it detects the
medium is idle again. However, as A is outside the interference range of C, waiting is
not necessary. A ‘collision’ at B from C’s transmission to another device is too weak to
propagate to A, and will not interfere with B’s transmission to A. In this situation, C is
exposed to B.
2.1.3 Medium Access Mechanisms
The IEEE 802.11 standard defines two methods in which an IEEE 802.11 radio card may
gain control of the half-duplex medium. The default method, Distributed Coordination
Function (DCF), is a random access method determining who gets to transmit on the
wireless medium next. The other medium access control method called Point Coordi-
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nation Function (PCF), where the access point briefly takes control of the medium and
polls the stations served by the AP. DCF uses a contention-based algorithm to provide
access to all traffic, which includes two methods, CSMA/CA (Carrier Sense Multiple
Access/Collision Avoidance) and DCF with RTS/CTS (Request to Send/Clear to Send).
The PCF and DCF sub-layers are shown in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: IEEE 802.11 protocol architecture
In IEEE 802.11 standards, carrier sensing is the primary method used to avoid colli-
sions. Carrier sensing is accomplished by simply measuring the amount of energy received
on the channel. If that energy is above a certain threshold, the sensing node determines
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that another node is currently transmitting and that it must remain wait for the channel
to become free/available.
Along with carrier sensing, inter-frame space (IFS) is primarily used to ensure that
the channel is truly free. When a node is sensing the channel, the channel must be
free for the length of the distributed coordination function IFS (DIFS) period. The
DIFS is the longest inter-frame space, used as a minimum delay for asynchronous frames
contending for access. The SIFS is the shortest waiting time for medium access and used
as the wait time between the Request to Send (RTS), Clear to Send (CTS), DATA, and
acknowledgement (ACK) frames. Since the SIFS is always shorter than the DIFS, this
ensures that another node does not incorrectly determine that the channel is idle during
the handshake and that priority is given to the transmission in progress.
In the following subsections, we discuss two medium access mechanisms in DCF, CS-
MA/CA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance) and RTS/CTS/Data/ACK.
2.1.3.1 CSMA/CA
Carrier sense with multiple access and collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) is a media ac-
cess control (MAC) layer mechanism used by IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networks
(WLANs). CSMA/CA is a random access scheme with carrier sense and collision avoid-
ance through random backoff. The basic CSMA/CA mechanism is shown in Figure 2.4.
If the medium is idle for at least the duration of the DCF (distributed coordination
function) inter-frame spacing (DIFS), a node can access the medium right away.
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Figure 2.4: CSMA/CA
If the medium is busy, nodes have to wait for the duration of the DIFS, entering a
contention phase afterwards. Each node chooses a random backoff time within a con-
tention window and starts counting down its backoff timer. The backoff timer stores a
node’s residual backoff times. The node continues to sense the medium. If a node senses
the channel is busy, it has to wait for the next chance until the medium is idle again. If
a certain station does not get access to the medium in the first cycle, it stops its backoff
timer, waits for the channel to be idle again for the DIFS duration and starts the counter
again. As soon as the counter expires, the node accesses the medium. This means that
deferred stations do not choose a randomized backoff time again, but continue to count
down. Stations that have waited longer have an advantage over stations that have just
entered, in that they only have to wait for the remainder of their backoff timer from the
previous cycles. Thus, this randomly distributed delay helps to avoid collisions; other-
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wise all stations would try to transmit data after waiting for the medium to become idle
again. CSMA/CA reduces the probability of collision among nodes, but it cannot avoid
the hidden terminal problem.
2.1.3.2 RTS/CTS/Data/ACK
To solve the hidden terminal problem discussed in Section 2.1.2, the IEEE 802.11 WLAN
standard defines a medium access control mechanism using two control packets RTS and
CTS. Acknowledgements are added for enhanced reliability. Figure 2.5 illustrates the use
of RTS, CTS, data and acknowledgement (ACK).
Figure 2.5: DCF with RTS/CTS/Data/ACK
After waiting for the DIFS duration (plus a random backoff time if the medium was
busy), the sender issues a RTS control packet. The RTS packet includes the receiver’s
address of the data transmission to come and the duration of the whole data transmission.
This duration specifies the time interval necessary to transmit the whole data frame and
the acknowledgement (ACK) related to it. Every node receiving this RTS has to set its
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network allocation vector (NAV) in accordance with the duration field. The NAV then
specifies the earliest point at which the station can try to access the medium again.
If the receiver of the data transmission receives the RTS, it answers with a CTS
message after waiting for a short inter-frame spacing (SIFS) interval. The CTS packet
contains the duration field. All stations receiving this packet from the receiver of the
intended data transmission have to adjust their NAV. The latter set of receivers need
not be the same as the first set receiving the RTS packet. All nodes have to wait be-
fore accessing the medium. Thus, this mechanism reserves the medium for one sender
exclusively.
Finally, the sender can send the data after a SIFS interval. The receiver waits for a
SIFS period of time after receiving the data packet and then acknowledges whether the
transfer was correct. When the transmission completes, the NAV in each node marks the
medium as free and the standard cycle can start again.
When using RTS and CTS to avoid the hidden terminal problem, collisions can only
occur at the beginning while the RTS is sent. This is because two or more stations may
start sending at the same time (RTS or other data packet).
The above RTS/CTS mechanism is only used in unicast communications, but not used
in multicast communications. There currently does not exist an effective algorithm for
implementing RTS/CTS mechanism in multicast communications for the following two
reasons. First, CTS packets sent by the multicast neighbors of a transmitter have a very
high probability of colliding at the transmitter. More importantly, it may not be possible
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for all the multicast neighbors to agree on a common time slot for the transmission of
a packet, or the delay would be very long to reach such an agreement. Therefore, all
multicast implementations in wireless networks so far have used only CSMA/CA without
RTS/CTS.
2.1.4 Overview of DSSS and OFDM
The IEEE 802.11 standard specifies two modulation methods, which are direct-sequence
spread spectrum (DSSS) and orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) [28].
IEEE 802.11 introduces DSSS as a technology to minimize the interference for the 2.4
GHz frequency band, while IEEE 802.11a uses OFDM modulation to control interference
in the 5 GHz frequency band. DSSS supports the transmission rate up to 11Mbit/s at
the physical layer, while OFDM supports the transmission rate up to 54Mbits/s.
2.1.4.1 Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS)
Direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) is a spread spectrum modulation technique. In
DSSS, the original data signal is multiplied with a pseudorandom noise spreading code.
DSSS provides stronger protection against interfering signals, and makes the interfering
signal less perceptible. DSSS also provides security of transmission if the code is not
known to the public, which makes it very popular in military applications.
When transmitting data using DSSS, the required data signal is multiplied with what
is known as a spreading or chip code data stream. Figure 2.6 shows spreading with
21
DSSS. The resulting data stream has a higher data rate than the data itself. The data is
multiplied using the XOR (exclusive OR) function.
Figure 2.6: Spreading with DSSS
Each bit in the spreading sequence is called a chip, and this is much shorter than each
information bit. The spreading sequence or chip sequence has the same data rate as the
final output from the spreading multiplier. The rate is called the chip rate, and this is
often measured in terms of a number of M chips/second.
The baseband data stream is then modulated onto a carrier. Figure 2.7 shows the
process of DSSS generation. In this way the overall signal is spread over a much wider
bandwidth than if the data had been simply modulated onto the carrier. The reason is
that signals with high data rates occupy wider signal bandwidths than those with low
data rates.
To decode the signal and receive the original data, the signal is first demodulated from
the carrier to reconstitute the high speed data stream. Demodulating the received signal
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Figure 2.7: DSSS Generation
is achieved using the same carrier as the transmitter and reversing the modulation. The
result is a signal with approximately the same bandwidth as the original spread spectrum
signal. Additional filtering can be applied to generate the original signal. The receiver
then uses the same chip sequence to reconstruct the original data. Figure 2.8 shows the
process of DSSS decoding.
Figure 2.8: DSSS decoding
It is possible to transmit several sets of data independently on the same carrier and
then reconstitute them at the receiver without mutual interference. This way a base
station can send data to several mobile devices on a single channel. Similarly several
mobile devices can send data to a single base station, provided that in each case an
independent spreading code is used.
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2.1.4.2 Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM)
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing or OFDM is a modulation format that is
being used for many of the latest wireless and telecommunications standards, such as
IEEE 802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11g, 802.11n, 802.11ac and more.
OFDM is a form of multi-carrier modulation. OFDM works by splitting the radio
signal into multiple smaller sub-signals that are then transmitted simultaneously at dif-
ferent frequencies to the receiver. It is necessary for a receiver to be able to receive the
whole signal to be able to successfully demodulate the data. As a result, when signals are
transmitted close to one another, they must be spaced so that the receiver can separate
them using a filter, and there must be a guard band between them. Figure 2.9 shows
the traditional view of receiving signals carrying modulation. On the other hand, the
sidebands overlap from each carrier in OFDM as shown in Figure 2.10. The sidebands
in OFDM can still be received without the interference because they are orthogonal to
each another. This is achieved by having the carrier spacing equal to the reciprocal of
the symbol period.
Figure 2.9: Traditional view of receiving signals carrying modulation
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Figure 2.10: OFDM Spectrum
The data to be transmitted on an OFDM signal is divided over a large number of
radio frequencies. Each radio frequency carries only a small portion of the total amount
of data. This reduces the data rate taken by each carrier. The lower data rate has the
advantage that interference from reflections is much less critical. This is achieved by
adding a guard band time or guard interval into the system. This ensures that the data
is only sampled when the signal is stable and no new delayed signals arrive that would
alter the timing and phase of the signal.
The distribution of the data across a large number of carriers in the OFDM signal has
some further advantages. Nulls caused by multi-path effects or interference on a given
frequency only affect a small number of the carriers, the remaining ones being received
correctly. By using error-coding techniques, which does mean adding further data to
the transmitted signal, it enables many or all of the corrupted data to be reconstructed
within the receiver. This can be done because the error correction code is transmitted in
a different part of the signal.
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Thus, using OFDM makes the transmitted signal robust against frequency selective
interference and fading, such as multipath fading. If frequency selective fading occurs
on the radio channel, only a small portion of the data is affected, while in a broadband
transmission with all data on a single carrier the complete radio-frequency signal would
be affected.
One requirement of the OFDM transmitting and receiving systems is that they must
be linear. Any non-linearity will cause interference between the carriers as a result of inter-
modulation distortion. This will introduce unwanted signals that would cause interference
and impair the orthogonality of the transmission.
2.2 Overview of Cryptography
Cryptography is defined as the study of mathematical techniques related to aspects of
information security such as confidentiality, data integrity, and authentication [15]. The
use of cryptographic techniques offers:
• confidentiality: ensuring that no one can read the message except the intended
receiver;
• data integrity: assuring the receiver that the received message has not been altered;
• authentication: proving the identity of the user;
• non-repudiation: assuring that a sender cannot deny having sent the message.
26
A goal of cryptography is to adequately address the above four criteria in both theory
and practice. Cryptography is about the prevention and detection of any malicious activ-
ity. In this section, we will discuss major cryptographic techniques, namely, encryption
and decryption, digital signatures, and message authentication codes.
2.2.1 Encryption Schemes
In cryptography, encryption is the process of encoding messages in such a way that others
cannot read it, but authorized parties can. An encryption scheme is an effective approach
to achieve confidentiality. In an encryption scheme, a message is encrypted using an
encryption algorithm, turning it into an unreadable ciphertext. This is usually done with
the use of an encryption key, which specifies how the message is to be encoded. Any
adversary that can see the ciphertext should not be able to determine anything about the
original message. An authorized party, however, is able to decode the ciphertext using
a decryption algorithm that usually requires a decryption key. There are two types of
encryption schemes: symmetric-key encryption and public-key encryption [16].
2.2.1.1 Symmetric-key Cryptography
Symmetric-key algorithms use a single secret key to encrypt and decrypt messages, as
shown in Figure 2.11. Thus communicating parties must agree on the same secret key
before they wish to communicate with each other.
A symmetric encryption scheme SE=(G,E,D) consists of three algorithms [16], as
27
follows:
(1) The key generation algorithm G is a randomized algorithm that returns a string K.
Let Keys(SE) denote a set of all strings that have non-zero probability of being
output by G. The members of this set are called keys. We write K
R←− G for the
operation of executing G and let K denote the key returned.
(2) The encryption algorithm E takes the key K ∈ Keys(SE) and a plaintext M ∈
{0, 1}∗ to return a ciphertext C ∈ {0, 1}∗ denoted as C R←− EK(M).
(3) The decryption algorithm D takes a key K ∈ Keys(SE) and a ciphertext C ∈ {0, 1}∗
to return the plaintext M ∈ {0, 1}∗ denoted as M ← DK(C).
Figure 2.11: Symmetric key encryption and decryption
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2.2.1.2 Public-key Cryptography
Public-key encryption algorithms use a private key that is known only to its owner and
a public key that can be made known to anyone. The public key and the private key are
mathematically linked. Data encrypted with a public key can be decrypted only with its
corresponding private key and vice versa.
Each user u in the network has a pair of keys 〈Pu, Su〉 associated with him. The public
key Pu is accessible to everyone, and the private-key Su is known only to user u. A public
and private key pair is generated by running a key-generation algorithm. To send a secret
messageM to user u, the sender first encrypts messageM into a cipher text C = EPu(M)
using u’s public key Pu and a public encryption algorithm E, and then sends the cipher
text C to user u. E is a public encryption algorithm. Upon receiving cipher text C, user
u can decrypt the message by using his private key Su and computing DSu(C), where D
is a decryption algorithm. Clearly, for this to work we need that DSu(EPu(M)) =M .
Figure 2.12 shows the public-key encryption and decryption process. Two parties
(sender and recipient) use public-key encryption as follows. If the sender wants to send
to the recipient an encrypted message, he uses the recipient’s public key to encrypt the
message. For example, Bob wants to send a message to Alice. Bob first encrypts the
message using Alice’s public key and then sends the encrypted message to Alice. When
receiving the encrypted message, Alice decrypts the encrypted message using her private
key.
During the transmission of the encrypted message, an unauthorized user might inter-
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Figure 2.12: Public key encryption and decryption
cept the encrypted message from Bob. However, the unauthorized user cannot retrieve
the original message since the encrypted message can only be decrypted with Alice’s pri-
vate key, which is known only to Alice. If Alice wants to send a message back to Bob,
she encrypts her message using Bob’s public key. Bob then decrypts the message using
his private key.
A public-key encryption scheme is a triplet (G,E,D) of algorithms (key generation,
encryption, and decryption) which are required to satisfy the following conditions [16]:
(1) Key generation algorithm: an algorithmG produces a pair (Pu, Su), where Pu is called
the public key, and Su is the corresponding private key. We also refer to (Pu, Su) as
a pair of encryption/decryption keys.
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(2) Encryption algorithm: an algorithm E takes as inputs a public-key Pu and a string
M ∈ {0, 1}k called the message, and produces as output a string C ∈ {0, 1}∗ called
the ciphertext. The notation C ∈ EPu(M) denotes C being an encryption of message
M using key Pu.
(3) Decryption algorithm: an algorithm D takes as inputs a private-key Su and a cipher-
text C from the range of EPu(M), and produces as output a stringM
′ ∈ {0, 1}∗, such
that for every pair (Pu, Su), for everyM , for every C ∈ D(Pu,M), the probability for
the decryption result DSu(C) being not equal to the output string M
′ is negligible.
2.2.1.3 Symmetric-key vs. Public-key Cryptography
Symmetric-key cryptography uses a single key for both encryption and decryption. It is
easier to implement, and generally requires less processing power. On the other hand,
public-key cryptography uses different keys for encryption and decryption. The decryp-
tion key cannot be calculated from the encryption key. Public-key encryption is normally
used to encrypt other keys for subsequent communications. Symmetric-key cryptograph is
well suited for performing cryptographic transformations on large streams of data because
symmetric key encryption is computationally less expensive than public-key encryption
given equivalent levels of security.
Symmetric-key cryptography requires a sender and a receiver to agree on a key before
data transmission. The security of the cryptographic algorithm lies solely with the key.
Symmetric-key cryptography incurs high costs for key creation and maintenance. For
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example, given M people, the total of M2 keys have to be created/maintained. On
the other hand, the public-key cryptography only requires to maintain M pair of keys.
The drawbacks of public-key cryptography is that it is more computationally expensive
compared with most symmetric-key algorithms of equivalent security, and also requires
the use of large keys. These drawbacks makes it cost prohibitive to send large amounts
of data using public-key encryption.
Since both symmetric and public key cryptography have their own advantages, file
transfer systems typically employ a hybrid of the two, such as SSL (secure socket layer)
used in FTPS (file transfer protocol secure) and HTTPS (hypertext transfer protocol
secure), or SSH (secure shell) used in SFTP (secure file transfer protocol). Hybrid cryp-
tosystems employed in an FTPS or SFTP server use public keys to initially encrypt
symmetric keys known as session keys. The session keys are then used to encrypt the
actual data. A session key is only used in one session. After the session, the key is simply
discarded. If a session key is compromised, only the data sent within that particular
session will be at risk.
2.2.2 Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography can be used to provide a secure method for exchanging secret
keys. Two of the most common key exchange algorithms are the Diffie-Hellman key
agreement algorithm and RSA key exchange process. Diffie-Hellman and RSA are two
most popular public key algorithms in use today.
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2.2.2.1 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
In 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman published the Diffie-Hellman algorithm for
key exchange [96]. This was the first published use of public key cryptography. The
Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm was the first practical method for establishing a
shared secret over an unsecured communication channel.
The effectiveness of the Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm depends on the diffi-
culty of computing discrete logarithms. Figure 2.13 shows the basic Diffie-Hellman Key
Agreement process.
Figure 2.13: Diffie-Hellman key agreement
• Alice and Bob agree on a prime number p and a base g, which is a primitive root
modulo p.
• Alice chooses a secret number a, and sends Bob ga mod p.
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• Bob chooses a secret number b, and sends Alice gb mod p.
• Alice computes (gb mod p)a mod p = gab mod p.
• Bob computes (ga mod p)a mod p = gab mod p.
Both Alice and Bob then use the number gab mod p as their shared key for confidential
communications.
However, the Diffie-Hellman algorithm is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks as
there is no authentication in place before keys are exchanged. Therefore, the algorithm
is usually used in combination with an additional authentication method, such as digital
signatures. For example, IPsec uses the Diffie-Hellman algorithm in conjunction with
RSA authentication to exchange a session key that is used for encrypting all traffic that
crosses an IPSec tunnel.
The Diffie-Hellman algorithm is not intended for use as a general encryption scheme.
Its purpose is to transmit a shared key across an insecure medium.
2.2.2.2 RSA Key Exchange
In the year following the Diffie-Hellman proposal, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard
Adleman proposed another public key encryption system, which is now known as the
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm [97]. The RSA algorithm shares many simi-
larities with the Diffie-Hellman algorithm in that RSA is also based on multiplying and
factoring large integers. However, RSA is significantly faster than Diffie-Hellman algo-
rithm [98]. The RSA algorithm can be used for digital signatures, key exchanges and
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encryption. It is built into software such as Microsoft, Apple and Novell products. It has
also been implemented into hardware such as network interface cards and smart cards.
For RSA key exchange, secret keys are exchanged securely online by encrypting a
secret key with the intended recipient’s public key. Only the intended recipient can
decrypt the message to retrieve the secret key because the decryption requires the use of
the recipient’s private key. Therefore, a third party who intercepts the encrypted shared
secret key cannot decrypt the message without the knowledge of the intended recipient’s
private key. Figure 2.14 illustrates the basic RSA key exchange process.
Figure 2.14: Basic RSA Key Exchange
2.2.2.3 Diffie-Hellman vs. RSA Key Exchange
Diffie-Hellman and RSA are both based on supposedly intractable problems. While Diffie-
Hellman is based on the difficulty of exponentiation and modular arithmetics, RSA is
based on the difficulty of factoring large numbers. With keys of 1,024 bits long, Diffie-
Hellman and RSA give comparable levels of security [98].
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In terms of computation time, the RSA encryption using public keys is substantially
faster than any Diffie-Hellman operation. The RSA decryption using private keys entails
more or less the same amount of work as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange with similar
resistance [98]. Therefore, we choose RSA rather than Diffie-Hellman for key exchanges
in our proposed authentication protocols to support fast intra-network and inter-network
handovers.
2.2.3 Digital Signatures
A digital signature gives a recipient reasons to believe that the message was created by
a known sender and that the message was not altered in transit [16]. Digital signatures
ensure the integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation of a message.
A digital signature is a hash value that has been encrypted with the sender’s private
key. A hash value (often called a message digest) is derived from the original text of the
message. The act of signing just means the hash value was encrypted with a private key.
The hashing function ensures the integrity of the message, and the signing of the hash
value provides authentication and non-repudiation.
Following are the available cryptographic methods to provide different types of secu-
rity services:
• A message can be encrypted, which provides confidentiality.
• A message can be hashed, which provides integrity.
• A message can be digitally signed, which provides integrity, authentication, and
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non-repudiation.
• A message can be encrypted and digitally signed, which provides confidentiality,
integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation.
Figure 2.15: Digital signature generation and verification
Figure 2.15 shows a digital signature generation and verification process. Assume two
users have agreed upon a hash function and a key for the signature verification process
in advance. If Alice wants to send a digitally signed message to Bob, Alice will perform
the following steps:
• Generating a message digest of the original plain-text message
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• Encrypting the message digest using her private key (This encrypted message digest
is the digital signature.)
• Transmiting the message and the digital signature to Bob
Upon receiving the digitally signed message, Bob will:
• generate a new digest for the received message
• decrypt the attached digital signature using Alice’s public key
• compare the value he calculated with the value he decrypted
If Alice’s digital signature can be verified, the following can be assumed:
• Bob is assured that the message was not modified. If even one bit of the original
message was changed, the digest generated using the received message would differ
from the decrypted value, and cause the signature verification process to fail.
• Bob is assured that Alice sent the message. Public key transformation functions
cannot be duplicated by any practical means; therefore, only a signature generated
by the originator’s private key can be correctly decrypted using the originator’s
public key.
Although the integrity of the message is assured, there is no authentication supporting
non-repudiation unless Alice’s public key can be proven to belong to Alice only.
For example, if Sue were able to establish an alias for herself as Alice, she might
masquerade as Bob’s friend Alice. This problem is resolved by using an authentication
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service. An authentication server is a third party who vouches for the identity of a
public key owner using a public key infrastructure (PKI). A PKI provides the public-key
encryption and digital signature services necessary to verify, enroll, and certify users of a
secure application.
2.2.4 Message Authentication Code
Another technique to ensure data integrity is message authentication codes (MACs).
Unlike digital signatures, MAC values are both generated and verified using the same
key. This implies that the sender and receiver of a message must agree on a shared key
before initiating communication.
The process of MAC generation and verification is shown in Figure 2.16. The sender
of a message executes a MAC algorithm to produce a MAC value. The message and
a key shared by the sender and receiver are the inputs to the algorithm. The message
and the MAC value are then sent to the receiver. The receiver in turn runs the message
of the transmission through the same MAC algorithm using the same key, producing a
second MAC value. The receiver then compares the first MAC received to the second
generated MAC. If they are identical, the receiver can safely assume that while in transit
the message was not altered.
A message authentication code MA = (G, τ, ν) results from three algorithms, as
follows [16]:
(1) The key generation algorithm G is a randomized algorithm that returns a key K;
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Figure 2.16: The use of MAC algorithm
denoted as K
R←− G.
(2) The MAC algorithm τ is an algorithm that takes the key K and a message M to
return a MAC value σ; denoted as σ ← τK(M).
(3) The verification algorithm ν is an algorithm that takes the key K, a message M , and
a MAC value τ for M to return a verification result d, which is a one-bit message
indicating if the verification is successful and denoted as d← νK(M, τ).
The cryptographic security goal of a MAC is to ensure integrity and authentication.
Digital signatures provide non-repudiation property in addition to integrity and authen-
tication. Digital signatures are usually slower than MACs, and thus used only when
there is not yet a shared secret or the non-repudiation property is required. Thus, we
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choose MACs in our proposed authentication protocols to support fast intra-network and
inter-network handovers.
2.3 Security Threats
In this section, we review major security threats encountered in WMNs [18, 19].
(1) Physical Threats
Routers of a WMN are usually deployed outdoors, such as the roofs of buildings,
or on street lamps. They are thus vulnerable to attacks, such as tampering with
information inside routers, stealing private keys stored in routers, or even replacing
a router with a rogue router. Therefore, physical protection of routers in a WMN is
very important.
(2) Jamming Attacks
Jamming is a type of attack which interferes with the radio frequencies that a node
uses for communications. A jamming source could be powerful enough to disrupt
communication in the entire network. Even with less powerful jamming sources, an
adversary can potentially disrupt communication in the entire network by strategi-
cally distributing the jamming sources. Jamming attacks in WMNs may happen very
often since this type of attack can be launched without much effort and sophistication.
(3) Threats to Routing Protocols
WMNs may be susceptible to routing protocol threats and route disruption attacks.
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Many of these threats require packet injection with specialized knowledge of the
routing protocol. We summarize these threats below.
• In a black-hole attack, an attacker creates forged packets to impersonate a valid
router and subsequently drops packets resulting in high packet loss rates.
• In a grey-hole attack, an attacker creates forged packets to selectively drop routes
or inspect network traffic.
• In a worm-hole attack, routing control messages are replayed from one network
location to another, which can severely disrupt routing.
• In a route error injection attack, an attacker disrupts routing by injecting forged
route error messages to break mesh links. Relative to other routing attacks, this
attack conceivably has higher exploitability because it does not require detailed
knowledge of the routing protocol state model.
(4) Identity Privacy Attack
Users would like to remain anonymous while roaming in different parts of the network
for privacy reasons. To protect clients’ privacy, client IDs are numbers or strings that
should not relate to the clients’ real identities, much like bank account numbers or
social security numbers.
(5) Forgery Attack
Forgery usually describes a message-related attack against a cryptographic digital sig-
nature scheme. An attacker tries to fabricate a digital signature for a message without
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having access to the respective signer’s private signing key, which is called a forgery
attack. There are three types of forgery: existential, selective, and universal [17].
Existential forgery is the creation (by an attacker) of at least one message/signature
pair where the signature was not produced by the legitimate signer. Existential
forgery is essentially the weakest adversarial goal. As long as the pair of message and
signature is valid, the attacker has succeeded in constructing an existential forgery.
Selective forgery is the creation (by an attacker) of a message and signature pair where
the message has been chosen by the attacker prior to the attack. The message may
be chosen to have interesting mathematical properties with respect to the signature
algorithm. However, in selective forgery, the message must be fixed before the start
of the attack.
Universal forgery is the creation (by an attacker) of a valid signature for any given
message. An attacker capable of universal forgery is able to sign messages he chose
himself (as in selective forgery), messages chosen at random, or even specific messages
provided by an opponent.
Besides the above forgery attacks, there is also a total break : when an attacker can
compute the signer’s private key and therefore forge any possible signature on any
message.
(6) Space-time Trade-off Attack
Space-time trade-off is a situation in which memory usage can be reduced at the cost
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of slower program execution (and, conversely, the computation time can be reduced
at the cost of increased memory usage). A space-time trade-off attack is a type of
cryptographic attack where an attacker tries to recover a key when the plaintext and
the ciphertext are known. Attackers can use the space-time trade-off method to try
to break the data encryption keys used in the data encryption algorithms [109].
This attack can also be used against hash-based MAC algorithms where attackers
attempt to recover a MAC key of a hash-based MAC algorithm. A space-time trade-
off attack has two phases: pre-computation phase and online phase. In the pre-
computation phase, the attacker executes an exhaustive search and stores the hashing
results. This is done offline and may take a long time. Once this pre-computation
is done, the attacker could recover a key almost instantaneously by using the results
that are pre-computed and saved in the memory. The time taken in the online phase
is shortened thanks to the pre-computation results stored in memory.
(7) Replay Attack
An attacker records messages of an ongoing authentication session and replays these
messages in the future in an attempt to be successfully authenticated and possibly
gain access to the network as a client. An attacker may replay a client’s messages to
gain access to the network, or an access point’s messages in order to impersonate the
access point.
(8) Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack
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A denial-of-service (Dos) attack is an attempt to make a machine or network re-
source unavailable to its intended users. A DoS attack generally consists of efforts
to temporarily or indefinitely interrupt or suspend services of a host connected to
the network. In an authentication protocol, an attacker may send bogus messages
or replay past valid messages repeatedly to force a router to use up its resources to
process a large amount of these DoS attack messages.
(9) Impersonation Attack
In an impersonation attack, an attacker masquerades as a trusted node. IP address
spoofing is a form of impersonation attack. IP spoofing refers to the creation of IP
packets with a forged source IP address, with the purpose of concealing the identity
of the actual sender.
The attacker can use such IP spoofing attacks to defeat IP address-based authentica-
tion. This process is primarily used when trust relationships are already established
between devices on a network and internal system. For example, on some corporate
networks, the internal systems trust each other through IP addresses. Users can log
in without a username and password if they are already connecting from another
device already accepted by the internal network.By spoofing the IP address from a
trusted device, an attacker may be able to impersonate the target device without
authentication.
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Among the security threats discussed above, identity privacy attack, forgery attack,
time-memory trade-off attack, replay attack, DoS attack, and impersonation attacks are
the main security concerns to authentication and key management in WMNs, which
are the focus of our research. Although physical attacks, routing protocol attacks and
jamming attacks may happen in WMNs due to the nature of wireless communications,
defending against these threats belong to other security solutions such as intrusion de-
tection, prediction and prevention, as well as secure routing.
2.4 Security Models and Trust Management in Wireless Networks
In this section, we provide a review of security models and trust management in wireless
networks.
2.4.1 Security Models for Handovers in Wireless Networks
Several security models have been proposed to address the issue of secure handovers in
wireless networks. The home-foreign-domain model in [9, 20, 21] provides a security
approach for handovers among multiple wireless networks. The home-foreign-domain
model is usually observed in the global system for mobile (GSM) communications, the
universal mobile telecommunication system (UMTS), or in mobile IP networks. During a
handover in this model, the home domain of a user is involved, where the user is registered
and its account information is kept. The home domain is contacted by a foreign domain
every time the user roams to the foreign domain and needs to be authenticated.
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Using the home-foreign domain model, mobile IP allows users to keep the same IP
address, stay connected, and maintain ongoing applications while roaming between IP
networks [29]. Agent discovery, registration and tunneling are three phases performed in
a mobile IP process.
• Agent discovery: Mobility agents (home and foreign agents) advertise their avail-
ability on each link on which they provide service.
• Registration: When the mobile node is away from its home network, it registers its
care-of address with its home agent. A care-of address is a temporary IP address
assigned by a foreign network to a mobile device when the device is connecting to
that network. The home network forwards messages to the mobile devices using
the current care-of address assigned to the device.
• Tunneling: In order for datagrams to be delivered to the mobile node when it is
away from the home network, the home agent has to tunnel the datagrams to the
care-of address.
Figure 2.17 illustrates the routing of datagrams to and from a mobile node away from
home, once the mobile node has registered with its home agent. The mobile node is
presumed to be using a care-of address provided by a foreign agent.
• A datagram to the mobile node arrives on the home network via standard IP routing.
• The datagram is intercepted by the home agent and is tunneled to the care-of
address, as depicted by the arrow going through the tube.
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Figure 2.17: Mobile IP datagram flow
• The datagram is “detunneled” and delivered to the mobile node.
• For datagrams sent by the mobile node, standard IP routing delivers each datagram
to its destination. In the figure, the foreign agent is the mobile node’s default router.
Leu [22] proposed another model supporting secure handovers among different do-
mains in cellular networks. With this approach, a client is registered with a home do-
main. To be authenticated, a client in a foreign domain needs to be authenticated by the
authentication server of its home domain. All authentication messages are forwarded by
a broker. The broker is trusted by all the domains to facilitate clients roaming among dif-
ferent domains. Comparing to the home-foreign-domain model, the benefit of this model
is that bi-lateral roaming agreements among different domains are not needed. However,
to authenticate a visitor, a foreign domain needs to contact the visitor’s home network,
which is similar to the home-foreign-domain model.
If applying either of the above two models to WMNs, the latency of inter-network
handovers could be very long due to multi-hop wireless communications, and thus may
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result in potential service interruption.
Cellular networks and IEEE 802.11 networks employ handover mechanisms for han-
dover within the same network type. Mobile IP provides triggers or other services to
accelerate mobile IP based handovers. Existing IEEE 802 standards provide mechanisms
for detecting and selecting network access points, but do not allow for detection and selec-
tion of network access points in a way that is independent of the network type. Further-
more, multi-technology enabled terminals have also become available. Such multi-mode
terminals pose new challenges to mobility management [56]. To address some of these
challenges, the IEEE 802.21 standard, also called media independent handover (MIH),
provides different handover mechanisms to enable handovers between networks of the
same type as well as handovers between heterogeneous technologies (including IEEE 802
and cellular technologies) while optimizing session continuity.
Our work in this thesis addresses one of the most important issues to support seamless
and fast handovers - security. In particularly, we propose solutions for authentication,
key management and group key management in WMNs. As part of our future work, we
will extend our proposed security solutions to support handovers between heterogeneous
networks without incurring service interruptions, hence improving the user experience
with mobile terminals.
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2.4.2 Trust Management
As an important concept in network security, trust is interpreted as a set of relations
among entities participating in the network activities. In commercially deployed wireless
networks, such as WMNs, unauthorized clients should not be allowed to access network
resources. Trust is fundamental in such networks, and any security mechanism requires
trust as its underlying component.
Trust management in the Internet can be broadly classified into two models: hier-
archical public key infrastructure (PKI) and web of trust [23]. In the hierarchical PKI
model, there is a certificate authority (CA) at the top level and trust flows from the
top to bottom, down to end users. This hierarchical trust model does not burden end
users to prove their identity. IBM research laboratories developed a trust establishment
framework [24] allowing the “bottom-up” emergence of a PKI through the exchange of
certificates.
In comparison with a centralized PKI, a web-of-trust model is based on the idea
of decentralized trust and social networks, which leaves trust decisions in the hands of
individual users, not centralized certificate authorities. Pretty good privacy (PGP) [25]
implements a web of trust model for establishing trust relationships between users. This
could allow a user to indirectly and unknowingly trust other people that the user does
not know.
In PGP, each user maintains a list of other users’ public key certificates. This list is
called a key ring. When a new user’s public-key certificate is inserted to user U ’s key
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ring, user U assigns a level of trust to this certificate. PGP defines trust levels and allows
a user to assign three levels of trustworthiness to another user’s public-key certificate.
The three levels of trust are “complete trust”, “marginal trust”, or “no trust”. This trust
level tells PGP how much a user trust another user’s public-key certificate. PGP allows a
user to sign other users’ public-key certificates. Therefore, a user’s public key certificate
could contain a number of other users’ signatures. If a user receives a sender’s certificate
that contains a number of other users’ signatures, the user will verify all signatures using
the corresponding public keys from his key ring. After verifying all signatures from the
sender’s public key certificate, the user will trust the sender if the user determines that
at least one of the signatures in the sender’s public key certificate has been signed by
another user he/she completely or marginally trusts.
Trust management in distributed and resource-constraint networks, such as mobile
ad hoc networks (MANETs), is more difficult than that in the Internet. Generally, this
type of distributed network has neither pre-established infrastructure, nor centralized
control servers/trusted third parties. The trust information or evidence used to evaluate
trustworthiness is provided by peers, i.e., the nodes that form the network. Yi [26]
used a PGP-like mechanism to initialize an ad hoc system. Trust between nodes is
established through secure side channel communications (e.g., physical contact, infrared
communication). They assume that social relationships among mobile ad hoc network
members are essentially the same as those in a PGP system, where the trust establishment
is based on social relationships in a real society or community.
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For intra-network or inter-network handover operations, clients and destination access
points need to authenticate each other. The trust between clients and destination access
points in wireless networks such as WLAN, GSM, or mobile IP networks is based on the
trust between the clients and their home networks. A client must register with its home
network. To authenticate a client, the destination access point has to communicate with
the client’s home network. However, the binding of a client with a home network may
result in potential service interruption sin WMNs due to multi-hop wireless communica-
tions. To develop an efficient solution for fast intra-network and inter-network handovers
in WMNs, we propose a new architecture, trust models and certificates, which do not
require a client to be bound to a home network. Thus, the destination access points do
not need to communicate with a client’s home network for authentication. To the best of
our knowledge, no such trust model or certificates exist in literature to support a scalable
architecture and to provide a dynamic and flexible handover process for intra-network
and inter-network handovers.
2.5 Overview of IEEE 802.11i Security Standard
The security solutions employed by the IEEE 802.11 standard include wired equivalent
privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi protected access (WPA), and Wi-Fi protected access 2 (WPA2).
WEP is the first security solution in IEEE 802.11. Figure 2.18 shows the authen-
tication steps of WEP. An access point and a user are both configured with a shared
encryption key. The access point issues a random challenge to the user. The user then
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returns the challenge encrypted using the shared key. The access point decrypts this
message. If the decrypted message matches the original challenge, the access point is
considered to successfully authenticate the user.
Figure 2.18: WEP Authentication
WEP is specified in the IEEE 802.11b standard. Although its name implies that
wireless connections are as secure as wired connections, WEP has been demonstrated to
have numerous flaws. For example, the key in WEP is static, which means that with
sufficient time and the right tool, a hacker could use reverse-engineering to derive the
encryption key. There exist programs such as Aircrack that can recover a 128-bit WEP
key in 2-3 minutes [104].
WPA supersedes WEP as a security technology for IEEE 802.11i wireless networks.
WPA improves WEP in terms of authentication and encryption. WPA supports the
advanced encryption standard (AES) algorithm, which is a stronger encryption algorithm
53
than RC4 used in WEP. WPA provides mutual authentication, which WEP does not offer.
IEEE 802.11i is an IEEE 802.11 amendment used to facilitate secure communication
for WLANs. IEEE 802.11i, implemented with WPA, forms a complete wireless security
standard for defining authentication, key management, and group key management.
WPA was designed to be used with the temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP). TKIP
is an encryption protocol included as part of the IEEE 802.11i standard for wireless LANs
(WLANs). It was designed to provide more secure encryption than the notoriously weak
WEP, the original WLAN security protocol. TKIP is the encryption method used in
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), which replaced WEP in WLAN products.
WPA2 replaced the original WPA technology on all certified Wi-Fi hardware and is
based on the IEEE 802.11i standard for data encryption. WPA2 improves the security of
Wi-Fi connections by requiring the use of stronger wireless encryption techniques than
WPA requires. Specifically, WPA2 replaces TKIP in WPA with a stronger data encryp-
tion method called CCMP (counter mode cipher block chaining message authentication
code protocol). CCMP is an AES-based encryption protocol that forms part of the IEEE
802.11i standard for wireless local area networks, particulary those using WiMax tech-
nology. CCMP employs 128-bit keys and a 48-bit initialization vector that minimize
vulnerability to reply attacks. The pre-shared keys used in WPA-2 are automatically
changed and authenticated at devices after a specified period of time, known as the rekey
interval, has elapsed. This encryption is so complex that it requires special hardware to
be added to access points for the purpose of encryption and decryption.
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2.5.1 Authentication in IEEE 802.11i
The model of authentication in IEEE 802.11i was borrowed from the IEEE 802.1X stan-
dard [30] as shown in Figure 2.19. IEEE 802.1X was originally intended for wired local
area networks (LANs), but it turned out that the same concepts can be used in wireless
LANs. The IEEE 802.1X model involves three entities in the authentication procedure:
a supplicant, an authenticator, and an authentication server. The supplicant is a client
device (e.g., a laptop) that wishes to connect to the network. The authenticator is a
network device, such as a wireless access point. The authentication server is a process,
which can run on the access point in smaller networks, or on a dedicated server machine
in larger networks.
Figure 2.19: 802.1x
The authenticator acts like a security guard to a protected network. The supplicant
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is not allowed access through the authenticator to the protected side of the network until
the supplicants identity has been validated and authorized. With 802.1X port-based
authentication, the supplicant provides credentials, such as a digital certificate, to the
authenticator. The authenticator forwards the user’s credentials to the authentication
server for verification. If the authentication server determines that the credentials are
valid, the supplicant is allowed to access resources located on the protected side of the
network.
Thus, a client must be authenticated before it can gain access to a network, which
involves three steps as shown in Figure 2.20.
(1) When a client requests access to a network, an access point requests the client’s
identity. The client responds to the authenticator (access point) with the client’s
identity, which is forwarded to the authentication server.
(2) The authentication process is in step (2). The complete process of an IEEE 802.11i
authentication consists of messages exchanged between the client and the authenti-
cation server.
EAP-TLS [31] is a default authentication standard adopted in IEEE 802.11i WLANs.
EAP-TLS is a certificate-based mutual authentication protocol. An authentication
server provides its certificate to a user and requests the user’s certificate. The user
validates the authentication server’s certificate to authenticate the authentication
server. The user then responds to the server with its certificate. After verifying
the user’s certificate, the authentication server successfully authenticates the client.
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During the authentication process, the access point relays packets between the client
and the authentication server.
(3) When the authentication process finishes, the authentication server sends a successful
message (or, a failure message if the authentication has failed) to the user through
the access point. The client is then granted access to the network.
Figure 2.20: EAP-TLS
2.5.2 Key Management and Group Key Management in IEEE 802.11i
The result of the authentication process in IEEE 802.11i not only allows a client to connect
to an access point, but also provides several keys for further communication between the
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client and the access point. There are three types of keys generated in the IEEE 802.11i
key management scheme as discussed below.
• Pairwise Master Key (PMK): PMKs are the highest order keys in the IEEE 802.11i
standard. A PMK is computed by a client and an authentication server through the
IEEE 802.11i authentication protocol. The PMK is encrypted using a key shared
by the authentication server and the access point. The authentication server then
sends the encrypted PMK to the authenticator (the access point). The PMK is
known only to the client and the authenticator. It is a master key, because it is not
used directly for encryption or integrity protection of messages, but rather used to
derive encryption keys.
• Pairwise Transient Key (PTK): PTKs are derived from a PMK, generated and
updated through a 4-way handshake protocol [31]. After confirming the existence
of a PMK and the liveness of a client and an authentication server, the client and the
authentication server generates a pairwise transient key (PTK) for each subsequent
communication, and synchronizes the installation of the PTK on both machines.
• Group Temporal Key (GTK): GTK is used to protect multicast data.
Figure 2.21 shows the messages exchanged through a 4-way handshake protocol.
• An access point sends a nonce value ANonce to a client. The client generates a
nonce SNonce, and computes a PTK using the PMK shared with the authenticator
as follows.
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Figure 2.21: The 4-way handshake protocol
PTK = f(PMK,ANonce ‖ SNonce ‖MA ‖MC),
whereMC andMA are the physical addresses of the client and the AP, respectively.
The operator || denotes a concatenation. f is a pseudo-random number generation
function.
As soon as the PTK is generated, it is divided into three separate keys as shown in
Figure 2.22: the key encryption key (KEK), the key conformation key (KCK), and
the temporal encryption key (TEK).
– Key encryption key (KEK): Used to encrypt the GTK as discussed below;
– Key confirmation key (KCK): Used to compute a message authentication code
as discussed below;
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Figure 2.22: 802.11i key hierarchy
– Temporal encryption key (TEK): Used to encrypt or decrypt unicast data
packets as shown below.
• The client sends a nonce value SNonce and a MAC value of SNonce to the access
point. KCK is the MAC key used to generate the MAC value. The access point
then computes the same PTK according to the above formula.
• The access point uses the KCK to verify the MAC value sent by the client. If the
verification is successful, the access point generates a GTK and encrypts it using
the KEK. The access point then sends the encrypted GTK and the MAC value of
GTK to the client.
• The client decrypts the message to get the GTK. After verifying that the MAC
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value in the message is valid, the client sends a confirmation message to the access
point.
Both PMKs and PTKs need to be updated after their lifetimes expire. The GTK
needs to be updated periodically. In addition, when a device leaves the network, the
GTK needs to be updated as well. This is to prevent the device from receiving further
multicast or broadcast messages from the access point.
To update the group key update, IEEE 802.11i defines a two-way handshake protocol
as follows [31]. First, an access point generates a new GTK, encrypts the GTK using a
KEK assigned to each client, then unicasts each client the encrypted KEK along with
a MAC value derived from the KCK. The MAC value in the message protects the data
from modification. Second, after receiving the new GTK, each client replies to the access
point with an acknowledgment.
2.6 Security Protocols for Intra-network and Inter-network Handovers
In this section, we first describe the handover process in wireless networks. We then review
authentication protocols and key distribution schemes for intra-network and inter-network
handovers, respectively.
2.6.1 Handover Operations in Wireless Networks
A handover procedure consists of several phases [32]. In the first phase, a handover
impetus is detected. The obvious reason to initiate a handover procedure is that a mobile
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client is about to move out of the transmission range of the currently serving access point.
An alternative handover occurs if a mobile device moves into the range of a network
access point that is preferable to the current one because of a stronger signal, while the
currently serving access point is still available. Another reason to initiate a handover is
load balancing. A client is in the transmission range of more than one access point and
the currently serving access point is overloaded. Detection of a handover is based on a
so-called handover algorithm. A handover algorithm takes collected measurement data
as input, and determines whether or not a handover should take place. The measurement
data typically include the currently received signal strength and/or the current load on
the serving access point among other factors.
Once a handover impetus is detected, a new access point (the destination access point)
is selected in the next phase of the handover procedure. The choice of a destination access
point typically depends on the signal strength of all access points, and whether or not
these access points have the capacity to serve the client after the handover.
In the last phase, the execution phase, the client disconnects itself from its currently
serving access point (the source access point of the handover) and connects to the des-
tination access point. The execution phase also includes mobility management on the
network side that guarantees the re-routing of incoming and outgoing data traffic over
the new access point.
When a client roams to a new access point, the client needs to be authenticated
by the new access point. Besides authentication, another critical issue is key distribu-
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tion. A shared key needs to be distributed to the client and the new access point before
the authentication process. In practice, authentication and key distribution always go
together. In the next section, we review existing authentication and key distribution
schemes proposed for handover operations in wireless networks.
2.6.2 Authentication and Key Distribution Schemes for Intra-network Han-
dovers
Due to resource constraints on mobile devices, security mechanisms for handovers should
be designed to avoid negative impacts on performance and energy consumption.
We first identify the requirements of authentication and key distribution protocols
designed specifically for the intra-network handover operation in WMNs.
• The authentication and key distribution protocols must incur low computation costs
due to mobile devices’ limited computational capabilities, storage and/or power
supply. The number of messages to be exchanged should be minimized due to
wireless channels having much lower bandwidth than wired networks.
• The delay of re-authentication during the handover process should be sufficiently
short to avoid service interruption.
• The authentication protocol must support mutual authentication between a client
and an access point. It must also provide the protection of client identity, and must
be resilient to various types of attacks [33] such as forgery, replay attack, denial of
service, space-timee trade-off attack, and identity privacy attack.
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• The amount of control traffic generated by mobility management mechanisms, such
as handover authentication and key distribution, has a significant impact on the
overall network performance. Network operators are interested in reducing the
amount of control traffic in their networks (possibly at the expense of higher server
loads or lower handover performance [34]).
We broadly divide authentication and key distribution protocols for wireless networks
into three categories: multi-hop authentication and key distribution, proactive authenti-
cation and key distribution, and ticket-based authentication and key distribution.
• In multi-hop authentication and key distribution protocols [36, 37, 38, 39], when a
mobile client moves from one access point to another, it has to be re-authenticated
by the authentication server (home network) which may be located many hops away
from the client. Multi-hop wireless communications incur long latency and may lead
to service interruptions.
• Proactive authentication and key distribution protocols [40, 41] attempt to mini-
mize the authentication and key distribution latency during the handover process
by distributing pairwise master keys (PMK) as proof of successful initial authenti-
cations to potential target access points of a mobile client before the client moves
in contact with another access point.
• Ticket-based authentication and key distribution protocols [34, 42] try to minimize
authentication and key distribution latency during the handover process by using
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tickets as proof of successful initial authentications.
In the following subsections, we discuss the authentication and key distribution pro-
tocols in each category.
2.6.2.1 Multi-hop Authentication and Key Distribution
The current wireless mesh networking standard IEEE 802.11s [43, 44] uses IEEE 802.11i
security standards [35]. Using IEEE 802.11i authentication protocols, such as EAP-TLS,
a client is authenticated by an authentication server (AS), which may be many hops away
from the client. When the client transfers from one MAP to another, the client has to be
re-authenticated by the authentication server, which can incur long latencies.
IEEE 802.11F or inter-access point protocol (IAPP) is an optional extension to IEEE
802.11 that provides wireless access point communications among multi-vendor systems.
When a client moves away from its current access point, it may start to search for a
new access point. If a new access point is located, the client will send a re-association
request frame to the new access point. The request contains the client’s MAC address
and the basic service set identifier (BSSID) of the old access point. Upon receiving the
re-association request frame, the new access point sends an access-request message to
the authentication server to verify the BSSID of the old access point. If that BSSID
is valid, the authentication server will send an access-accept message to the new access
point which contains security information for handover communication between the old
and new access points. IAPP supports secure exchanges of clients’ keys between the
65
current access point and the new access point during the handover process. However,
IAPP does not effectively reduce the handover latency because both the current and
new access points have to communicate with a remote authentication dial in user service
(RADIUS) server during the handover process [45, 46].
Protocol for carrying authentication for network access (PANA) [36] is a network-
layer transport for the extensible authentication protocol (EAP) defined in IEEE 802.11
standards that enables authentication between clients and access networks. PANA runs
between a client and a server in order to perform authentication and authorization for
the network access service. PANA does not define any new authentication mechanisms,
but carries the EAP payload instead, which performs the authentication. Therefore,
authentication during the handover still has to be performed via the multi-hop wireless
communication mechanism of EAP.
Our proposed login authentication protocol (LAP) and handover authentication pro-
tocol (HAP) (described in section 3.2) only require one-hop communications during the
intra-network handover authentication and key distribution process instead of multi-hop
communication, thus significantly minimizing the handover latency and service interrup-
tion.
2.6.2.2 Proactive Authentication and Key Distribution
In the handover authentication and key distribution protocol of IEEE 802.11i, after the
authentication server successfully authenticates a mobile client, it sends a key called pair-
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wise master key (PMK) to the access point associated with the client. The client then
performs the same calculation as the authentication server to obtain the same PMK. The
access point and the client then use the PMK to derive a pair-wise transient key (PTK)
for encrypting future packets exchanged between them [35]. The authentication server
then sends the PMK to the neighbors of the current access point one-by-one. The PMK
serves as proof of the client’s successful authentication performed by the authentication
server. By letting the authentication server pre-distribute the PMK to the neighbors of
the current access point, the client does not need to be authenticated by the authentication
server when it moves to another access point. However, the pre-distribution of keys by
the authentication server incurs extra traffic overhead within the backhaul network. In
addition, if the distance between the authentication server and a neighbor access point
is long, the PMK may not arrive in time at the neighbor access point before the client
moves and connects to that neighbor access point, thus causing service interruption.
Consider the mesh network shown in Figure 2.23. Client C is authenticated successfully
and connected to MAPM . The authentication server then sends a PMK to the neighbors
of M , namely MAP N , R and P . When client C connects to a neighbor MAP in the
future, the neighbor MAP will use the PMK to authenticate C. The authentication
server distributes the PMK to N , R and P via three, four and five hops, respectively.
This incurs traffic in the backhaul network. When the traffic load in the network is
heavy, it may take longer for the PMK to reach the neighbor MAPs, and can increase
the chance of service interruption if the client moves faster. Although our proposed
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Figure 2.23: Backhaul overhead
handover authentication also employs pre-distribution of keys, it requires only one local
transmission (one broadcast) from the current access point to its neighbors as opposed
to multi-hop key pre-distributions in other protocols [40, 41], which impose extra traffic
overhead in the backhaul network.
The scheme proposed by Mish et al. [40] pre-distributes PMKs using neighbor graphs.
Once the mobile station A completes an initial full EAP-TLS authentication with an
access point APi, the authentication server determines the neighbors of APi using the
neighbor graph. The authentication server then sends a PMK to each neighboring node
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N of access point APi. The client A also receives all the PMKs the authentication server
sends to APi’s neighbors. If A requests to re-associate with N in the future, N will use
the PMK to authenticate A. When A roams and connects itself to a new access point,
APj , the authentication server will in turn distribute a PMK to each of APj ’s neighbors.
There are two major issues with this scheme. First, as the number of mobile clients in the
network increases and as they move around the network, the PMK distribution task is
a burden on the authentication server. Second, the PMK distribution consumes network
bandwidth on a global scale.
Park et al. [41] also use neighbor graphs for pre-distribute keys. However, the au-
thentication server does not distribute the PMKs. Instead, the authentication server
distributes a set of matrices, which are then used by access points and mobile clients
in combination with the key generation process proposed by Du et al. [47] to generate
PMKs. This protocol proposed by Park in [41] works as follows. After the authentication
server successfully authenticates a client C using EAP-TLS, it generates two matrices for
C: a matrix M of size h × N and a matrix A of size N × h, where N is the number of
access points in the network, and h < N is a random number chosen by the authentica-
tion server. Let i and j denote the identification numbers of client C and the associated
access point, respectively. The authentication server then sends row A(i) of matrix A
and column M(i) of matrix M to client C, and row A(j) of matrix A and column M(j)
of matrix M to the access point. The matrix information is encrypted using the private
key shared by the client (or the access point) and the authentication server. The client
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and its associated access point then exchange columns M(i) and M(j), which serve as
proofs of their initial successful authentications. They compute Kij = A(i) ×M(j) and
Kji = A(j) ×M(i), respectively. Kij and Kji have the same value because matrix K is
symmetric, which is the PMK shared by the client and the acess point. This scheme has
the same drawbacks as the algorithm proposed by Mish et al. [40].
Our proposed handover authentication protocol (HAP) (described in section 3.2.2)
distributes a shared key between neighboring MAPs (i.e., local traffic) and does not
require the involvement of an authentication server, which significantly minimizes global
traffic overheads and key pre-distribution latency.
2.6.2.3 Ticket-based Authentication and Key Distribution
Li [42] proposed a ticket-based authentication and key distribution protocol to support
fast handover in WLANs, which is a proactive key distribution approach. After the
authentication server successfully authenticates a mobile client C, it sends a set of tickets
to C, one for each neighbor access point of the current access point C connects to. A
ticket for a neighbor N contains the encrypted PMK to be shared by C and N later, when
C moves to the service area of N . The authentication server distributes the PMKs, which
are stored in the set of tickets C owns, to the neighbor access points in preparation for C’s
roaming. The major drawback of this scheme is the distribution of PMKs to the neighbor
access points, which is acceptable in the wired backbone of a WLAN, but is bandwidth-
consuming in the wireless backbone of a WMN. In addition, the authentication server
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has to generate a large number of tickets, one for each client-AP pair in the network.
However, our proposed protocols only require to generate one ticket per client.
The protocol proposed by Kassab [34] is very similar to that by Mish et al. [40]
discussed earlier. After the authentication server successfully authenticates a mobile
client C, it sends a set of PMKs to C and to the neighbor access points of the current
access point C that is associated with, one PMK per client-access point pair. When
C roams to a neighbor access point N , it generates a ticket that is encrypted with the
PMK shared by C and N . N uses the shared PMK to verify the ticket and authenticates
C. This protocol has the same disadvantages as the proactive key distribution scheme
proposed by Mish et al. [40].
Shames Qazi [48] proposed a ticket-based authentication scheme for WMNs. The
authentication server assigns tickets to registered mesh clients so that they can commu-
nicate with each other. The scheme is designed for authentication between mesh clients,
and not between MAPs and clients. In addition, it does not provide any solution for fast
authentication and key distribution during intra-network handover.
Anmin Fu [49] proposed a handover authentication and key distribution mechanism
based on tickets for IEEE 802.16m (mobile WiMAX). In this scheme, all the access
points and clients in a network are considered as a group and share a group key. After
the authentication server successfully authenticates a client C, it generates a ticket for
C, which is encrypted with the group key, and sends the ticket to C. When C moves to
another access point N , it submits the ticket to N , who verifies the ticket using the group
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key. In large mesh networks, using a single group key for the whole network is neither
secure nor scalable.
A qualitative comparison of our proposed login authentication protocol (LAP) and
handover authentication protocol (HAP) with other protocols is given in Table 2.1, where
n denotes the number of neighbor MAPs of the current MAP to which a client is currently
connected.
The major difference between our handover authentication scheme (discussed in sec-
tion 3.2.2) and the other ticket-based protocols is that in our scheme keys and certificates
needed for a handover are distributed by a MAP to its one-hop neighbors, while in the
other protocols they are distributed by the authentication servers which are typically
multiple hops away from the neighbor MAPs.
2.6.3 Authentication and Key Distribution Schemes for Inter-network Han-
dovers
In this section, we provide a literature review of authentication and key distribution
protocols for secure inter-network handovers in wireless networks. We broadly divide
authentication and key distribution protocols for inter-network handovers into four cat-
egories: 3GPP authentication and key agreement protocols, authentication protocols for
secure roaming service in GLOMONET, key distribution approach for inter-network han-
dovers in heterogeneous wireless networks, and EAP-based inter-domain authentication
protocols.
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Table 2.1: Comparison of authentication approaches in wireless networks
Type of Login or # of Authentication Backhaul Neighbor
Protocol Authentication Handover? Hopsa Sever Overheadb Graph
Involved? Required?
EAP-TLS Multi-hop Login Multiple Yes 9 No
[43, 44]
IAPP [45, 46] Multi-hop Handover Multiple Yes 2 No
PANA [36] Multi-hop Login Multiple Yes 7 No
Mobile IP Multi-hop Handover Multiple Yes 2 No
[37, 38, 39]
LAP Certificate Login One No 0 No
(Chapter 3)
802.11i Pro-active Handover Multiple Yes n No
handover [35]
Mish et al. Pro-active Handover Multiple Yes max 3n Yes
[40]
Park et al. Pro-active Handover Multiple Yes 2n + 1 Yes
[41]
Kassab et al. Ticket-based Handover Multiple Yes n + 1 Yes
[34]
Anmin Fu [49] Ticket-based Handover Multiple Yes n No
HAP Certificate Handover One No 0 No
(Chapter 3)
a Number of hops between a client and the authenticator.
b Number of messages exchanged between MAPs and the authentication server to prepare for an
intra-network handover.
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2.6.3.1 3GPP Authentication and Key Agreement Protocols
The universal mobile telecommunication system (UMTS) is a prominent standard in 3G
wireless systems. UMTS adopts an enhanced authentication and key agreement from the
third-generation partnership project (3GPP), also referred to as 3GPP AKA [57]. 3GPP
AKA greatly enhances the authentication framework of the global system for mobile
communications (GSM) system with some added security features such as the integrity
check feature and strong encryption algorithms.
In the 3GPP AKA protocol, besides authenticating each other, a user and a network
agree on the cipher and integrity keys, CK and IK, respectively. These keys are derived
from the user’s secret keyK and revealing them may disclose information about the user’s
secret key. Therefore, if there exists any vulnerability in the 3GPP AKA protocol, the
subscriber’s key K may be compromised.
The two main design goals of 3GPP AKA are mutual authentication between a user
and a foreign network, and the establishment of a new pair of cipher and integrity keys
(CK and IK) after a successful mutual authentication. Since CK and IK are derived
from the user’s secret key K, the user’s secret key may be compromised if CK and IK
are known to other users. Hence, a secure connection, via mutual authentication, needs
to be established between a user and a foreign network before session keys (CK and IK)
can be exchanged. The user maintains a counter SQNMS to verify the freshness of CK
and IK. So does the home network using a counter SQNHN .
Figure 2.24 illustrates the steps of the 3GPP AKA protocol.
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• A user MS sends a request including its ID IMSI to a foreign network FN via the
home network HN . The foreign network FN identifies user MS by its ID IMSI,
and then sends the authentication data request including the user’s ID IMSI to
the home network HN .
• Upon the receipt of the authentication data request, the home network sends an
authentication data response back to the foreign network FN that contains an
ordered array of n authentication vectors AV (1...n). An authentication vector is a
concatenation of the following fields/variables: RAND, XRES, CK, IK, and AUTN.
The generation of an authentication vector is shown in Figure 2.25.
• The foreign network FN selects the next unused authentication vector from the
ordered array of AVs in its database. FN then sends the random challenge RAND
and the authentication token AUTN extracted from the AV to the user MS.
• MS computes the anonymity key AK as AK = f5(K,RAND), where K is the
user’s secret. MS also computes the sequence number SQN as SQN = (SQN ⊕
AK)⊕AK.
– If SQN 6= (SQN ⊕ AK) ⊕ AK, user MS sends a user authentication reject
message to FN and aborts the procedure.
– If SQN = (SQN ⊕AK)⊕AK, user MS verifies if the received SQN is in the
correct range.
∗ If SQN >= SQNMS , the authentication of the FN is successful. User
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MS computes XRES and sends it to foreign network FN after verifying
that the received SQN is in the correct range, (e.g., SQN is in the range
of 1 to n).
∗ If SQN < SQNMS , MS sends a synchronization failure message to FN .
After receiving the synchronization failure message from the MS, FN
sends a message to the home network HN , which contains RAND and
AUTN. The home network HN then checks if the SQNHN is indeed out
of range. If so, it sets its own SQN to that of the received SQNMS and
generates a new batch of AVs which are sent back to the FN . After re-
ceiving the new batch of AVs the FN deletes the old ones and replaces
them with the new AVs.
FN compares the received XRES sent from MS with the one in the AV. If they
match, the authentication of MS is successful. After successfully authenticating
each other, MS and FN obtains CK and IK from the AV.
An adaptive protocol for authentication and key agreement (AP-AKA) [50] was de-
veloped based on the framework of 3GPP AKA to enhance the security of the 3GPP
AKA. Both 3GPP AKA and AP-AKA follow the home-foreign-domain model and pro-
vide enhancement to achieve mutual authentication. Compared to 3GPP AKA, the home
network HN in AP-AKA does not maintain a counter for each user. This modification
eliminates the operational overhead of re-synchronization. The analysis in [50] shows
that 3GPP AKA is weak towards a special case of redirection attacks while AP-AKA is
76
Figure 2.24: 3GPP AKA
robust against it. However, in AP-AKA the user’s traffic redirection via a virtual relay
to a neighboring network could cause the user to be charged more than usual because the
location of the user has been virtually changed. Also, AP-AKA introduces two additional
message exchanges between a user and a foreign network, which adds some signaling cost.
The first step of the AP-AKA is not integrity protected, so it could be forged. Also, a
man-in-the-middle attack can be executed on AP-AKA while inter-networking with a
GSM, because the foreign network initiates the AKA procedure without an integrity
check.
2.6.3.2 Authentication Protocols for Secure Roaming Service in GLOMONET
GLOBAL mobility network (GLOMONET) [58], such as GSM and CDMA (code division
multiple access) networks, offers effective global roaming service for a legitimate user be-
tween a home network and a visited network. However, it also increases the possibility of
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Figure 2.25: Generation of authentication vectors
78
illegal access from malicious intruders. Several authentication protocols [9, 58, 59, 60] for
global roaming services have been developed in the GLOMONET. Suzuki et al developed
an authentication protocol for roaming services [58]. They introduced a challenge/re-
sponse interactive authentication mechanism with a symmetric cryptosystem to construct
their authentication protocol. Buttyan et al. pointed out some potential attacks to the
authentication protocol in [58], and further proposed an improved protocol and made it
resistant against the presented attacks [59]. Subsequently, Hwang et al. [60] introduced
a new self-encryption mechanism to simplify the protocol in [59].
Two protocols proposed in [9] further simplify the authentication protocols proposed
in [60] and aim at providing identity anonymity for roaming users in the GLOMONET
environment.
The first protocol in [9] hides the real user’s identity via a prearranged pseudonym
identity PID based on the secret splitting principle [61]. Secret splitting is a type of
information-hidden technique that divides a message into pieces. Each piece by itself
has no meaning, but when these pieces are put together, the original message can be
restored. In this protocol, a foreign network F authenticates a roaming user M through
M ’s home network H. After the authentication, an authentication key is established
between M and F . In subsequent communications, F can directly authenticate M by
using the authentication key rather than authenticating it through H. The proposed
protocol uses a symmetric-key algorithm and can be applied when a foreign network and
a home network have a pre-established shared secret.
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The second protocol in [9] hides the real user’s identity by encrypting the real identity
with a shared key based on a self-certified scheme [62]. This protocol considers home
network H as a temporary trusted third party (TTY) for roaming services. When M
visits F , both of them initialize a registration procedure withH (F acts as an access agent
forM). IfM and F successfully register with H, they both obtain a witness from H, and
the trust relations between M and F are established. In subsequent communications, M
can directly negotiate a session key with F without accessing H. The protocol uses a
public-key algorithm and can be applied when a foreign network and a home network do
not have a pre-established shared secret.
All of these authentication protocols are based on a home-foreign-domain model,
which requires multi-hop wireless communications to a client’s home network and results
in longer delays for inter-network handovers.
2.6.3.3 Key Distribution Approach for Inter-network Handovers in Hetero-
geneous Wireless Networks
For a seamless handover, keys must be available at the target network at the time of the
handover. Non-cellular wireless access networks, such as wireless mesh networks, do not
have a dedicated handover infrastructure. As a result, no special entities are available to
perform key distributions.
Hoeper [51] proposed a key distribution approach for inter-network handovers in het-
erogeneous wireless networks. A heterogeneous wireless network consists of devices using
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different underlying radio access technologies such as Wi-Fi, 3G, or 4G. Suppose a client
C moves from a router S of network A to a router T of network B, where network A and
B have roaming agreements for supporting inter-network handovers. Client C and net-
work B need to establish a shared secret key before C moves to B. Authentication server
ASA of network A and authentication server ASB of network B serve as key distributors.
Multi-hop wireless communications are required between router S and authentication
server ASA in network A, and also between router T and authentication server ASB in
network B.
Suppose C is moving from router S of network A to router T of network B. Key
distribution protocols are triggered by client C’s handover request R in two ways as
shown in Figure 2.26. In scenario 1, a shared key K is distributed through C’s currently
connected router S. In this case, S forwards C’s request R to its authentication server
ASA for moving to network B. Upon receiving the request, ASA generates a key K and
sends it to ASB. ASB then forwards key K to T . ASA also sends key K to C through S.
Both C and target router T then have a shared key K. In scenario 2, a shared key K is
distributed through C’s target router T . In this case, C sends a key distribution request
R to T , which forwards the request R to its key distributor ASB. ASB then requests key
K from ASA who returns key K to T .
This key distribution solution requires server access during a handover process. It
imposes communication delays and additional network traffic which significantly slows
down the handover process.
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Figure 2.26: An example of key distribution methods proposed by Hoeper
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2.6.3.4 EAP-based Inter-domain Authentication Protocols
We discuss two inter-domain authentication protocols that uses the extensible authen-
tication protocol (EAP) framework, namely, the one-time key secure network protocol
(ONSP) [63] and the inter-domain authentication protocol proposed by Heba K. Aslan
in [53].
The one-time key secure network protocol (ONSP) [63] proposed for WiFi (802.11)
networks is a modified version of the Kerberos authentication protocol within the exist-
ing extensible authentication protocol (EAP) framework. ONSP provides inter-domain
authentication to a user that already has a security association with the home domain.
ONSP requires a key distribution center (KDC) to manage the authentication between
users and servers.
For a very large network, it is impractical to register all the users in a single domain.
In ONSP, users and servers register with their own KDCs in a hierarchical structure.
Each node in the hierarchy represents a domain, and a parent domains administers all its
child domains. Each domain has one KDC to manage the authentication of its users and
servers. Every KDC shares a different secret key with each descendant KDC to execute
inter-domain authentication. As a result, the root KDC has to save the keys shared with
all descendant KDCs, one key per KDC.
Figure 2.27 illustrates the authentication flow in ONSP for an inter-domain authen-
tication process.
1. A user UX roaming from domain X wants to access a server SY in a foreign domain
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Figure 2.27: The ONSP inter-domain authentication process
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Y . The user UX sends an authentication request message AURQUX to the server
SY .
2. SY generates an authentication request AURQSY , and sends AURQSY and the
user’s authentication request AURQUX to the KDC of domain Y, KDCY .
3. KDCY creates an authentication request AURQKDCY , forwards the user’s authen-
tication request AURQUX and KDCY ’s authentication request AURQKDCY to key
distribute center KDCR, the parent KDC of KDCX and KDCY .
4. KDCR generates an authentication request AUFWKDCX which contains the user’s
authentication request AURQUX , a new user identity UY , a new temporary user
key KUY and a new session key KSS .KDCR encrypts the authentication request
AUFWKDCX using a key KKDCX shared by KDCR and KDCX . In addition,
KDCR creates an authentication response AURSKDCY to KDCY after verifying
KDCY ’s authentication request AURQKDCY . KDCR then sends the authentica-
tion request AUFWKDCX and the authentication response AURSKDCY to KDCX .
5. KDCX decrypts the authentication request AUFWKDCX using the shared key
KKDCX to obtain UY , KUY and KSS . KDCX then generates an authentication
response AURSUX for the user. KDCX sends two authentication responses to
KDCY : one is the authentication response AURSKDCY for KDCY from KDCR;
the other is the authentication response AURSUX for UX from KDCX .
6. After verifying the authentication response AURSKDCY from KDCR, KDCY is
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considered to successfully authenticate KDCR. KDCY obtains the user identity
UY and temporary key KUY generated by KDCR. KDCY then generates a new
session identity SID and an authentication response AURSSY to server SY . KDCY
sends to server SY the new session identity SID and two authentication responses:
one is the authentication response AURSUX from KDCX to the user, and the other
is the authentication response AURSSY from KDY to SY .
7. The server SY extracts the session key KSS from the authentication response
AURSSY of KDCY . SY creates a nonce NNSY and then generates a challenge
CHSY using KSS . SY also generates a service ticket STSY for the user using KSS .
SY sends to the user the challenge CHSY , the service ticket STSY , and the authen-
tication response AURSUX of KDCX .
8. The user UX obtains the session key KSS and the new identity UY from the au-
thentication response AURSUX . UX creates a response RESSY to CHSY with the
nonce NNSY after decrypting CHSY using key KSS . In addition, the user generates
a temporary authenticator AUY to be used for subsequent authentication.
In order to allow a user to access service on a foreign server SY , several authenti-
cation rounds are required to be performed, such as between the nearest common KDC
and the foreign KDC, between the previously visited KDC and the user, between the
foreign KDC and the foreign server, and between the foreign server and the user. Thus,
ONSP inter-domain authentication suffers from high authentication delay due to multiple
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authentications performed between several network entities.
The inter-domain authentication protocol proposed in [53] also uses the EAP protocol
for authentication and key distribution. The proposed protocol is based on the use of hash
functions and the Diffie-Hellman algorithm to distributes authentication keys between
mobile stations and base stations. In order to avoid the domino effect, the Diffie-Hellman
components are distributed instead of the authentication keys themselves. However, the
use of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm increases the authentication latency due to expensive
exponentiation and modular arithmetic operations that both the MS and the BS have to
perform. Similar to ONSP [63], an authentication server is involved in the authentication
process to accept a user’s handover request.
Figure 2.28: Inter-domain handover authentication process
Figure 2.28 illustrates the steps of the inter-domain handover authentication protocol.
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• When a mobile station (MS) moves from one base station (BS) to anther in a
different region, it sends to the authentication server (AS) a request containing
its identity IMS , the identity of the target base station IBS , and a cipher-based
message authentication code (CMAC) value of the message computed using a master
session key (MSK). A master session key is shared by a mobile station and the
authentication server. A MSK is unique for each mobile station.
• The MS and the AS calculate a hash value H(MSK, IGW ) using the MSK and the
identity of the foreign network gateway (IGW ). The AS forwards the hashed value
H(MSK, IGW ) to the GW.
• The MS and the GW compute a temporary CMAC key TCK = H(H(MSK, IGW ), IBS).
The GW then forwards the temporary key TCK to the BS.
• The BS sends to the MS a message {TBS , IBS , am mod p, CMAC(TCK)}, which
contains a timestamp TBS , the identity of BS (IBS), its Diffie-Hellman component
am mod p, where m is the Diffie-Hellman secret of the BS, and a CMAC value
computed using TCK. After receiving the message, the MS verifies the freshness
of the message using TBS , and then uses TCK to validate the CMAC value. If the
computed CMAC value is same as the one in the massage, the MS is considered to
successfully authenticate the BS.
• The MS sends to the BS a message {TMS , IMS , ay mod p, CMAC(TCK)} contain-
ing a timestamp TMS , its identity IMS , its Diffie-Hellman component a
y mod p,
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where y is the Diffie-Hellman secret of the MS, and a CMAC value computed using
TCK. The BS is considered to successfully authenticate the MS if the timestamp
TMS is valid, and the computed CMAC value CMAC(TCK) matches the MAC
value the BS previously sent to the MS. Both the MS and the BS then calculate
the authentication key AK = aym mod p, which will be used to derive the traffic
encryption key for subsequent communications.
All the protocols discussed above require the involvement of a client’s home network
or a third party entity during the handover. Consider the scenario in Figure 2.29 where a
client roams from WMNA to WMNB. If using one of the above authentication and key
distribution schemes in WMNs, a client needs to communicate with its home network or
a third party entity via the wired backhaul ofWMNB. The messages exchanged between
the client and the wired backhaul of WMNB are via multi-hop wireless communications.
As the number of wireless hops increases from one to five, the delay of a message between
the routers increases from 0.15 seconds to 0.8 seconds [7]. Since the authentication process
involves several messages, the handover latency may be several seconds long. The latency
of multi-hop wireless communications during the inter-network handover process may
result in longer delay, thus leading to potential service disruptions. This limitation of
the above protocols motivates us to propose a new authentication and key distribution
solution for fast inter-network handovers.
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 Figure 2.29: Inter-network handover scenario
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2.7 Group Key Management
Group key management (GKM) refers to the actions taken to update and distribute
the group key upon members joining and leaving a multicast group. When an existing
member leaves (or a new member joins) the multicast group, the group key must be
updated accordingly to achieve forward secrecy (or backward secrecy). Forward secrecy
ensures that after an existing member leaves the group, he/she will not have access to
future keys. Backward secrecy ensures that after a new member joins the group, he/she
will not have access to past keys.
Existing work on GKM has been proposed for group communications at the applica-
tion layer. To the best of our knowledge, no work has addressed the issue of GKM at
the data link layer for multicast/broadcast. (We often use the term “data link” instead
of “medium access control” in this dissertation because the former is shorter, and the
abbreviation “MAC” is used to denote ”message authentication code”.) In this section,
we first review existing work on GKM at the application layer. We then discuss the
applicability of the reviewed works to GKM at the data link layer in WMNs.
GKM for groups of small to medium sizes can be classified into two approaches:
centralized and contributory.
2.7.1 Centralized GKM
In the centralized approach [13, 14, 64, 65, 66, 118, 121, 122, 123, 124], a central key
server (CKS) is responsible for generating, updating and distributing the group key of a
91
multicast group. Every time a member joins (leaves) the group, the CKS generates and
distributes a new group key to the whole group in order to ensure backward (forward)
secrecy. For the purpose of key distribution, each member i of the group shares a secret
key ki with the CKS.
The simplest key distribution mechanism is based on a flat structure [122, 123, 124].
When a new member u joins the group, the CKS generates a new group key K ′. It then
encrypts the new group key K ′ using the current group key K and sends the encrypted
message to the whole group. The current members of the group will decrypt the message
using the current group key K to obtain the new group key K ′. Because the new member
u does not know the current group key K, the CKS has to encrypt the new group key
K ′ using the secret key ku it shares with the new member u, and sends the encrypted
message to u. Member u will decrypt the message using key ku to obtain the new group
key K ′.
When a member v leaves a group, the CKS generates a new group key K ′′. Unlike
the above GKM procedure for a join operation, a leave operation does not allow the
CKS to encrypt the new group key K ′′ using the current group key K and then send
the encrypted message to the whole group. If the CKS did, the leaving member v would
know the new group key K ′′ since v knows the current group key K; that would violate
the forward secrecy requirement. Therefore, the CKS has to encrypt the new group key
K ′′ using each member i’s individual shared key ki (excluding member v), resulting in
O(n) encrypted messages, where n is the number of members in the multicast group. As
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the group size becomes large, GKM based on the flat structure is not scalable, especially
when members leave the group often.
To improve the scalability of GKM for large groups, logical key trees have been used
in many GKM algorithms [13, 14, 64, 65, 66, 118, 121]. Thanks to the use of logical key
trees, the number of encrypted messages required for a leave operation that the CKS has
to send is reduced from O(n) to O(logn). A detailed description of the logical key tree
GKM approach can be found in Section 5.1. Representatives of GKM algorithms in this
category are the logical key hierarchy (LKH) [13] and one-way function tree (OFT) [14]
algorithms, which will be described in detail in Sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, respectively.
2.7.2 Contributory GKM
The centralized GKM approach assumes that there is a secure channel between each
member and the CKS so that they can establish a shared key before GKM operations
start. In some types of networks such as mobile ad hoc networks or sensor networks,
such pre-established secure channels are not readily available. This limitation of these
networks calls for a different approach to GKM called contributory GKM.
In contrast to the centralized GKM approach, the contributory GKM approach does
not use a central key server. Instead, each group member contributes an equal share to
the common group key (which is computed as a function of all members’ contributions).
Figure 2.30 shows an example of contributory GKM. Four members contribute four keys,
K1, K2, K3 and K4. The group key K is a function of the four members’ keys: K =
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f(K1,K2,K3,K4).
Figure 2.30: An example of a contributory approach
Due to the lack of pre-established secure channels, many GKM algorithms proposed
for wireless ad-hoc networks fall into this category [127, 128, 129, 130].
Existing contributory GKM are generally based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
algorithm [118]. The Diffie-Hellman algorithm involves several exponentiation opera-
tions, which can be computationally expensive to be executed on resource-constrained
mobile devices. (This high computational cost is a trade-off for the unavailability of
pre-established secure communication channels.)
For very large multicast groups distributed over vast geographical areas, centralized
and contributory GKM schemes may not be able to handle such groups. In this case,
decentralized GKM algorithms should be used instead.
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2.7.3 Decentralized GKM
Using the decentralized approach [67, 68, 119, 120, 125, 126], a multicast group is organized
into smaller subgroups, each having its own subgroup key. Each subgroup is managed by
a subgroup controller which is in charge of key computation and distribution within its
subgroup. Subgroup controllers and subgroups can exist on multiple levels, and lower-
level subgroup controllers are clients of higher-level subgroup controllers. The absence of
a general group key means membership changes in a subgroup are treated locally. Thus,
a membership change impacts only the subgroup of the member: only the subgroup
key needs to be updated, independently of the keys of the other subgroups. Different
subgroups may use different GKM protocols. This approach can allow more entities to
fail before the whole group is affected, minimizing the problem of concentrating the work
on a single centralized key server. Thus, it reduces the risk of total system failure.
Figure 2.31 illustrates a decentralized GKM architecture with six subgroups. Each of
subgroups has its own subgroup key. A main group controller maintains control of the top-
level subgroup. There are no clients in the top-level subgroup, only the group controller
and its subgroup controllers being part of this subgroup. As shown in Figure 2.31, GC,
SGC2, SGC3 and GSC4 form the top-level subgroup. GC generates a subgroup key K1,
encrypts it with each subgroup controller’s individual key and sends to SGC2, SGC3
and GSC4. The subgroup controller (e.g., SGC2, SGC3, GSC4) then decrypts it, re-
encrypts it with its own subgroup key (e.g., K2, K3, K4), and then multicasts it to its
own subgroup. When a membership change occurs in a subgroup, only that subgroup
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Figure 2.31: An example of a decentralized architecture
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involved in a rekeying process. For example, when member M1 or M2 leaves subgroup 5,
only the subgroup K5 needs to be updated. The subgroup controller SGC5 generates a
new subgroup key K ′5 and distributes to the members in the subgroup 5. Other subgroup
keys are not affected by the membership changes of the subgroup 5.
Using this approach, sending data is not as simple as multicasting the data to the
group encrypted with a subgroup key because such a multicast will only reach the local
subgroup. Two methods can be used for data transmission. We use Figure 2.31 as an
example to illustrate the two data transmission methods.
The first method is simple and completely transparent to a sender.
• The source encrypts a multicast packet p using the group key K1 as EK1(p) and
multicasts the encrypted packet EK1(p) to SGC2, SGC3 and GSC4.
• Subgroup key controllers SGC2, SGC3 and GSC4 decrypt the packet EK1(p) using
key K1, and re-encrypt the multicast packet p with the corresponding subgroup
keys as EK2(p), EK3(p) and EK4(p), respectively. Each subgroup controller then
multicasts its encrypted message to its own subgroup.
• Members (e.g.,M5,M6,M7,M8) in subgroup 4 decrypt the encrypted packet EK4(p)
using subgroup key K4 to obtain the multicast packet p.
• Subgroup controllers SGC5 and SGC6 are also members of subgroup 4. After
decrypting the encrypted message EK4(p) using subgroup key K4, SGC5 and SGC6
re-encrypt the multicast packet p using subgroup keys K5 and K6 as EK5(p) and
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EK6(p), respectively.
• Subgroup controller SGC5 then multicasts EK5(p) to subgroup 5. Members in
subgroup 5 decrypts message EK5(p) using subgroup key K5 to obtain the multicast
packet p. (Similar operations are performed in subgroup 6.)
In the first method, to decrypt and re-encrypt multicast data would require an enor-
mous amount of computational overhead on subgroup controllers.
In the second method, the source generates a random number as a data encryption key
(DEK) on a per-transmission basis (i.e., each multicast packet will be encrypted with a
different DEK). The sender uses a DEK to encrypt the multicast packet p as EDEK(p). In
order to decrypt the encrypted message EDEK(p), members need to know the DEK. The
source uses the first method to encrypt and distribute the DEK to all group members along
with the encrypted packet EDEK(p). Subgroup controllers only need to forward each
encrypted multicast packet EDEK(p) to members without decrypting and re-encrypting
the multicast packet. In this method, the computational cost for decrypting and re-
encrypting a multicast packet is reduced to the cost for decrypting and re-encrypting a
randomly generated number, the DEK.
The decentralized architecture ensures scalability for GKM in very large scale networks
such as cellular wireless network, WiMax, and 4G systems, where the members of a group
may be distributed over different and vast geographical areas.
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2.7.4 Applicability to GKM at the Data Link Layer
Among the above GKM approaches, the centralized approach is the most efficient and
cost-effective for GKM at the data link layer in WMNs for the following reasons. First,
there already exists a central controller that can generate and distribute the group key
to the members, which is the access point of a basic service set. Second, the members of
the group − the mobile devices connected to the access point − are physically located
close to the central controller. Thus, there is no need for a decentralized scheme. Third,
there is no need to use the contributory approach because there already exists a secure
communication channel between the access point and each mobile device. The secure
channel is provided by a shared key between the access point and and each device called
a pairwise transient key (PTK) in IEEE 802.11 standards [35]. The PTK is generated
through the 4-way handshake protocol of the IEEE 802.11i standard, and is used to
encrypt unicast data between a mobile device and an access point.
As a result, we use the centralized approach for GKM at the data link layer in WMNs.
Instead of the flat structure used in IEEE 802.11 GKM, we use the logical key tree
structure for GKM at the data link layer in order to reduce the rekeying latency from
O(n) to O(logn).
2.8 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have reviewed wireless communications, cryptography, security threats,
security models and trust management in wireless networks, and IEEE 802.11i security
99
standard. We present a literature review of existing security protocols for intra-network
and inter-network handovers, as well as group key management schemes for fast rekeying
implementation.
100
Chapter 3
Efficient Authentication for Fast
Intra-Network Handovers in a
Wireless Mesh Network
Authentication is essential in any service-oriented communication networks to identify
and reject any unauthorized network access. Designs and implementations of authenti-
cation protocols, or any security protocols in general, for WMNs are challenging due to
bandwidth-limited wireless channels; reduced throughput caused by wireless multi-hop
routing [55]; vulnerable shared broadcast medium; distributed network architectures and
operations; and resource-constrained mobile devices (e.g., cellular phones, PDAs). On
the other hand, clients’ mobility requires efficient, fast yet secure handover mechanisms.
Existing authentication protocols employed for wireless networks such as those in
IEEE 802.11i and 802.11s standards do not meet the above needs and challenges. For
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instance, the authentication protocol in IEEE 802.11i is a centralized scheme (intended
for use in wireless local area networks) and requires an authentication server, which
is not efficient for WMNs. First, multi-hop routing between an access point and the
authentication server via wireless links would result in long delay, low reliability and thus
potential service interruption. Second, a central authentication server impedes distributed
operations and thus affects scalability. The IEEE 802.11s standard [43] defined for wireless
mesh networks uses the same the same security architecture as IEEE 802.11i, and hence
inherits the above drawbacks of IEEE 802.11i. Moreover, the current version of the
IEEE 802.11s standard does not specify any mechanism to support fast handovers for
mobile clients running real-time applications such as voice over IP (VoIP), newscast and
tele-conferencing.
Our work in this chapter contributes towards extending the IEEE 802.11s standards
to support fast handovers for mobile clients. In particular, we focus on fast authentica-
tion during the handover process as well as during the initial login time. We propose a
new trust model and certificates for a WMN, based upon which our proposed authen-
tication protocols are designed. Our proposed certificate-based authentication protocols
are resource-efficient and resilient to attacks. No central authentication server is needed.
Instead, mobile clients and mesh access points directly authenticate each other, avoiding
wireless multi-hop communications. Fast authentication from one MAP to another in the
same network during the handover process is supported using certificates. Performance
analysis and simulation results show that our login authentication protocol improves the
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latency of 802.11s login authentication, and our handover authentication protocol sup-
ports fast authentication during the handover process.
In Section 3.1, we describe the proposed certificates and trust model for intra-network
handovers in detail. In Section 3.2, we present our login and handover authentication
protocols. We discuss the security analysis in Section 3.3. We present the performance
evaluations of the proposed protocols in Section 3.4. We summarize this chapter in
Section 3.5.
3.1 The Proposed Trust Model and Certificates for Intra-network Han-
dovers
In this section, we present a trust model and certificates upon which our authentication
protocols are built. We describe in detail the different types of certificates used in the
proposed authentication protocols to support fast authentication during the handover
process in a WMN.
3.1.1 The Proposed Trust Model
We propose a trust model built upon the existing WMN architecture to offer mobile
clients’ seamless, fast handovers from one MAP to another in the same network.
Trust relationships among entities in aWMN are the basis for designing authentication
protocols for intra-network handovers. The proposed trust model (shown in Figure 3.1)
is built upon the concept of “certificate” and “certificate agent”. A certificate is used to
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establish the trust relationships among various entities in WMNs. A certificate agent is
a trusted third party who issues and manages various types of certificates and trusted by
the entities in a mesh network. A certificate agent’s role can be compared to public-key
certificate authorities or credit card issuers.
Following are the trust relationships among the network entities shown in Figure 3.1:
(1) certificate agent − client: The mutual trust is based on the public key certificates
issued by the certificate authority and is established when a client applies for a client
certificate from a certificate agent.
(2) certificate agent − mesh access points (MAPs): The mutual trust between a MAP
and its certificate agent is established via the public key certificates issued by a public
certificate authority (e.g., Comodo, Symantec, Godaddy, GlobeSign). The trust is
established when a MAP applies for a MAP certificate from a certificate agent.
(3) MAP − client: The mutual trust relationship between a client and its home MAP
is established via their respective client certificate and MAP certificate, which are
described in Sections 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2.
(4) MAP − MAP: Any two neighboring MAPs trust each other via their MAP certifi-
cates. This trust allows a client to roam among different MAPs in a mesh network.
Obtaining a client certificate or a MAP certificate is done offline before a client joins a
network, and is not part of the authentication process. Thus, the public key operations for
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Figure 3.1: Trust model of a WMN
obtaining certificates do not affect the efficiency of our authentication protocols presented
in Section 3.2.
3.1.2 Certificates Used in the Proposed Authentication Protocols
Certificates are issued and managed by certificate agents who are trusted by all entities of
WMNs to perform such tasks. There can be several certificate agents serving a network.
Certificates are used to establish the trust between a certificate agent and a MAP, a
certificate agent and a client, a MAP and a client, and between a MAP and another
MAP (see Figure 3.1). The lifetime of a certificate is determined by its issuer’s policy.
Three types of certificates are used in our authentication protocols: client certificate,
MAP certificate, and intra-network transfer certificate. They are needed for mutual
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authentication between a client and a MAP when the client logs in to the network, or
roams to another MAP in a single WMN.
We will use the notations listed in Table 3.1 throughout the chapter to facilitate the
discussions.
3.1.2.1 Client Certificates
A client applies for a client certificate from a certificate agent. The trust between a client
and a certificate agent is established through their public key certificates issued by a
central authority.
Following is the structure of a client certificate:
TC = {IC , IA, τexp, PC , SigA}
• TC : client certificate issued by certificate agent A whose ID is IA.
• IC : ID of the client who has been given this certificate.
• IA: ID of the certificate agent who issued the certificate TC .
• τexp: expiry date and time of certificate TC . The certificate agent will re-issue a
new certificate for the client if the certificate has expired.
• PC : public key of client IC , which is used by a MAP to verify the signature signed
by the client in the login authentication protocol (see Section 3.2.1). The certificate
agent obtains the public key from the client’s public key certificate. We assume that
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Table 3.1: Notations
Notation Description
C Client
R Mesh access point (MAP)
A Certificate agent
Ix ID of entity x
ΘC Intra-network transfer certificate issued to a client
Px Public key issued to x
Tx Certificate issued to x
τexp Expiry date and time of a certificate
Nx A nonce generated by x
Sigx Digital signature of entity x
MACalg Type of MAC algorithm
EPx(m) Encryption of message, m using x’s public key
DPx(m) decryption of message, m using x’s public key
EKMAC (m) Encryption of message, m using MAC key KMAC
KMAC The key used to produce a message authentication code
(Section 3.1.2.3)
Vk(m) Message authentication code (MAC) resulting from the application
of a MAC algorithm and a MAC key k on a message m
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the agent is a trusted party and has access to public key certificates of all clients
and MAPs.
• SigA: digital signature of certificate agent IA, which gives a recipient reason to
believe that the certificate was created by certificate agent IA, and that it was not
altered in any way.
3.1.2.2 MAP Certificates
The operator of a mesh network applies for MAP certificates, one per MAP, and dis-
tributes them to the MAPs in the network. The operator is also responsible for request-
ing and distributing a new MAP certificate before the current MAP certificate expires.
Following is the structure of a MAP certificate:
TR = {IR, IA, τexp, PR, SigA}
• TR: MAP certificate issued by certificate agent A whose ID is IA.
• IR: ID of the MAP that is given this certificate.
• IA: ID of the certificate agent who issued certificate TR to MAP R.
• τexp: expiry date and time of certificate TR. The certificate agent will re-issue a
new certificate for the MAP once the current certificate expires.
• PR: public key of MAP R, which will be used by clients to verify the signature of
MAP R in messages R sends. The certificate agent obtains the public key from the
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MAP’s public key certificate.
• SigA: digital signature of certificate agent IA.
3.1.2.3 Intra-network Transfer Certificates
An intra-network transfer certificate is used to establish the trust relationship between
a MAP and a client when a client roams from one MAP to another in a single WMN.
When a client C first logs into the network, it sends its client certificate to a nearby
MAP M1, which will authenticate the client. If authentication succeeds, M1 will issue
to C an intra-network transfer certificate and become the home MAP of C. (We borrow
the terminology from mobile IP.) When C roams to a foreign MAP M2, it submits the
certificate to M2 for authentication. The intra-network transfer certificate proves to the
foreign MAP that client C has been successfully authenticated by its home MAP.
The structure of an intra-network transfer certificate ΘC is as follows:
ΘC = {µ, VKMAC (µ)}, where
µ = {Icert, IR, IC , PC , τexp,MACalg}
Message µ stores the information of the client and home MAP as follows:
• Icert: ID of the intra-network transfer certificate. The combination of Icert, IR and
IC uniquely identifies a transfer certificate in the network.
• IR: ID of the MAP who issues this intra-network transfer certificate.
• IC : ID of the client who owns this intra-network transfer certificate.
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• PC : public key of the client. The client’s home MAP obtains the client’s public key
from C’s client certificate.
• τexp: expiry date and time of this certificate.
• MACalg: message authentication code algorithm. (The inclusion of the type of
MAC algorithm in an intra-network transfer certificate is optional. It is not required
if the parties agree on an algorithm in advance.)
We now discuss about the value VKMAC (µ) stored in the intra-network transfer cer-
tificate and the use of the MAC algorithm. During the authentication between client
C and its home MAP M1 (step (1) in Figure 3.2), they exchange two partial keys (also
called nonces1) NC1 and NR1 (see Section 3.2.1 for details of the authentication proce-
dure). They will both then compute a shared key KMAC = NC1||NR1, where || denotes a
concatenation. M1 subsequently applies the MAC algorithm and key KMAC to message
µ to produce a MAC value VKMAC (µ), which will protect message µ, and thus the intra-
network transfer certificate against forgery and unauthorized modifications. M1 combines
message µ and VKMAC (µ) to form the certificate to be sent to C.
M1 also sends a message r = {Icert, IR, IC ,KMAC} to M2, which contains the ID of
this intra-network transfer certificate, M1’s ID IR, C’s ID IC and key KMAC to be used
with this intra-network transfer certificate. The combination of Icert, IR and IC is used
to identify the association of a key KMAC with the corresponding intra-network transfer
1Such a partial key is used only once and cannot be re-used by the party that created it in the first
place. In this article, we call these partial keys nonces to simplify the presentation.
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certificate.
When client C moves into contact with a foreign MAP (e.g. M2) to prepare for a
handover to the new MAP, C submits the intra-network transfer certificate issued by M1
to the foreign MAP (e.g. M2) for authentication (step (3) in Figure 3.2).
In order to allow a foreign MAP (e.g. M2) to process the intra-network transfer
certificate and authenticate C, the home MAP M1 is required to securely send the key
KMAC = NC1||NR1 to the foreign MAP (e.g. M2) in advance. (We describe in Sec-
tion 3.2.2 how to deliver key KMAC from the home MAP to any of its neighbor in a
timely, secure, and efficient manner.)
The foreign MAP (e.g. M2) will use key KMAC and the MAC algorithm to verify the
authenticity and data integrity of the intra-network transfer certificate ΘC submitted by
client C. (M2 will also verify the identity of C in the handover authentication protocol
described in Section 3.2.2, and illustrated by steps (4) and (5) in Figure 3.2.)
It should be noted that each certificate has its own expiration date. The synchro-
nization of certificate updates follows the timing synchronization function of the 802.11s
standard [72]. The lifetime of a key KMAC is the same as that of the intra-network
transfer certificate associated with it. A foreign MAP in the network can re-issue a new
intra-network transfer certificate for the certificate owner if the current intra-network
transfer certificate is about to expire.
Readers may note that the formats of the above certificates are similar to that of
X.509 certificates. However, our certificates contain extra information that cannot be
111
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Information exchange between a client and MAPs
accommodated by the X.509 format, e.g., client ID in a client certificate, MAP ID in a
MAP certificate, and the MAC value in an intra-network transfer certificate.
3.2 The Proposed Authentication Protocols
Built upon the above proposed trust model and certificates, we propose two authentication
protocols, one for the initial login into a network and the other for subsequent roaming
(handovers). Our authentication protocols follow a key hierarchical structure similar
to that of IEEE 802.11i [35]. That is, a pairwise master key (PMK) is created during
the authentication process, and a pairwise transient key (PTK) and a group transient
key (GTK) are derived from the PMK subsequently. The two parties involved in the
authentication will used the PTK for point-to-point communications and the GTK for
group communications (broadcast, multicast) between them.
Public key operations are computationally intensive. Mobile devices, on the other
hand, have limited computing capability and power resources. Therefore, our design of
the proposed authentication protocols aim to minimize:
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• the number of message exchanges between a mobile client and MAPs, or the au-
thentication server; thus minimizing the authentication latency and resource con-
sumption by the mobile device.
• the number of public key operations performed by mobile devices; thus minimizing
resource consumption by mobile devices.
In addition, we aim to minimize the number of multi-hop communications, thus min-
imizing the authentication latency and traffic in the backhaul network. At the same
time, we ensure that the protocols are secure and scalable. Note that MAPs are not
computationally constrained and typically have constant power supplies; thus we are not
concerned about them regarding the computation power required for performing public
key operations.
3.2.1 The Login Authentication Protocol (LAP)
The trust between a client and a MAP is established via the client certificate and the
MAP certificate. Since an agent is a trusted authority, a client certificate (or a MAP
certificate) issued in advance by the agent is the proof of the authentication between the
agent and the corresponding client (or MAP).
Following are the order of the messages to be exchanged in the protocol:
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(1) C −→ R: IC
(2) R −→ C: TR
(3) C −→ R: TC , EPR(NC1, NC2, NC3)
(4) R −→ C: EPC (NR1, NR2, NR3)
(5) C −→ R: NR2
(6) R −→ C: NC2,ΘC
(1) A client C requests to join a network and associate with a MAP. C sends a request
message containing its ID to MAP R.
(2) A MAP R replies with a message which contains its MAP certificate to inform mesh
clients and neighboring MAPs of its presence and ID. Client C verifies the digital
signature of the certificate agent A who issued the MAP certificate TR using A’s
public key. (We assume that client C and MAP R have the public key certificate of
the certificate agent.) C also verifies other information in the MAP certificate such
as the ID of the certificate agent and the certificate expiry date.
(3) If the above verifications are successful, C extracts the MAP’s public key from the
MAP certificate TR (see Section 3.1.2.2) and generates three nonces NC1, NC2 and
NC3. C then encrypts the nonces NC1, NC2 and NC3 using MAP R’s public key PR,
and sends the encrypted message EPR(NR1, NR2, NR3) and C’s client certificate TC
to MAP R. Upon receiving the message, R decrypts NC1, NC2 and NC3 using its
private key, and verifies the digital signature of the certificate agent who issued the
client certificate TC (using the certificate agent’s public key). R then verifies other
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information recorded in the client certificate TC such as the ID of the certificate
agent who issued TC and the certificate expiry date.
(4) If the above verifications succeed, MAP R retrieves the client’s public key from
certificate TC (see Section 3.1.2.1), and generates a message containing three nonces
NR1, NR2 and NR3. R then encrypts three nonces NR1, NR2 and NR3 using the
client’s public key PC , and sends the encrypted message EPC (NR1, NR2, NR3) to
client C. C will decrypt the message using its private key to get NR1, NR2 and
NR3. Both the client and the MAP then calculate their shared MAC key KMAC =
NC1||NR1, where the operator || denotes a concatenation, and NC1 and NR1 are
the nonces generated in steps (3) and (4). (The security of nonces NC1 and NR1,
and thus inclusively key KMAC , is ensured by the MAP’s and client’s public-private
keys.)
(5) Client C then sends NR2 to the MAP R. Upon receiving this message, MAP R has
successfully authenticated the client C, because only C has the knowledge of NR2.
(6) To allow the client to authenticate the MAP, R sends NC2 (generated by C in step
(2)) to client C. The MAP also creates an intra-network transfer certificate ΘC for
C, and subsequently sends a message containing both NC2 and the intra-network
transfer certificate to C. After client C receives NC2 correctly, it is considered
to have successfully authenticated the MAP because only R has the knowledge of
NC2. C will use the intra-network transfer certificate ΘC to roam from one MAP
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to another in the network.
Following are additional discussions of the above protocol.
(a) Although other clients could see and may attempt to use the intra-network transfer
certificate, only the rightful owner of the certificate will be able to use it to pass
the handover authentication procedure. The certificate has to be used in conjunc-
tion with the key KMAC , which only the client owning the intra-network transfer
certificate knows (see Section 3.2.2).
(b) We recommend SHA-2 hash functions for use in the hash-based MAC algorithm be-
cause they are employed in several widely-used security applications and protocols.
SHA-2 is considered collision resistant [73].
If the size of the MAC output is L bits, the size k of the MAC key KMAC should
be longer than L/2 bits. Key sizes of less than L/2 bits would decrease the security
strength of the function. Keys longer than L bits are acceptable but the extra
length would not significantly increase the function strength [74]. Therefore, we
recommend a key size of 160 bits, the same size as that of the SHA-2 outputs. As
a result, the size of the nonces NC1 and NR1 (and of the other nonces) is 80 bits.
(c) Key management between a MAP and a client allows the MAP and the client to derive
a shared key to be used after the authentication for secure data exchanges. We follow
the framework of key management defined in IEEE 802.11i security standards [35].
That is, right after step (4) of the authentication procedure, both parties compute
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a shared pairwise master key as follows:
PMK = NC3||NR3 (3.1)
After the login authentication is completed, the two parties use the pairwise master
key PMK to compute a shared key called pairwise transient key (PTK) as specified
by the IEEE 802.11i security standards (see Section 3.2.3). The PTK will be used
to encrypt packets exchanged between the client and the MAP. The generation and
computation of the PTK is discussed in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.2 The Handover Authentication Protocol (HAP)
To support fast handovers for clients roaming from one MAP to another, we propose a
method of key pre-distribution among neighboring MAPs. After a home MAP M1 suc-
cessfully authenticates a client C through the login authentication protocol, it generates
a message containing the ID of the intra-network transfer certificate,M1’s ID, C’s ID, key
KMAC associated with C’s intra-network transfer certificate. The MAP then encrypts
the message using the public key Px of a neighboring MAP Mx, and sends the encrypted
message to Mx. (We assume that each MAP has the public key certificates of its neigh-
boring MAPs.) The neighbor MAP Mx decrypts the message using its private key to
extract key KMAC to prepare for future authentications of client C. The above public
key operations are performed by MAPs, which are not constrained in terms of computing
capability or power supply.
117
Since the client may move in any direction, the home MAP should send key KMAC
to all of its neighbors in anticipation of client Cs mobility. The home MAP can combine
several encrypted messages (each containing the ID of the intra-network transfer certifi-
cate, client ID, client’s public key and KMAC) into one packet and transmit the packet to
all neighbors using a broadcast in order to save bandwidth. After a neighboring MAPM2
receives keys KMAC and a request for connection from client C, it executes the following
handover authentication protocol (presented in the order of the messages exchanged):
(1) C −→M2: ΘC , NC , VKMAC (NC)
(2) M2 −→ C: NR, VKMAC (NC , NR)
(3) C −→M2: NR, VKMAC (NR)
(1) Client C submits its intra-network transfer certificate ΘC to the foreign MAP M2,
along with a nonce NC , and a message authentication code VKMAC (NC). The
message authentication code is the result of applying the MAC algorithm and secret
key KMAC to nonce NC .
WhenM2 receives this message, it first verifies the correctness of VKMAC (NC) using
the MAC key KMAC it received from the home MAP M1. If the computed MAC
value matches VKMAC (NC),M2 can confirm that message (1) of HAP is valid. Next,
M2 verifies the validity of the intra-network transfer certificate. It checks the content
of the intra-network transfer certificate, especially the ID of the client’s certificate
agent and the certificate expiry date. It then applies the MAC algorithm and the
secret key KMAC received from M1 to message µ to output a message authentica-
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tion code V ′KMAC (µ). (Recall from Section 3.1.2.3 that an intra-network transfer
certificate consists of two parts: the relevant information stored in a message µ
and a message authentication code VKMAC (µ), which is the result of applying a
MAC algorithm and a MAC key to message µ.) If V ′KMAC (µ) = VKMAC (µ), M2 can
confirm that the intra-network transfer certificate is valid (i.e., C was successfully
authenticated by its home MAP).
Note that an attacker may capture the intra-network transfer certificate and attempt
to use it, but will not pass the MAP’s authentication, because the attacker cannot
produce a valid pair (NC , VKMAC (NC)) without the knowledge of key KMAC . Fur-
thermore, the pair (NC , VKMAC (NC)) enables the protocol to resist denial-of-service
attacks (see Section 3.3.6).
(2) M2 generates a nonceNR, and computes a message authentication code VKMAC (NC , NR),
which are sent to client C. When C receives this message, it computes a MAC value
V ′KMAC (NC , NR), using nonces NC and NR. If V
′
KMAC
(NC , NR) = VKMAC (NC , NR),
the client has successfully authenticated the foreign MAP M2. Nonce NC serves as
a challenge which C presents to M2. The inclusion of NC in the MAC computation
is the response of M2 to the challenge. (We also include nonce NR in the MAC
computation so that the recipient of the message can detect unauthorized changes
to the nonce.)
(3) Client C then executes the MAC algorithm using the MAC key KMAC it computed
in step (4) of the login authentication (Section 3.2.1), and the nonce NR as input.
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The result is a message authentication code VKMAC (NR), which C will send to M2
along with NR, which was the challenge fromM2. Upon receiving NR, VKMAC (NR),
M2 repeats the same MAC calculation on NR. If it obtains the same message
authentication code as VKMAC (NR), then this proves C’s identity since C is the
only client who has the knowledge of the key KMAC .
Following are additional implementation issues and discussions.
(a) If the foreign MAP M2 receives the intra-network transfer certificate ΘC before the
message r = {Icert, IR, IC ,KMAC} from the home MAP (Section 3.1.2.3), M2 will
not be able to verify the validity of the intra-network transfer certificate because it
does not have the MAC key KMAC in order to apply the MAC algorithm to the
certificate. In that case, M2 sends back an error message to C and C will initiate
a login authentication instead of a handover authentication.
M2 will issue a new intra-network transfer certificate to C through the login au-
thentication protocol. Client C will use the new intra-network transfer certificate
issued by M2 for its subsequence roaming instead of using C’s previous intra-
network transfer certificate issued by M1. If MAP M3 is a neighboring MAP of
both M1 and M2, M3 may receive two messages r1 = {IcertM1 , IM1 , IC ,KMAC1}
and r2 = {IcertM2 , IM2 , IC ,KMAC2} after C performs the login authentication pro-
tocol with M1 and M2, respectively. When C moves from MAP M2 to the next
MAP M3, C submits the new intra-network transfer certificate generated by M2
to M3. The combination of IcertM2 , IM1 and IC in the message r2 indicates the
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association of key KMAC2 with the corresponding intra-network transfer certificate
Θ2C . M3 will use the key KMAC2 and Θ2C to authenticate C through the handover
authentication protocol.
In this worst-case scenario, the handover authentication reverts back to the current
practice in WMNs, i.e., repeating the login authentication with the foreign MAP.
However, with low to moderate mobility speeds, we expect that this worst-case
scenario will not happen often, and the handover authentication protocol will be
used in most cases.
(b) After M2 receives message r = {Icert, IR, IC ,KMAC} from the home MAP, it also
propagates this message to its neighbors to prepare for client C’s future move to an-
other MAP, sayM3. M3 will use message r and the intra-network transfer certificate
submitted by C to authenticate C as described above.
(c) The MAC key KMAC has to be updated periodically to maintain its security. When
it is updated, the intra-network transfer certificate associated with it has to be
renewed as well. The MAP R currently serving the client (either a foreign MAP or
its home MAP) is responsible for generating a new intra-network transfer certificate
and a new MAC key. The MAP then encrypts them using the shared key PTK and
sends the encrypted message to the client.
(d) After a successful handover authentication, the foreign MAP will generate a new
pairwise master key PMK, and encrypt the PMK using client’s public key PC .
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The foreign MAP then sends the encrypted PMK to the client. The client will
use his private key to decrypt the message to obtain PMK. The foreign MAP and
the client will use the PMK to compute a shared key (pairwise transient key PTK)
for their subsequent secure communications, which will be discussed in the next
subsection.
(e) The handover processing delay should be as short as possible to ensure quality of
service for real-time applications, such as voice over IP [111].
The International Telecommunication Union defines network delay for voice applica-
tions in Recommendation G.114 [95]. This recommendation specifies the standards
for one-way delay limits as shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Standards for one-way delay limits
Range in Description
milliseconds
0-150 acceptable for most user applications
acceptable provided that administrators are aware of the
150-400 transmission time and the impact it has on the transmission
quality of user application
above 400 unacceptable for general network planning purpose
The handover authentication protocol (HAP) does not use digital signatures (public
key cryptography), but rather a MAC algorithm (symmetric key cryptography), to
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minimize authentication latency during the handover process.
The computation cost of a MAC operation is 0.015ms [74]. Three MAC values are
generated in the HAP. To verify them, a receiver also needs to perform three MAC
operations. Thus, there is a total of six MAC operations executed in the HAP,
which requires 0.09ms for the computation cost.
The computation costs for generating and verifying a digital signature are 11.6ms
and 17.2ms [100], respectively. If using digital signatures in the HAP instead of the
MACs, three digital signature generations and three digital signature verifications
are required. The total computation cost of all digital signature operations in the
HAP will be 86.4ms. Thus, the computation cost of the MAC operations used in
the HAP is only about 1% of that of digital signatures.
Given the acceptable delay limit of 150ms specified by International Telecommuni-
cation Union (see Table 3.2), if digital signatures are used in the HAP, the com-
putation cost of the digital signatures would consume 57.6% of the total delay in
addition to other types of delay such as transmission, packet processing and queuing
delay. The total delay would be unacceptable for handover authentication of real-
time applications. On the other hand, the computation cost of the MAC operations
used in the proposed HAP results in only 0.06% of the total delay. Therefore, we
use a MAC algorithm in the HAP instead of digital signatures.
(f) Fast handover authentication requires the deployment of certificate agents, and gen-
eration and maintenance of certificates. The offline deployment of certificate agents
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compensates for the elimination of an authentication server during the handover
authentication process. (The HAP does not involve an authentication server.) Fast
handover authentication also requires MAPs to execute more complex operations
of the handover authentication protocol in order to directly authenticate mobile
clients.
3.2.3 Key Generation
We briefly describe the procedure for generating PTKs after a successful authentication
between a client C and a MAP R. The PTK generation procedure follows the four-way
handshake protocol defined in IEEE 802.11i [35], as follows.
(1) R −→ C: MR, NR, T1
(2) C −→ R: MC , NC , T2, VPTK(MC , NC , T2)
(3) R −→ C: MR, NR, T3, VPTK(MR, NR, T3)
(4) C −→ R: MC , T4, VPTK(MC , T4)
In the above procedure,
• MC and MR denote the physical addresses of C and R, respectively.
• NC and NR are nonces generated by C and R, respectively.
• T1, T2, T3 and T4 indicate the message types.
The four-way handshake protocol starts with MAP R generating a nonce NR and
sending it to the client C. Client C receives message (1) of the 4-way handshake protocol,
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generates a nonce NC , and computes a PTK using the PMK it shares with MAP R as
follows where the operator || denotes a concatenation.
PTK = f(PMK,min(MC ,MR) ‖ max(MC ,MR)
‖ min(NR, NC) ‖ max(NR, NC))
(3.2)
C then sends a message to R that contains nonce NC and a message authentication
code (MAC) VPTK(NC , NC ,MT2). The MAC serves as proof of C’s possession of the
PMK, because the PTK is the key for generating the MAC and the PTK is computed
using the PMK.
Upon receiving message (2), MAP R computes the PTK using Eq. (3.2), and uses
the PTK to verify the MAC sent by C. If the verification is successful, R generates
a message authentication code VPTK(MR, NR,MT3) and sends it to C in message (3)
so that C can verify R’s possession of the PMK. Message (3) of the 4-way handshake
protocol also includes a group transient key (GTK) for multicast applications. We omit
the GTK in the message because it is unrelated to the PTK generation procedure.
After C successfully verifies the MAC sent by R, it sends a confirmation to R, which
is message (4) shown above.
The PTK is updated periodically using the above four-way handshake protocol. The
PMK is also updated periodically (but at a much less frequent rate than the PTK) by
the login authentication protocol presented in Section 3.2.1.
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3.3 Security Analysis of the Proposed Authentication Protocols
In this section, we identify the security threats [33] relevant to our proposed protocols
and discuss counter-measures against them.
3.3.1 Overview
The proposed protocols are protected against various security threats, thanks to the
following security features:
• Digital signatures of certificate agents in client and MAP certificates: to prevent
forgery of and unauthorized modifications to these certificates.
• Public-key cryptography: to protect messages (3) and (4) of the login authentication
protocol (Section 3.2.1).
• Nonces (used-only-once partial keys): to combat replay attacks and denial-of-service
attacks, as will be discussed shortly.
• MAC algorithm and MAC keys: to enable a receiver to verify that a message or an
information unit (e.g., a nonce) in a message has not been altered in an unauthorized
manner. They also provide assurances that a message has been originated by an
entity in possession of the MAC key.
The following rules apply to both login and handover authentication protocols:
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(R1) A new message with nonces intended for a specific recipient must use newly gener-
ated nonces and not those previously sent to the recipient. If a message with nonces
was lost or damaged and the message is retransmitted, the retransmitted message
must use newly generated nonces.
(R2) Each message is associated with a timer. If the timer expires before the sender
receives a response from the intended recipient of the message, the sender assumes
that the message has been lost or damaged.
(R3) If the authentication procedure fails after a pre-determined number of tries, the
MAP will give up and send the diagnostic information to the network administrator,
which will initiate an investigation to determine the cause of the failure.
In addition, a client and a MAP involved in a login authentication session are required
to follow the following rule:
(R4) If any of the messages (3) to (6) of the login authentication protocol (Section 3.2.1)
is lost, the login authentication protocol will restart from message (3).
Similarly, the following rules are required by the handover authentication protocol:
(R5) When a receiver receives a message with a nonce and a corresponding MAC value,
it performs the MAC computation. If the resulting MAC value does not match the
MAC value in the message, the receiver assumes that this is a message from an
attacker.
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(R6) If any message of the handover authentication protocol is lost, the protocol will
restart from message (1).
Note that message losses and retransmissions discussed in this chapter are meant to
be associated with the transport layer. (Loss detections and retransmissions may be done
at the data link layer [e.g., by the RTS/CTS/DATA/ACK exchange of the IEEE 802.11
medium access control protocol], but are transparent to the authentication protocols and
do not follow the above rules.)
In the following sub-sections, we describe the countermeasures implemented in the
proposed authentication protocols against the attacks listed in [33] that are relevant to
our protocols.
3.3.2 Identity Privacy Attack
Most people would like to remain anonymous while roaming in different parts of a network
for privacy reasons. To protect clients’ privacy, client IDs in certificates are numbers or
strings that are not related to the clients’ real identities, much like bank account numbers
or social security numbers. Only the certificate agents know the mapping between clients’
real identities and client IDs recorded in the certificates they issue.
3.3.3 Forgery Attack
A certificate agent’s digital signature ensures that the client certificates it issues are
protected against modifications and that counterfeit certificates are infeasible to fabricate.
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The integrity of an intra-network transfer certificate ΘC = {µ, VKMAC (µ)} is ensured by
the accompanying MAC value VKMAC (µ) . Any unauthorized changes to the content of
an intra-network transfer certificate will result in an incorrect MAC value because the
attacker does not know the MAC key shared between the client and its home MAP.
Similarly, a counterfeit intra-network transfer certificate will not be paired with a correct
MAC value due to the counterfeiter’s lack of knowledge of the MAC key.
3.3.4 Time-memory Trade-off Attack
The simplest form of attack against hash-based MAC algorithms is to use brute force
to uncover the secret key. An attacker would use a given input and the corresponding
MAC output value (e.g., NC and VKMAC (NC) in message (1) of the handover authen-
tication protocol, Section 3.2.2) to figure out the MAC key using brute force. With
pre-computation done offline, the time taken in the online stage is shortened at the ex-
pense of more memory. This is called a time-memory trade-off attack. To combat this
type of attack, we use current state-of-the-art MAC algorithms, SHA-2, in the proposed
protocols, and periodically update MAC keys.
3.3.5 Replay Attack
An attacker records messages of an ongoing authentication session and replays these
messages in the future in an attempt to be successfully authenticated and possibly gain
access to the network as a client. An attacker may replay a client’s messages to gain
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access to the network, or a MAP’s messages in order to impersonate the MAP. We
prevent this type of attack by using message encryption, nonces, and the security rules
listed in Section 3.3.1.
3.3.5.1 Replaying Client Messages
We consider possible replay attacks on messages generated by the proposed authentication
protocols.
In the login authentication protocol described in Section 3.2.1, an attacker A overhears
and replays a message (3) sent earlier by a client C.
• If the MAP had successfully received the original message (3) from C, it would
have saved the nonces NC1, NC2 and NC3. When the MAP receives the replayed
message, it compares the nonces in the message against the saved nonces NC1, NC2
and NC3, and can detect that this is a replayed message because a new message
is supposed to have new nonces and not repeated nonces (rules (R1) and (R2) in
Section 3.3.1).
• If the MAP did not receive the original message (3) from C, the MAPmay accept the
replayed message as a valid message (if the timer associated with the sent message
(2) has not expired yet) and reply with a message (4). However, the attacker will
not be able to decrypt message (4) because he does not know the private key of
client C, and thus fails to proceed to step (5) of the login authentication protocol
in Section 3.2.1.(Client C will also see message (4) sent by the MAP, assuming that
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it has not timed out on the lost message, and proceed to step (5) of the protocol.
In this case, the attacker actually helps instead of harming.)
In the login authentication protocol, an attacker may replay a message (5) of a client
C.
• If the MAP had successfully received the original message (5) from C, it can detect
that the current message is a replayed message thanks to the repetition of nonce
NR2 in the message.
• If the MAP did not receive the original message (5) from C, the MAP may accept
the replayed message as a valid message and reply with a message (6). (Again,
the attacker helps the client “retransmit” the lost message (5), assuming that the
MAP has not timed out due to the lost message from C.) Note that although the
attacker will also receive message (6) it will not be able to access network services
because that requires the knowledge of the pairwise master key (PMK) described
in Section 3.2.1. The attacker does not have that knowledge because it does not
possess the necessary private keys to decrypt messages (3) and (4) in order to obtain
the nonces needed to compute the PMK.
In the handover authentication protocol presented in Section 3.2.2, an attacker cap-
tures and replays a message (1) sent earlier by a client C.
• If the MAP had successfully received the original message (1) from C, it saved the
nonce NC . When the MAP receives the replayed message, it compares the nonce
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in the message against the saved nonces, and can detect that this is a replayed
message because a new message is supposed to have a newly generated nonce.
• If the MAP did not receive the original message (1) from C, it may accept the
replayed message as a valid message and reply with a message (2). However, the
attacker will not be able to compute the correct MAC value VKMAC (NR) because it
does not know the MAC key KMAC , and thus fails the authentication by the MAP
in step (3).
Note that client C may also receive message (2) from the MAP, if it has not timed
out on the lost message, and responds with a message (3). If C does not receive
message (2) before a timer expires, it re-sends a new message (1) with a different
nonce NC′ .
Also in the handover authentication protocol, an attacker may replay a message (3)
of a client C.
• If the MAP had successfully received that message (3) from C earlier, it can detect
that this is a replayed message thanks to the repetition of nonce NR in the message.
• If the MAP did not receive the original message (3) from C, it may accept the
replayed message as a valid message. The client is then considered successfully
authenticated by the MAP, assuming that the MAP receives the replayed message
before it times out on the lost message. Since only the client and the MAP know
the shared key KMAC , by computing the MAC value V
′
KMAC
(NR) using KMAC and
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comparing it with the one in the message (3), M2 can confirm that message (3) is
originated from C, not from the attacker. Thus, M2 has successfully authenticated
client C as C is the only client who knows KMAC .
3.3.5.2 Replaying MAP Messages
We examine possible attack scenarios aimed at replaying MAP messages.
In the login authentication protocol described in Section 3.2.1, an attacker overhears
and replays a message (4) sent earlier by a MAP R.
• If the client had successfully received the message (4) from R, it saved the nonces
NR1, NR2 and NR3. When the client receives the replayed message, it compares
the nonces in the message against the saved nonces, and can detect that this is
a replayed message because a new message is supposed to have newly generated
nonces (rules (R1) and (R2) in Section 3.3.1).
• If the client did not receive the original message (4) from R, the client may accept
the replayed message as a valid message (if the timer on the sent message (3) has
not expired yet), and reply with a message (5). However, the attacker will not be
able to generate the MAC value VKMAC (NC2) because he does not know the MAC
key KMAC , and thus fails the authentication by the client in step (6).
Note that the MAP may also receive the replayed message correctly and proceed
to step (6) of the protocol. In this case, the attacker actually helps to “retransmit”
the message (4) that the MAP lost in the first place. (If R does not receive the
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replayed message (5) , client C will time out on waiting for message (6) from R and
restart the authentication procedure.)
Also in the login authentication protocol described in Section 3.2.1, an attacker may
replay a message (6) sent earlier by a MAP R.
• If client C had successfully received message (6) from R earlier, it can detect that
this is a replayed message because it had received the same transfer ticket earlier.
• If client C did not receive the original message (6) from the MAP, C will accept
the replayed message and consider the authentication successful (assuming that C
receives the replayed messages before it times out on the lost message). However,
the attacker will not be able to impersonate the MAP because it does not know
the PMK shared by the client and the MAP, which is required for subsequent
communications between the client and the MAP.
In the handover authentication protocol presented in Section 3.2.2, an attacker over-
hears and replays a message (2) sent earlier by a MAP R. If the client had successfully
received the original message (2) from R earlier, it can detect that this is a replayed
message thanks to the repetition of nonce NR in the message. If the client did not receive
the original message (2), it may accept the replayed message as a valid message and reply
with a message (3) (before it times out on the lost message). After C receives the replayed
message (2), it computes a MAC value V ′KMAC (NC , NR) using KMAC (a shared key be-
tween C and M2). If V
′
KMAC
(NC , NR) = VKMAC (NC , NR), C confirms that message (2)
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is originated from M2, not from the attacker. The protocol prevents the attacker from
impersonating M2 if the attacker does not know the key KMAC shared only between C
and M2. Thus, client C has succesfully authenticated M2, who has the knowledge of the
shared key KMAC , not the attacker.
3.3.6 Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack
An attacker may send bogus messages or replay past valid messages repeatedly to force a
MAP to spend resources on processing a large amount of these DoS attack messages. To
combat a DoS attack, the proposed authentication protocols rely on the security features
and rules stated in Section 3.3.1.
3.3.6.1 Analysis of the Login Authentication Protocol
In the login authentication protocol described in Section 3.2.1, an attacker may repeatedly
send copies of message (1) to a MAP. The MAP will interpret the duplicates of this
message as the losses of messages (2) it has sent. The MAP will stop the authentication
procedure after a pre-determined number of failed attempts, according to rule (R3) stated
in Section 3.3.1, to save resources. Note that this type of attack can happen to any
protocol, and not just specifically to authentication.
An attacker may sniff valid message (3) and message (5) from a successful login
authentication and replay the message repeatedly to the involved MAP in order to over-
whelm it. The MAP can detect that this is a replayed attack because a new message (5)
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is supposed to have a new nonce. If the MAP receives the replayed message several times,
it can infer that it is under a DoS attack and can take appropriate actions to thwart the
attack [78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87].
Note that an attacker may flood a MAP with bogus copies of message (3) that it
creates by itself, but those bogus messages will be detected by the MAP because the
attacker could not possess a valid client certificate TC . After processing a number of such
bogus messages, the MAP can infer that it is under a DoS attack and take appropriate
actions. (If an attacker possesses a valid client certificate, this can be categorized as an
insider attack, which is much harder to detect. This requires human interventions, e.g.,
checking if the mobile device was stolen; verifying the client’s background.).
3.3.6.2 Analysis of the Handover Authentication Protocol
All messages of the handover authentication protocol are protected against forgery and
unauthorized modifications by the MAC algorithm. An attacker cannot generate a valid
message in the handover authentication protocol, without the knowledge of the MAC key,
which is shared only with the client, its home MAP, and the foreign MAP (Rule (R5)
stated in Section 3.3.1).
On the other hand, an attacker may repeatedly replay message (1) (or message (3))
originated earlier by a client C. The MAP can detect that these are replayed messages
because the attacker will not be able to compute the correct MAC value VKMAC (NR) and
thus fails the authentication by the MAP in step (3). If the MAP receives the replayed
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message several times, it can conclude that it is under a DoS attack and can take necessary
counter-attack measures [78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87].
3.3.7 Compromised MAPs
An attacker may compromise a MAP by: (1) dropping valid authentication messages
to prevent clients from joining the network, or (2) granting access to unauthorized or
non-paying users. Following are effective counter-measures against these attacks.
(1) Dropping valid messages deviates from the normal procedure of the authentication
protocol, which requires the attacker to modify the authentication code. Software-
based attestation techniques such as SWATT [89] and Pioneer [90] can be used to
externally verify the contents of the memory of an embedded device (SWATT) or a
CPU (Pioneer) in order to detect changes to the original code. An external verifier
can detect with high probability if a single byte of the memory deviates from the
expected value [89]. These techniques allow a network operator to periodically verify
the routers in its network and detect compromised nodes. Note that this attack can
happen to any protocol (e.g., routing) and not just authentication. From a client’s
point of view, the consequence of the attack is similar to that of a router failure:
the client times out on the authentication request, and will look for another MAP
nearby to join. This type of router placement redundancy should be implemented
regardless of security issues: if a MAP fails or malfunctions, nearby MAPs should
be able to support the failed MAP’s clients.
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(2) To grant access to users that do not own valid certificates, the attacker would need
to modify the authentication code. One countermeasure is to use attestation tech-
niques such as SWATT and Pioneer to detect changes in the authentication code,
as discussed above. An alternative we propose is to use a dual authentication pro-
cess. The authentications described in Section 3.2, if successful, give the client only
short-term access to network services. The client will subsequently be authenti-
cated by an authentication server (via multi-hop communications), while enjoying
network services using the short-term access permission. After the server success-
fully authenticates the client, it will issue to the client a service certificate [8] that
serves as a pass for the client to access network services on a long-term basis. An
illegitimate or non-paying user will not be issued such a service certificate, and will
not be able to continue to use network services after the short-term access privilege
expires. The dual authentication process allows for both fast authentication dur-
ing the handover process, and for stronger security provisions by an authentication
server.
3.4 Performance Evaluation
We compare the performance of our proposed authentication protocols with existing pro-
tocols using both numerical analysis and simulations. The protocols to be compared
include EAP-TLS and the algorithm proposed by Kassab et al. [34]. A detailed descrip-
tion of Kassab’s algorithm is given in Appendix A. EAP-TLS is the most commonly
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used authentication protocol for IEEE 802.11-based wireless networks and represents the
multi-hop handover authentication approach. Kassab’s [34] and Li’s [42] algorithms are
representatives of the certificate-based approach and are the closest to ours. Kassab’s and
Li’s algorithms work in a similar manner. The major difference between them is that the
authentication server (AS) in Kassab’s distributes PMKs to the MAPs neighboring to the
home MAP, while the AS in Li’s distributes certificates. The size of a certificate is bigger
than that of a PMK. Thus the traffic overhead incurred by Li’s algorithm is higher than
that by Kassab’s. Therefore we chose to compare our handover authentication protocol
(HAP) with the more efficient algorithm, Kassab’s.
3.4.1 Numerical Analysis
The numerical analysis demonstrates the theoretical gain of our proposed protocols over
EAP-TLS and Kassab’s scheme. The performance of the protocols is measured in terms
of
• communication costs, which indicate the number of messages exchanged between a
MAP and a client to complete an authentication session.
• computation costs, which are the latencies (in milliseconds) incurred by the following
security operations: encryption using public key (Epub); decryption using public
key (Dpub); encryption using shared key (EK); decryption using shared key (DK);
generation of a digital signature (Gsig); verification of a digital signature (Vsig);
computation/verification of a message authentication code (MAC); and hashing.
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Table 3.3 lists the above operations, the current state-of-the-art algorithms imple-
menting the operations, and the computation time each of these algorithms incurs [91]
(the first, second, and third columns, respectively). The fourth, fifth, and sixth columns
of Table 3.3 lists the numbers of security operations the proposed login and handover
authentication protocols, Kassab’s scheme and EAP-TLS perform, respectively. By mul-
tiplying the computation cost of each operation (from the third column) and the number
of times it is executed, and summing up the costs of all operations executed by a protocol,
we obtain its total computation cost as shown in the third to last row of Table 3.3. The
computation cost of the login authentication protocol (97.935 ms) is slightly less than
that of EAP-TLS (97.962ms). But more importantly, the computation cost of the han-
dover authentication protocol (0.105 ms) is 2.45% of the Kasssab’s scheme (4.3 ms) and
is three orders of magnitude lower than that of the login authentication and EAP-TLS
protocols.
The second to last row of Table 3.3 lists the number of messages exchanged in each
protocol. The authentication latencies shown in the last row are the sums of computation
costs and communication delays, where d is the average delay of a one-hop transmission
incurred by a message, and h is the number of hops between the client and the home
authentication server. (Parameter h is applicable to only EAP-TLS as our handover
protocol and Kassab’s handover scheme does not require a client to communicate with the
home MAP during the handover process.) The average delay of a one-hop transmission
d includes the backoff time, RTS/CTS/DATA/ACK exchange, DIFS and SIFS values,
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transmission time, propagation time, and processing time as shown in Figure 3.3. The
results show that the larger the number of hops between a client’s home MAP and a
foreign MAP, the lower the authentication latency our protocols incur compared with
EAP-TLS.
Figure 3.3: Delay incurred by a one-hop transmission
In particular, the gain of the login authentication protocol over EAP-TLS is due to
• a reduction in the number of messages exchanged, six vs. nine;
• one-hop communication between the client and the MAP vs. multi-hop commu-
nication between the client and the authentication server (captured by parameter
h).
The gain of the handover authentication protocol over EAP-TLS is also due to the
above two reasons, plus the elimination of public key operations during the handover au-
thentication. The gain of the HAP over Kassab’s protocol results from less cryptographic
operations, and one less message, three vs. four.
141
Table 3.3: Computation and communication costs of authentication protocols
Op. Algorithm Time Login Handover EAP-TLS Kassab’s
(ms) see 3.2.1 see 3.2.2
Epub RSA [99] 1.42 1 0 1 0
Dpub RSA 33.3 1 0 1 0
Gsig ECDSA [100] 11.6 1 0 1 0
Vsig ECDSA 17.2 3 0 3 0
EK AES [101] 2.1 0 0 0 1
DK AES 2.2 0 0 0 1
MAC HMAC [74] 0.015 1 7 0 2
Hash SHA-2 [73] 0.009 0 0 3 0
Total computation cost (ms) 97.935 0.105 97.962 4.3
Number of messages 6 3 9 4
Authentication latency (ms) 97.935+6d 0.105+3d 97.962+9dh 4.3+4d
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Table 3.4: Common simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Movement model Random way point
Speed 0-30m/s
Propagation fading model none
Transmission range of MAPs 315m
Transmission range of mesh clients 304m
Transmission rate at physical layer 2 Mbits/s
Physical layer protocol PHY802.11b
Number of runs per data point 10
Confidence interval 95%
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Table 3.5: Simulation parameters for different experiments
Experiment Figure Network Clients,
Mobility Speed
1. Figure 3.6(a), 400m x 400m, 20-60 nodes,
LAP one MAP 0-30m/s
2. Figure 3.6(b), 10-60 nodes,
LAP vs. EAP-TLS 20m/s
3. Figure 3.6(c), 600m x 600m, 20-60 nodes,
HAP four MAPs 5-30m/s
4. Figure 3.6(d), 10-60 nodes,
HAP 10-20m/s
5 and 6. Figure 3.6(e) - 3.6(h), 600m x 600m, 10-60 nodes,
HAP vs. Kassab, five MAPs, 20m/s
and EAP-TLS each MAP is
7 and 8. Figure 3.6(i) and 3.6(j), six hops away 10-60 nodes,
HAP vs. Kassab from the AS 20m/s
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3.4.2 Simulation Results
We use QualNet (version 5.2), a commercial software that provides scalable simulations
of wireless networks [102], for our experiments.
3.4.2.1 Performance Metrics
One performance metric is authentication delay (latency), which is measured as the time
between a client’s transmission of an authentication request to a nearby MAP and the
receipt of an acceptance confirmation. After a client sends an authentication request, it
sets a timer. If it does not receive a confirmation by the time the timer expires, it will
re-send the request. The authentication delay is measured starting with the first request.
In all experiments, we calculate the average authentication delay (AAD), averaged over
all mobile clients participating in the experiment. In several cases, we also keep track of
the maximum authentication delay (MAD), the maximum value among all mobile clients.
In the proposed HAP, after a successful login authentication, the home MAP will
send a MAC key it shares with the client to the neighboring MAPs to prepare for a
handover in the near future. (This is a one-hop communication, from the home MAP to
the neighboring MAPs in one broadcast message.) In Kassab’s protocol, after a successful
login authentication, the AS sends to every neighbor N of the home MAP a PMK to be
shared by N and the client when the client roams and needs to be authenticated by N .
(These are multi-hop communications, from the AS to each neighboring MAP.) This pre-
distribution of keys/certificates incurs some delay before the next handover. We call this
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delay key pre-distribution delay (KPDD), which should be minimized to avoid service
interruption when clients move from one MAP to another. We compare the proposed
HAP with Kassab’s protocol in terms of key pre-distribution delay.
3.4.2.2 Simulation Parameters
The common simulation parameters for all experiments are listed in Table 3.4. The
transmission range of the wireless routers (MAPs) is 315 m, according to the specifications
of wireless routers manufactured by Tropos [103]. The transmission range of mesh clients
is 304 m, according to the specifications of wireless adapters manufactured by Cisco
[105]. The transmission rate at the physical layer is 2 Mbits/s. Mobility speeds of mobile
clients vary from 0 to 30 m/s and the mobility pattern follows the random waypoint
model [106]. Each data point in the graphs is the average of 10 runs using different
random seeds. Graphs are plotted with a confidence interval of 95%.
We conducted eight sets of experiments:
1. We measured the average authentication latency of the login authentication protocol
(LAP) as a function of clients’ mobility speed. The 400m x 400m network has one
MAP placed in the center of the square. Three scenarios: 20, 40, and 60 clients.
In each experiment, all clients have the same mobility speed. The speed is varied
from 0m/s to 30m/s.
2. We compared LAP with EAP-TLS and measured both the AAD and MAD. We
used the same network as in experiment (a). All clients moved at the same speed
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of 20m/s. The number of clients varied from 10 to 60.
3. We measured the AAD of the handover authentication protocol (HAP) as a function
of clients’ mobility speed. We simulated a network of size 600m x 600m with four
MAPs arranged as in Figure 3.4, and three scenarios: 20, 40 and 60 clients in the
network, respectively. In each experiment, all clients have the same mobility speed.
The speed is varied from 0 m/s to 30 m/s.
4. We measured the AAD and MAD of the HAP as functions of number of clients. We
used the same network as in experiment (3). All clients moved at the same speed
of 20 m/s. The number of clients varied from 10 to 60.
5. We compared the HAP with EAP-TLS and Kassab’s algorithm in terms of the
average authentication delay during the handover process. We used the network
configuration shown in Figure 3.5. The home MAP H has four neighboring MAPs.
The authentication server was located six hops away from each MAP in order to
illustrate the high overhead of the multi-hop handover authentication approach used
by EAP-TLS. We varied the number of clients from 10 to 60. All clients moved at
the same speed of 20m/s.
6. This experiment is the same as experiment (5) above, except that we recorded the
maximum authentication delay (MAD) during the handovers.
7. We compare the HAP with Kassab’s algorithm in terms of the average key pre-
distribution delay (KPDD). The network and simulation parameters are the same
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as those in experiment (5) above.
8. This experiment is the same as experiment (7) above, except that we recorded the
maximum key pre-distribution delay (KPDD).
The simulation parameters specific to each experiment are summarized in Table 3.5.
In all the experiments, the mobile clients were randomly distributed in the networks.
To test the scalability of the protocols, we let all clients present in the network send
authentication requests to their respective nearby MAPs simultaneously.
Figure 3.4: Network with four MAPs
3.4.2.3 Result Analysis
The results of the above eight sets of experiments are illustrated by the graphs in Fig-
ure 3.6.
1. The graph in Figure 3.6(a) shows the AAD of the LAP as a function of clients’
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Figure 3.5: Network with five MAPs
mobility speed. There is one MAP placed at the center of the network, serving
10-60 mobile clients. Each client is one hop away from the MAP. We observe that
the AAD is not impacted much by the mobility speed, which is a positive attribute
of the LAP. On the other hand, as the number of clients increases from 20 to 60,
the ADD also increases as expected, by approximately 4% to 6%. More clients
imply more authentication requests to be processed by the MAP, and more channel
contention around the MAP, resulting in longer delays.
2. Figure 3.6(b) shows the performance of the LAP vs. EAP-TLS under the same
network settings as above. When there are only 10 clients in the network, both
protocols perform similarly. Given more than 10 clients, the workload and channel
contention at the MAP increases. In these cases, the LAP offers lower AAD than
EAP-TLS, because the LAP requires less message exchanges than EAP-TLS (6 vs.
9, as shown in the second last row of Table 4.4). In the case of 60 clients, the AAD
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(a) Login protocol (LAP) - Function of mobility speed
(b) Login protocol (LAP) vs. EAP-TLS - Function of number of clients
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(c) Handover protocol (HAP) - Function of mobility speed
(d) Handover protocol (HAP)- Function of number of clients
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(e) Average authentication delay (AAD) of EAP-TLS, Kassab’s protocol
and HAP - Function of number of clients
(f) Average authentication delay (AAD) of HAP vs. Kassab’s protocol -
Function of number of clients (magnification of Fig.(e))
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(g) Maximum authentication delay (MAD) of EAP-TLS, Kassab’s proto-
col and HAP - Function of number of clients
(h) Maximum authentication delay (MAD) of HAP vs. Kassab’s protocol
- Function of number of clients (magnification of Fig.(g))
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(i) Average key pre-distribution latency (KPDD) of HAP vs. Kassab’s
protocol- Function of number of clients
(j) Maximum key pre-distribution latency (KPDD) of HAP vs. Kassab’s
protocol - Function of number of clients
Figure 3.6: Simulation results
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of the LAP is 16% lower than that of EAP-TLS. As the number of nodes increases,
the performance gap between the LAP and EAP-TLS enlarges, consistent with
the authentication latencies recorded in the last row of Table 3.3 (97.935+6d vs.
97.962+9dh, where h = 1). The graph also shows the MAD of both protocols. The
MAD of the LAP is about 32% higher than its AAD, which we deem acceptable,
and about 20% lower than the MAD of EAP-TLS.
Given 60 mobile clients connecting through the same MAP, the MAD of LAP and
EAP-TLS are 321.7 ms and 387.6 ms, respectively, or LAP improves the login
authentication delay by 65.9 ms. The amounts of cryptographic computation per-
formed by LAP and EAP-TLS are very similar (97.935 ms vs. 97.062 ms as shown
in the last row of Table 3.3). This shows that the gain of LAP over EAP-TLS is
mainly due to one-hop communication (between the client and the home MAP in
LAP) versus multi-hop communication (between the client and the authentication
server (AS) in EAP-TLS), and due to the reduction of the number of messages
exchanged from nine (EAP-TLS) to six (LAP).
3. The graph in Figure 3.6(c) shows the AAD of our handover authentication protocol
as a function of clients’ mobility speed. Four MAPs are uniformly distributed over
the network, serving 10-60 mobile nodes. Again, the mobility speed does not have
a big impact on the AAD of the HAP, as in the case of the LAP. Also, the more
clients send requests, the higher the AAD, as expected. Note very low AADs of
the HAP, ranging from 42.96 ms-63.8 ms, compared with the AADs of the one hop
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LAP and one hop EAP-TLS which are above 220 ms.
4. The above observations also apply to Figure 3.6(d), which shows the MADs and
AADs of our handover authentication protocol as functions of number of clients. In
the experiment with 60 nodes moving at a speed of 10 m/s, the MAD of the HAP
is 103.2 ms, about 150% of the corresponding AAD, but still very low compared to
the authentication delay of EAP-TLS.
5. The graph in Figure 3.6(e) shows the AAD of EAP-TLS, Kassab’s protocol and the
HAP as functions of the number of clients given the network topology in Figure 3.5.
The AS is six hops away from the home MAP. As the number of clients increases
from 10 to 60, the AAD of all three schemes increases as expected due to higher
loads on the MAPs and more traffic in the network. Both the Kassab’s protocol
and the HAP outperform EAP-TLS by a large margin in terms of AAD, thanks
to one-hop communication (between the client and the foreign MAP) during the
handover authentication versus multi-hop communication (between the client and
the AS) in EAP-TLS. Moreover, the AAD of the HAP is much lower than that of
EAP-TLS due to a reduction in the number of messages exchanged, three vs. nine
(see the second last row of Table 3.3).
We separated the curves of the HAP and Kassab’s protocol from Figure 3.6(e) and
magnified them in Figure 3.6(f). The new graph shows that our HAP noticeably
outperforms Kassab’s protocol. For example, when the number of clients is 60, the
AADs of HAP and Kassab’s scheme are 59.5 ms and 93.3 ms, respectively. HAP
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improves the authentication delay by 33.8 ms or by 57% compared to Kassab’s
scheme, out of which a reduction of 4.3 ms is due to less cryptographic computa-
tion. Kassab’s algorithm requires three more decryption operations and one more
encryption than HAP (see the third last row of Table 3.3). The remaining 29.4
ms (74.26%) authentication delay improvement results from the HAP incurring less
message exchanges than Kassab’s, three vs. four (see the Appendix A).
6. The above observations and explanations also apply to the graphs in Figure 3.6(g)
and Figure 3.6(h), which show the MAD of EAP-TLS, Kassab’s protocol, and the
HAP as functions of the number of clients. In all cases, the HAP incurs lower MAD
than both EAP-TLS and Kassab’s protocol.
7. Figure 3.6(i) shows the average key pre-distribution delay of the HAP and Kassab’s
scheme. As the number of clients increases from 10 to 60, the average KPDD ranges
from 273.3 ms to 552.8 ms for Kassab’s protocol, and from 61.7 ms to 133.8 ms for
the HAP. That is, the average KPDD of HAP is from 55% to 50.3% lower than
that of Kassab’s scheme. A lower KPDD implies less service interruption, because
neighboring MAPs are prepared earlier to connect with a roaming client.
Given 60 mobile clients trying to join the network via the same MAP, the average
KPDDs of HAP and Kassab’s scheme are 133.8 ms and 552.8 ms, respectively.
The HAP improves the average KPDD by 419 ms compared to Kassab’s scheme.
The computation cost of the HAP key pre-distribution is n encryptions, where n
denotes the number of MAPs adjacent to the home MAP. The computation cost of
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Kassab’s key pre-distribution is 2n+2 encryptions and 2 decryptions (see Table 3.3).
Given n = 4 in this experiment and assuming that the cryptographic operations
are performed one after another2, the computation cost of the HAP is 17 ms less
than that of Kassab’s. The remaining 200.1 ms (96.17%) out of 419 ms KPDD
improvement by the HAP result from the use of intra-network transfer certificates,
which eliminate multi-hop communications between the authentication server and
the neighboring MAPs, and from the reduction of one additional message exchange
(2n messages in the HAP vs. 2n+ 1 messages in Kassab’s).
8. The maximum key pre-distribution delays of the HAP and Kassab’s scheme are
shown in Figure 3.6(j). The above observations and explanations apply to this
experiment as well. In short, the HAP offers lower maximum KPDD compared
to Kassab’s protocol, from 55% to 50.3%. Almost all the gain of the HAP over
Kassab’s (95%) is the result of the use of intra-network transfer certificates to avoid
multi-hop communications between the authentication server and the neighboring
MAPs.
Both the performance analysis and simulation results confirm the advantage of the
proposed LAP over the EAP-TLS protocol of IEEE 802.11s and the HAP over Kassab’s
protocol and EAP-TLS. This contributes towards a faster handover process for mobile
clients using real-time services in WMNs.
2In practice, the neighboring MAPs may perform the cryptographic operations in parallel after receiv-
ing the key(s).
158
3.5 Chapter Summary
The objective of our work is to extend the capabilities of IEEE 802.11s standards to sup-
port fast handovers for real-time applications such as VoIP, tele-conferencing, and stock
quote distributions. We design a novel trust model and certificate-based authentication
protocols to support fast login and handovers in a WMN. A client and a MAP mutually
authenticate each other using one-hop communication. The authentication server is not
required to participate during the handover authentication process. Fast authentication
for roaming from one MAP to another is supported by using intra-network transfer cer-
tificates. Our numerical analysis and simulation results confirm that the proposed LAP
and HAP outperform the EAP-TLS protocol of IEEE 802.11s and a representative of the
certificate-based authentication approach, Kassab’s protocol. The proposed protocols are
also resilient to various types of attacks.
In this chapter, we studied issues related to intra-network handovers. In the next
chapter, we present a novel architecture, a trust model, certificates, and a suite of security
protocols to support fast inter-network handovers among multiple WMNs.
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Chapter 4
Security Protocols for Fast
Inter-Network Handovers among
Multiple Wireless Mesh Networks
Current research efforts focus mostly on handovers within a single network, and much
less attention is devoted to handovers between networks (inter-network handovers). An
inter-network handover occurs when a mobile client roams from one network to another,
while each network is controlled by a single operator. In this chapter, the terms different
networks, multiple networks, or networks refer to the networks controlled by different
operators. As part of most security policies, a network must authenticate a mobile user
roaming from other networks. Similarly, a mobile user has to authenticate the network
in order to avoid connecting to an untrustworthy access point. Thus, when roaming from
one network to another, a mobile user has to perform a mutual authentication with the
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network in order to ensure confidentiality.
Most existing solutions [9, 22, 50, 51, 52, 53] for inter-network handover authentica-
tions involve multi-hop communications with a mobile user’s home network, and require
a pre-established roaming agreement between a home network and a foreign network,
which are not acceptable for mobile wireless communications using IEEE 802.11. This
may result in long delay, low reliability and thus potential service interruptions. For some
applications (e.g. transferring files), this delay is acceptable; however, it is far too long
for real-time traffic such as VoIP or video conferencing.
Our work in this chapter contributes towards minimizing authentication latency for
mobile clients’ handovers between different WMNs Our proposed approach does not re-
quire multi-hop wireless communications between a home network and a foreign network.
We propose a new network architecture, a trust model and certificates to support inter-
network handovers through one-hop communication between a mobile client and a net-
work. Built upon the proposed architecture, trust model and certificates, we propose a
suite of key distribution and inter-network authentication protocols for mobile clients’
fast inter-network handovers.
In Section 4.1, we describe the proposed scalable inter-network architecture for han-
dovers among WMNs, new certificates for inter-network handovers, and a new trust model
that enables one-hop wireless communications between a mobile client and a foreign net-
work. In Section 4.2, we present our new authentication and key distribution protocols
for fast inter-network handovers. We present a security analysis of the proposed authenti-
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cation and key distribution protocols in Section 4.3. We present performance evaluations
of the proposed key distribution and authentication protocols via numerical analysis and
simulation results in Section 4.4. We conclude this chapter in Section 4.5.
4.1 The Proposed Architecture, Trust Model, and Certificates for Inter-
Network Handovers
Mobile devices such as smart phones and tablets are becoming ubiquitous. In the exist-
ing solutions for inter-network handover authentication [9, 22, 50, 51, 52, 53], a foreign
network has to communicate with a client’s home network via multi-hop wireless com-
munications to authenticate the client. This may result in high handover latency and
low reliability, leading to potential service interruptions in WMNs. To support mobile
clients’ fast handovers among multiple WMNs and to minimize the inter-network han-
dover latency, we propose a scalable architecture, a novel trust model and certificates for
inter-network handover authentications. Our proposed architecture, trust model and cer-
tificates enable a foreign network to directly authenticate a mobile client through one-hop
communication, which significantly reduces the inter-network handover latency.
4.1.1 The Proposed Inter-network Architecture
As discussed in Chapter 3, a WMN consists of mesh clients and mesh points (MPs)
(routers) . Mesh clients can be static hosts (e.g., desktops, database servers) or mobile
hosts (e.g., smart phones, tablets, laptops, PDAs). The MPs form a wireless mesh back-
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bone to provide multi-hop connectivity from one mesh client to another or to the Internet.
A small number of mesh points work as gateways, connecting the WMN to the Internet.
A subset of mesh points act as mesh access points (MAPs), connecting mesh clients to
the WMN. MAPs can be mobile or static. In the thesis we assume MAPs are mostly
static.
Based on the existing WMN structure, we propose an architecture consisting of multi-
ple WMNs, to support a mobile client’s inter-network handovers, as shown in Figure 4.1.
Each WMN is managed by a single operator. A subset of special MAPs in each network
are designated as border mesh access points (BMAPs) at the time of network deployment
by its operator. Besides performing the same functions as MAPs, BMAPs additionally
support mesh clients roaming from one network to another. BMAPs are physically lo-
cated at the border of their respective networks with much larger storage and faster
processors compared to standard MAPs.
In Chapter 3, we discussed the scenario in which a mobile client connects to a MAP
and then moves from one MAP to another within a single WMN. In this chapter, we
assume scenarios in which a client is currently connected to a border mesh access points
(BMAP) and moves from the current network to another network through an adjacent
BMAP.
Two BMAPs, BMAPx and BMAPy, are said to be adjacent BMAPs if and only if
− BMAPx and BMAPy do not belong to the same WMN, and are managed by
different operators.
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Figure 4.1: Scalable WMN architecture for secure inter-network handovers
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− BMAPx and BMAPy are within each other’s transmission range.
If two BMAPs belong to the same network and are within each other’s transmission
range, we refer them as neighboring MAPs as discussed in Chapter 3. A BMAP is also a
MAP within a single WMN, and treated as a regular MAP in the context of intra-network
authentication.
Given a mobile client C that is currently connected to network X through BMAPX ,
BMAPX is considered to be client C’s local BMAP, and network X is considered to be
client C’s local network. If BMAPX and BMAPY are within each other’s transmission
range, and BMAPY belongs to network Y , BMAPY is considered to be BMAPX ’s
adjacent BMAP. Network Y is considered to be network X’s adjacent network. Note that
network X and network Y are two different WMNs and managed by different operators.
For example, in Figure 4.1, X and Y are two WMNs managed by different operators.
Each network designates its BMAPs to support inter-network handover authentications if
a mobile client moves from its local BMAP to an adjacent BMAP. BMAP1 and BMAP3
are called adjacent BMAPs as BAMP1 and BMAP3 do not belong to the same network
and are within each other’s transmission range. So are BMAP2 and BAMP4. A client
C1 currently connects to BMAP1 in network X, as shown in Figure 4.1. BMAP1 is
client C’s local BMAP and network X is client C’s local network. Client C can roam
from network X to network Y through BMAP3 as BMAP3 is an adjacent BMAP of
BMAP1.
Most existing solutions [9, 22, 50, 51, 52, 53] for inter-network handover authentica-
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tions involve multi-hop communications between a mobile client’s home network and a
foreign network. This may result in long delay, low reliability and thus, potential service
interruptions in WMNs. In contrast, our proposed solution requires only one-hop wireless
communications between a client and a foreign network for inter-network handover au-
thentications. To support one-hop wireless communications specifically between a client
and a foreign network, we design a set of certificates that are used to establish the trust
relationship among various entities in WMNs. Certificates are issued and managed by
certificate agents who are trusted third parties.
To facilitate fast handovers between networks, we propose a hierarchy of certificate
agents that issue certificates to all network entities, including mobile clients, MAPs, and
BMAPs. This design allows certificate agents to handle certificate requests from multiple
networks in a scalable manner. There are two types of certificate agents: root agent and
subordinate agents. The root agent and subordinate agents form a hierarchy of certificate
agents to provide scalability for processing a large number of certificate requests.
The hierarchy of certificate agents can be represented by a tree in which the root
node represents the root agent, who can directly issue a certificate to a client, a MAP or
a BMAP, or delegate the duty to any of its subordinate agents. Each non-root node in
the tree represents a subordinate agent. Any subordinate agent can also directly issue a
certificate to a client, a MAP, and a BMAP. If a subordinate agent has child subordinate
agents, it can further delegate the duty to its child subordinate agents. Figure 4.2 shows
an example of a hierarchy of certificate agents, where the root agentRA delegates the duty
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to subordinate agents SA1 and SA2. The subordinate agent SA1 can further delegate its
duty to its children, subordinate agent SA3 and SA4.
As the network grows and the number of certificate requests increases, new subordi-
nate agents can be added to the agent hierarchy as needed. A new subordinate agent
can either be added directly under the root agent or under an existing subordinate agent.
Thus, the agent hierarchy provides the scalability to meet the demands of a growing
number of MAPs and mobile clients in WMNs.
Figure 4.2: An example of an agent hierarchy
4.1.2 The Proposed Inter-network Trust Model
Trust relationships among the entities in the above architecture are the basis for the
design of our proposed key distribution and authentication protocols for inter-network
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handovers. Unlike the existing home-foreign-domain model discussed in Section 1.1.2,
our proposed architecture and trust model provide a mobile client with the freedom
to move from one network to another without being bound to its home network. Our
proposed architecture and trust model do not require a client’s foreign network to contact
the client’s home network for authentication. Thus, there is no need for several round-trip
message exchanges between a mobile client’s home network and a foreign network, which
may result in long delay, low reliability and thus, potential service interruptions. Since we
eliminate multi-hop communications between the home network and foreign network, a
new trust model and mechanism are required to replace the home-foreign-domain model
for inter-network handover authentications.
Figure 4.3 depicts our proposed inter-network trust model with the trust relationships
among network entities. The proposed trust model is built upon the concept of “certifi-
cates” and “certificate agents”. A certificate is used to establish the trust relationship
among entities.
A certificate agent issues a client certificate or a BMAP certificate after verifying the
validity of the public key certificate of the client or the BMAP. A public key certificate is
issued by a public key certificate authority, such as Verisign or Microsoft. A valid public
certificate proves that the certificate holder can be trusted. We assume that each entity in
our architecture, e.g., clients, MAPs, BMAPs and certificate agents, holds a valid public
key certificate.
A certificate agent is a trusted third party who issues and manages various types of
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certificates and can be trusted by various entities in networks. A certificate agent’s role
can be compared to that of public-key certificate authorities or credit card issuers.
Figure 4.3: Trust model of WMNs
Following are the trust relationships among the network entities as shown in Fig-
ure 4.3:
(1) between a certificate agent and a client: By confirming the validity of their respective
public key certificates issued by the public key certificate authorities, a client and a
certificate agent can trust each other. The mutual trust is established when a client
applies for a client certificate from a certificate agent.
(2) between a certificate agent and a BMAP: A BMAP trusts its certificate agent via the
certificate agent’s public key certificate issued by the public key certificate authority.
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The trust between the BMAP and the certificate agent is established when the BMAP
applies for a BMAP certificate from the certificate agent.
(3) between a local BMAP and a client: The mutual trust between a client and its
local BMAP is established either via their respective client certificate and BMAP
certificate, or via an intra-network transfer certificate and a shared key, which will
be discussed in Section 4.2.2.4.
(4) between a local BMAP and an adjacent BMAP: Any two adjacent BMAPs trust each
other via their respective BMAP certificates. This trust allows a BMAP to accept a
client previously authenticated successfully by another BMAP located in a different
network.
(5) between a foreign BMAP and a client: A client trusts a foreign BMAP and vice
versa via an inter-network transfer certificate and a shared key. After a client and a
local BMAP successfully authenticate each other via either the login authentication
protocol (LAP) or the handover authentication protocol (HAP) described in Chap-
ter 3, the local BMAP generates an inter-network transfer certificate and a shared
key, and sends them to the client. The local BMAP also sends the shared key to the
adjacent (foreign) BMAPs. When moving into contact with a foreign BMAP, the
client presents the inter-network transfer certificate to the foreign BMAP. The client
and the foreign BMAP then use the inter-network transfer certificate and the shared
key to authenticate each other (Section 4.2.2.3).
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Obtaining a client certificate or a BMAP certificate is done offline before a client joins
a network, and not part of inter-network authentication and key distribution process.
Thus, the public key operations for obtaining certificates do not affect the efficiency of
our inter-network authentication and key distribution protocols presented in Section 4.2.
4.1.3 Certificates for Inter-Network Handovers
We have presented client certificates, MAP certificates and intra-network transfer certifi-
cates in Chapter 3. They are required for mutual authentication between a client and
a MAP when the client logs in to a network, or roams from one MAP to another MAP
within a single WMN. In this chapter, we propose additional certificates to support a
client moving from one network to another network.
Certificates are issued and managed by certificate agents who are trusted by all entities
of networks to perform such tasks. There can be several certificate agents serving different
WMNs. One agent can serve several networks. Certificates are used to establish the trust
between a client and a set of BMAPs, and between adjacent BMAPs (see Figure 3.1).
The lifetime of a certificate is determined by its issuer’s policy.
Three types of certificates are used in our inter-network authentication and key dis-
tribution protocols: client certificate, BMAP certificate, and inter-network transfer cer-
tificate. They are needed for mutual authentication between a client and a BMAP when
the client roams from one BMAP to an adjacent BMAP.
We will use the notations listed in Table 4.1 throughout the chapter to facilitate the
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discussion.
Table 4.1: Notations
Notation Description
C Client
Γ Type of certificate
A Certificate agent
Ix ID of entity x
λC Inter-network transfer certificate issued to a client
Px Public key issued to x
Tx Certificate issued to x
τexp Expiry date and time of a certificate
Nx A nonce generated by x
Sigx Digital signature of entity x
MACalg Type of MAC algorithm
EPx(m) Encryption of message, m using x’s public key
DPx(m) Decryption of message,m using x’s public key
Vk(m) Message authentication code (MAC) resulting from the application
of a MAC algorithm and a MAC key k on a message m
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4.1.3.1 Client Certificates
A client applies for a client certificate from a certificate agent. A client trusts a certificate
agent via the agents’s public key certificate issued by a central authority. A client certifi-
cate is unique to each client and can be used for both intra-network and inter-network
handovers.
Following is the structure of a client certificate which has also been described in
Chapter 3:
TC = {IC , IA, τexp, PC , SigA}
• TC : client certificate issued by certificate agent A whose ID is IA.
• IC : ID of the client that is given this certificate.
• IA: ID of the certificate agent who issued the certificate TC .
• τexp: expiry date and time of certificate TC . The certificate agent will re-issue a
new certificate for the client if the current certificate has expired.
• PC : public key of client IC , which is used by a MAP or BMAP to verify the signature
signed by the client in the protocol. The certificate agent obtains the public key
from the client’s public key certificate. We assume that the agent is a trusted party
and has access to public key certificates of all clients and MAPs.
• SigA: digital signature of certificate agent IA, which gives a recipient the reason to
173
believe that the certificate was created by certificate agent IA, and that it was not
altered in anyway.
4.1.3.2 BMAP Certificates
Each BMAP is pre-installed with a BMAP certificate. The network operator of each
network obtains a BMAP certificate for each BMAP from a certificate agent. When
requesting certificates, the network operator provides the agent with the public key of
each BMAP, which will later be embedded in the BMAP’s certificate. Since its public
key is part of the certificate, each BMAP must be pre-installed with a public key before
deployment.
Following is the structure of a BMAP certificate:
TBM = {Γ, IBM , IA, τexp, PBM , SigA}
• TBM : BMAP certificate issued by a certificate agent A whose ID is IA.
• Γ: Type of the certificate, indicating “inter-network” or “intra-network”.
• IBM : ID of the BMAP that is given this certificate.
• IA: ID of the agent who issued certificate TBM to BMAP BM .
• τexp: expiry date and time of certificate TBM . The agent will issue a new certificate
for the BMAP once the current certificate expires.
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• PBM : BM ’s public key, which will be used by its neighbors to verify the signature
of BM in messages BM sends. The certificate agent obtains the public key of BM
from BM’s public key certificate.
• SigA: digital signature of the certificate agent A, which will be used to identify the
sender of the certificate.
4.1.3.3 Inter-network Transfer Certificates
When a client roams from its local BMAP to an adjacent BMAP, the trust relationship
between the client and the adjacent BMAP is based on an inter-network transfer certifi-
cate. When a client C first logs in to the network through a BMAP, this BMAP becomes
C’s local BMAP BMi, which will authenticate the client through the login protocol. If
the authentication succeeds, BMi will issue C an inter-network transfer certificate and
become C’s local BMAP. When C roams to an adjacent BMAP BMj , it submits the
inter-network transfer certificate to BMj for authentication. The inter-network transfer
certificate proves to the adjacent BMAP that client C had been successfully authenticated
by its local BMAP.
The structure of an inter-network transfer certificate λC is as follows:
λC = {ν, VCMK(ν)}, where
ν = {Icert, IBMi , IC , PC , IN ,Γ, τexp,MACalg}
Message ν stores the information of the client, local BMAP and certificate agent as
follows:
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• Icert: ID of the inter-network transfer certificate. The combination of Icert, IBMi
and IC uniquely identifies a transfer certificate n the network.
• IBMi : ID of the BMAP who issues this inter-network transfer certificate.
• IC : ID of the client who owns this transfer certificate.
• PC : public key of the client. The client’s home BMAP obtains the client’s public
key from C’s client certificate.
• IN : ID of the network to which the current BMAP belongs.
• Γ: Type of certificate indicating “inter-network” or “intra-network”.
• τexp: expiry date and time of this certificate.
• MACalg: message authentication code algorithm. The inclusion of the type of MAC
algorithm in transfer certificates is optional. It is not required if the parties agree
on an algorithm in advance.
We now discuss about the value VCMK(ν) stored in the inter-network transfer cer-
tificate and the use of the MAC algorithm. During the authentication between
client C and its BMAP BMi (step (1) in Figure 4.5), they exchange two partial
keys NC4 and NR4 (see Section 4.2.2.1 for details of the authentication procedure).
They will both then compute a shared key CMK = NC4||NR4, where || denotes a
concatenation. BMi subsequently applies the MAC algorithm and key CMK to
message ν to produce a MAC value VCMK(ν). This MAC value will protect message
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ν, and thus the inter-network transfer certificate, against forgery and unauthorized
modifications. BMi combines message ν and VCMK(ν) to form the inter-network
transfer certificate to be sent to C.
When client C moves into contact with an adjacent BMAP BMj , C submits its
inter-network transfer certificate issued by BMi to BMj for authentication. BMi
sends the key CMK to the adjacent BMAPs, including BMj , in advance of the han-
dover via the key distribution to neighbors (KDN) protocol, which will be described
in Section 4.2.2.2. BMj will use key CMK and the MAC algorithm to verify the au-
thenticity and data integrity of the inter-network transfer certificate λC submitted
by client C in order to authenticate C. BMj applies the MAC algorithm and key
CMK to message ν to produce a MAC value V ′CMK(ν). If V
′
CMK(ν) = VCMK(ν),
BMj can confirm that the inter-network transfer certificate λC is valid. It should
be noted that each certificate has its own expiration date. The life time of a key
CMK is the same as that of the inter-network transfer certificate associated with
it. An adjacent BMAP can generate a new inter-network transfer certificate for a
mobile client if the mobile client’s current inter-network transfer certificate is about
to expire.
4.2 The Proposed Security Protocols for Fast Inter-Network Handovers
Based on the above inter-network architecture and trust model, we propose a suite of
inter-network security protocols operating in two phases: phase 1 for network initializa-
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tion, and phase 2 for inter-network handovers. The adjacent BMAP discovery protocol
in phase 1 is to initialize the networks, which prepares the BMAPs for inter-network
handover authentication and key distribution. The key distribution and inter-network
authentication protocols in phase 2 are to support clients’ fast inter-network handovers
from one network to another.
Public key operations are computationally intensive. Mobile devices, on the other
hand, have limited computing capability and power resources. Therefore, our design of the
proposed inter-network key distribution and authentication protocols aims to minimize
the number of public key operations performed by mobile devices, thus minimizing their
resource consumption. We also minimize the number of messages exchanged between
a mobile client and BMAPs, thus minimizing the authentication latency and resource
consumption by the mobile device. In addition, we aim to minimize the number of multi-
hop wireless communications, thus, minimizing the authentication latency and traffic
in the backhaul network. At the same time, we ensure that the protocols are secure
and scalable. Note that BMAPs are not computationally constrained and typically have
constant power supplies; thus we are not concerned about them regarding public key
operations.
4.2.1 Phase 1: Network Initialization
Adjacent BMAPs need to trust each other in order to support mobile clients roaming
from one network to another. To establish such trust between adjacent BMAPs, in this
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phase, adjacent BMAPs need to successfully authenticate each other.
The network initialization process consists of two stages: BMAP certificate distribu-
tion and adjacent BMAP discovery.
• In the BMAP certificate distribution stage, the operator of a mesh network ap-
plies for BMAP certificates from a certificate agent, one per BMAP, and distributes
them to the BMAPs in the network. The operator is also responsible for request-
ing and distributing a new BMAP certificate before the current BMAP certificate
expires. Since a certificate agent is a trusted authority, a BMAP certificate issued
by a certificate agent is the proof of the authentication between the agent and the
corresponding BMAP. Thus, each BMAP is pre-installed with its BMAP certificate.
• In the adjacent BMAP discovery stage, a BMAP tries to locate its adjacent BMAPs
from the adjacent networks through the adjacent BMAP discovery (ABD) protocol.
Two adjacent BMAPs then exchange their respective BMAP certificates, and verify
the authenticity of the other party’s certificate to authenticate each other.
The ABD protocol identifies the adjacent BMAPs of a given BMAP. The ABD pro-
tocol not only allows a BMAP to discover its adjacent BMAPs, but also verifies that the
adjacent BMAPs can be trusted. The trust between adjacent BMAPs is established via
the ABD protocol.
Figure 4.4 shows the adjacent BMAP discovery protocol, in which BMi and BMj are
two adjacent BMAPs, and located in two different networks. Following is the order of
the messages exchanged in the ABD protocol:
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(1) BMi −→ ∗ : Hello, IBMi , Ni
(2) BMj −→ BMi : Ni, Nj , TBMj , Sigj(Ni, Nj , TBMj )
(3) BMi −→ BMj : Nj , TBMi , Sigi(Nj , TBMi)
Figure 4.4: Adjacent BMAP Discovery (ABD) protocol
(1) BMi sends hello messages to its neighbors. The message containsBMi’s identity IBMi
and a nonce Ni. A nonce is a number used only once for resisting replay attacks.
Details of how nonces are used to resist replay attacks are discussed in Section 4.3.
(2) When a BMAP BMj receives message (1), BMj responds with a message which
contains the received nonce Ni, its BMAP certificate TBMj and a new nonce Nj to
inform the sender BMAP BMi of its presence. BMj also digitally signs the message.
When BMi receives message (2), BMi first verifies the digital signature of the certifi-
cate agent A who issued the BMAP certificate TBMj using A’s public key. BMi also
verifies other information in the BMAP certificate such as the ID of the certificate
agent and the expiry date of the certificate. The goal is to prove that the owner of the
certificate is a trusted BMAP. If the agent’s signature is successfully verified, BMi
extracts the public key of BMj from TBMj . BMi then verifies the digital signature of
message (2) using BMj ’s public key in order to know if message (2) was indeed sent
by BMj . Thus, once successfully verifying message (2), BMi authenticates BMj as
its trusted adjacent BMAP, who is the owner of TBMj and signer of message (2).
(3) If the above verifications are successful, BMi extracts nonce Nj from message (2)
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and generates a message which contains the BMAP certificate TBMi and the received
nonce Nj . BMi then signs this message using its digital signature and sends it to
BMj . Upon receiving the message, BMj verifies the digital signature of the certificate
agent who issued the BMAP certificate TBMi using the certificate agent’s public
key. BMj then verifies other information recorded in the BMAP certificate TBMi
such as the ID of the certificate agent who issued TBMi and the expiry date of the
certificate. The goal is to prove that BMj can trust BMi as an adjacent BMAP
for supporting inter-network handovers. If the verification of the certificate agent’s
signature succeeds, BMj retrieves the public key of BMi from TBMi . To determine
if message (3) was indeed sent by BMi, BMj uses BMi’s public key to verify the
digital signature of message (3). Once BMj successfully verifies message (3), BMj
consideres BMi as a trusted neighbor BMAP.
After executing the ABD protocol, a BMAP has discovered its adjacent BMAPs. By
verifying BMAP certificates via the ABD protocol, an adjacent BMAP can trust the local
BMAP, and vise versa. When a client roams from the local BMAP to an adjacent BMAP,
the adjacent BMAP will verify the inter-network transfer certificate issued by the local
BMAP to authenticate the client. We discuss the inter-network handover authentication
protocol in the next section.
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4.2.2 Phase 2: Inter-network Handover
To support fast inter-network handovers for clients moving from one network to another
via adjacent BMAPs, we propose a three-stage process: (a) inter-network transfer cer-
tificate generation, (b) key distribution, and (c) inter-network handover authentication.
In the first stage, inter-network transfer certificate generation, a local BMAP generates
and distributes an inter-network transfer certificate to a client after successfully authen-
ticating the client, which is described in detail in Section 4.2.2.1. In the key distribution
stage, a BMAP distributes a shared key to its adjacent BMAPs for a client’s inter-network
handovers, which is described in detail in Section 4.2.2.2. In the inter-network handover
authentication stage, a client and its adjacent BMAP execute the proposed inter-network
handover authentication protocol (IHAP) to authenticate each other, which is discussed
in Section 4.2.2.3.
Figure 4.5 shows a simplified process of an inter-network handover through the above
three stages. Suppose a client C connects to network A through a BMAP M2 and then
roams to an adjacent BMAP M4 of network B. After client C and M2 successfully
authenticate each other via the login authentication protocol through a BMAP (see Sec-
tion 4.2.2.1), M2 generates an inter-network transfer certificate λC and sends λC to C in
stage (a). M2 and C also compute a shared key CMK. M2 then distributes key CMK
to M4 through the KDN protocol in stage (b) (see Section 4.2.2.2). Client C and M4
then use the inter-network transfer certificate λC and key CMK, and execute the IHAP
protocol in stage (c) to mutually authenticate each other (see Section 4.2.2.3).
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Figure 4.5: Inter-network handover
In the following sections, we describe the three stages of an inter-network handover in
detail. A local BMAP first generates an inter-network transfer certificate λC for a client.
The local BMAP then distributes a shared key CMK to its adjacent BMAPs via the key
distribution to neighbors (KDN) protocol. When a client roams to an adjacent BMAP,
the client and the adjacent BMAP mutually authenticate each other via the inter-network
handover authentication protocol (IHAP) using λC and CMK.
4.2.2.1 Stage 1: Inter-network Transfer Certificate Generation
When a mobile client C connects to a network for the first time, client C and its connect-
ing MAP need to successfully authenticate each other through the login authentication
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protocol (LAP) as discussed in Section 3.2.1. If the connecting MAP BMi is also a
BMAP, BMi needs to generate an inter-network transfer certificate for C’s subsequent
inter-network handovers. We add more information (such as nonces NC4 and NR4, and
inter-network transfer certificate λC as shown in Figure 4.6) to the LAP discussed in
Section 3.2.1 in order to generate an inter-network transfer certificate.
The trust between client C and its home BMAP BMi is established via C’s client
certificate and BMi’s BMAP certificate. Since an agent is a trusted authority, a client
(or a BMAP) certificate issued in advance by the agent is the proof of a successful offline
authentication between the agent and the corresponding client (or BMAP). After BMi
successfully authenticates C, it creates an inter-network transfer certificate λC for C,
and subsequently sends a message containing the inter-network transfer certificate to C.
C will use λC to roam from the current BMAP to a BMAP in another network. The
inter-network transfer certificate has to be used in conjunction with a 128-bit MAC key
CMK.
Figure 4.6 shows the order of the messages to be exchanged between a client C and a
BMAP BMi in the login authentication protocol.
(1) A client C requests to join a network and associate with a BMAP BMi. C sends a
request message containing its ID number to the BMAP.
(2) A BMAP BMi replies with a message which contains its BMAP certificate TBMi
to inform C of its presence and ID. Client C verifies the digital signature of the
certificate agent A who issued the BMAP certificate TBMi using A’s public key.
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(1) C −→ BMi: IC
(2) BMi −→ C: TBMi
(3) C −→ BMi: TC , EPBMi (NC1, NC2, NC3, NC4)
(4) BMi −→ C: EPC (NR1, NR2, NR3, NR4)
(5) C −→ BMi: NR2
(6) BMi −→ C: NC2,ΘC , λC
Figure 4.6: Login authentication protocol through a BMAP
We assume that client C and BMAP BMi have the public key certificate of the
certificate agent. C also verifies other information in the BMAP certificate such as
the ID of the certificate agent and the certificate expiry date.
(3) If the above verifications are successful, C extracts the BMAP’s public key from the
BMAP certificate TBMi and generates a message which contains C’s client certificate
TC and four nonces NC1, NC2, NC3 and NC4. C then encrypts the four nonces using
the BMAP’s public key (EPBMi (NC1, NC2, NC3, NC4)). C then sends the encrypted
four nonces and its client certificate TC to the BMAP BMi. Upon receiving the
message, BMi decrypts the message using its private key to obtain the four nonces,
and verifies information recorded in TC such as the digital signature of the certificate
agent who issued the client certificate TC (using the certificate agent’s public key),
the ID of the certificate agent who issued TC and the certificate expiry date.
(4) If the above verifications succeed, BMi retrieves the client’s public key from certifi-
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cate TC , and generates four nonces NR1, NR2, NR3 and NR4. BMi then encrypts
the four nonces using the client’s public key (EPC (NR1, NR2, NR3, NR4)), and sends
the encrypted message to client C. C will decrypt the message using its private key
to obtain NR1, NR2, NR3 and NR4.
Both the client and the BMAP then calculate two 128-bit MAC keys KMAC =
NC1||NR1 and CMK = NC4||NR4, where the operator || denotes a concatenation,
and NC1, NC4, NR1 and NR4 are the nonces generated in steps (3) and (4) above.
BMi and C also derive a pairwise master key PMK = NC3||NR3 to be used after
the authentication to compute a shared key called pairwise transient key (PTK) as
specified by the IEEE 802.11i security standards. The generation of the PTK is
discussed in Section 3.2.3.
(5) Client C sends NR2 to the BMAP BMi. Upon receiving this message, the BMAP
BMi has successfully authenticated the client C, because only C has the knowledge
of NR2.
(6) To allow client C to authenticate BMi, BMi sends NC2 (generated by C in step (3))
to client C. BMi also creates two transfer certificates ΘC and λC for C’s intra-
network handovers and inter-network handovers, respectively. BMi subsequently
sends C a message containing nonce NC2, the intra-network transfer certificate ΘC
and the inter-network transfer certificate λC . After client C receives NC2 correctly,
it is considered to have successfully authenticated the BMAP because only BMi has
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the knowledge of NC2. C can use the intra-network transfer certificate ΘC to roam
to the next MAP of the current network. The intra-network transfer certificate ΘC
has to be used in conjunction with the key KMAC generated in step (4). C can
also use the inter-network transfer certificate λC in conjunction with the key CMK
[generated in step (4) above] to roam from its home BMAP BMi to a foreign BMAP
in another network (see Section 4.2.2.3).
If C connects to the network for first time through a MAP, and later roams to the
BMAP BMi, C and BMi authenticate each other through the handover authentication
protocol (HAP) discussed in Section 3.2.2. After a successful authentication through the
HAP, BMi generates and sends an inter-network transfer certificate λC to C. BMi also
generates two shared keys, CMK and PMK. BMi encrypts CMK and PMK using
client C’s public key. Upon receiving the encrypted message, client C decrypts them
using its private key to extract key CMK and PMK. C will use inter-network transfer
certificate λC and shared key CMK as proof of a successful authentication with BMi.
C and BMi will use PMK to generate a shared key to be used for secure data exchange
after the authentication.
After a client C is authenticated by its home BMAP BMi and obtains the inter-
network transfer certificate and the associated shared key CMK, we proceed to the key
distribution stage.
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4.2.2.2 Stage 2: Key Distribution
BMi also needs to distribute the shared key CMK to its adjacent BMAPs, since the
adjacent BMAPs need to know the CMK in order to authenticate client C in the future.
In the KDN protocol, the local BMAP BMi broadcasts an encrypted message to its
adjacent BMAPs. The message contains the ID of the inter-network transfer certificate,
BMi’s ID, client C’s ID, a nonce Ni and the shared key CMK. Figure 4.7 shows the
steps of the KDN protocol.
BMi −→ ∗ : {IBM1 , EP1(β)}, {IBM2 , EP2(β)}, . . . , {IBMn , EPn(β)},
Sigi({IBM1 , EP1(β)}, {IBM2 , EP2(β)}, . . . , {IBMn , EPn(β)})
where β = {Icert, IBMi , IC , Ni, CMK}
Figure 4.7: Key distribution to neighbors (KDN) protocol
Suppose BM1, BM2, . . . , BMn are adjacent BMAPs of BMi which are identified via
the adjacent BMAP discovery (ABD) protocol discussed in Section 4.2.1. After client
C and BMi successfully authenticate each other (via the Login authentication protocol
through a BMAP discussed in Section 4.2.2.1), BMi creates a message β, which contains
the ID of the inter-network transfer certificate Icert, BMi’s ID IBMi , client C’s ID IC ,
a nonce Ni, and key CMK. For each BMj where j = 1, 2, . . . , n, BMi encrypts the
message β using BMj ’s public key Pj . (Since each BMAP’s public key is included in
the BMAP certificate, BMi obtains the public keys of its adjacent BMAPs through the
ABD protocol discussed in Section 4.2.1.) BMi then sends the message to BMj , which
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contains BMj ’s ID IBMj , and encrypted message EPj (β).
Since the client may move in any direction, the local BMAP BMi sends key CMK
to all of its adjacent BMAPs in anticipation of client C’s mobility. The local BMAP
BMi may combine several such messages {IBMj , EPj (β)}, where j = 1, 2, . . . , n) into one
packet, generates the signature of the message Sigi({IBM1 , EP1(β)},
{IBM2 , EP2(β)}, . . . , {IBMn , EPn(β)}), and broadcast the packet to all adjacent BMAPs in
order to save bandwidth. The digital signature provides the guarantee that the message
is from BMi. Upon receiving the message, the adjacent BMAP BMj verifies BMi’s
signature, decrypts the message using its private key to extract key CMK. Thus, the
shared key CMK is distributed to BMi’s adjacent BMAPs before C’s inter-network
handover. The above public key operations are performed by BMAPs, which are not
constrained in terms of computing capability or power supply. To further enhance the
reliability for broadcasting the encrypted message in the KDN protocol, the local BMi
can broadcast the key distribution message more than once.
In summary, the key distribution protocols allow BMi to distribute the shared key
CMK to client C and all adjacent BMAPs. When client C roams to an adjacent BMAP,
C and the adjacent BMAP will use the shard key CMK and the inter-network transfer
certificate λC to mutually authenticate each other via an inter-network handover authen-
tication protocol, which will be discussed in the following section.
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4.2.2.3 Stage 3: Inter-network Handover Authentication Protocol (IHAP)
After client C roams to an adjacent BMAP BMj , C and BMj execute the inter-network
handover authentication protocol (IHAP) to mutually authenticate each other. Figure 4.8
shows the order of the messages to be exchanged in the IHAP.
(1) C −→ BMj : λC , NC , VCMK(NC)
(2) BMj −→ C : ΘC , NB, VCMK(NC , NB)
(3) C −→ BMj : NB, VCMK(NB)
Figure 4.8: Inter-network handover authentication protocol (IHAP)
(1) Client C sends its inter-network transfer certificate λC , a nonce NC and a message
authentication code VCMK(NC) to BMj . The message authentication code is the
result of applying the MAC algorithm and the shared key CMK to nonce NC (see
Section 2.2.4).
When BMj receives this message, it first verifies the correctness of VCMK(NC) using
the MAC key CMK it received from C’s previous BMAP BMi. If the computed
MAC value matches VCMK(NC), BMj can confirm that NC was not altered during
transmission. Next, BMj verifies the validity of the inter-network transfer certificate
λC . It checks the content of the inter-network transfer certificate, especially the ID
of the client’s certificate agent and the certificate expiry date. It then applies the
MAC algorithm and key CMK received from BMi to message ν to output a message
authentication code V ′CMK(ν). [Recall from Section 4.1.3.3 that an inter-network
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transfer certificate consists of two parts: the relevant information stored in a message
ν and a message authentication code VCMK(ν), which is the result of applying a
MAC algorithm and a MAC key to message ν.] If V ′CMK(ν) = VCMK(ν), BMj can
confirm that the inter-network transfer certificate is valid (i.e., C was successfully
authenticated by its previous BMAP BMi).
Note that an attacker may capture the inter-network transfer certificate and attempt
to use it, but will not pass the BMAP’s authentication, because the attacker cannot
produce a valid pair (NC , VCMK(NC)) without the knowledge of key CMK. The
pair (NC , VCMK(NC)) also enables the protocol to resist denial-of-service attacks
(see Section 4.3).
(2) BMj creates an intra-network transfer certificate ΘC for C, and subsequently sends
to C a message containing a nonce NB, the intra-network certificate ΘC , and a
message authentication code VCMK(NC , NB). After C receives this message, it com-
putes a MAC value V ′CMK(NC , NB), using nonces NC and NB. If V
′
CMK(NC , NB) =
VCMK(NC , NB), it is considered that C has successfully authenticated BMj . Nonce
NC serves as a challenge C presents to BMj . The inclusion of NC in the MAC compu-
tation is the response of BMj to the challenge. Nonce NB serves as a challenge BMj
presents to C. C will need to response this challenge to BMj in the next message
upon receiving NB. If V
′
CMK(NC , NB) = VCMK(NC , NB), C can also ensure that
nonce NB has not been altered during the transmission. C will use the intra-network
transfer certificate ΘC to roam from one MAP to another in the network to which
191
BMj belongs.
(3) Client C then executes the MAC algorithm using key CMK and nonce NB as input.
The result is a message authentication code VCMK(NB), which C will send to BMj
along with NB (the challenge from BMj). Upon receiving NB and VCMK(NB),
BMj repeats the same MAC calculation on NB. If it obtains the same message
authentication code as VCMK(NB), then this confirms C’s identity since C is the only
client who has the knowledge of key CMK. Thus, BMj has successfully authenticated
C.
Following are additional implementation issues and discussions.
(a) If the adjacent BMAP BMj receives the inter-network transfer certificate λC from
C before the key CMK from BMi, BMj will not be able to verify the validity of
the transfer certificate because it does not have key CMK in order to apply the
MAC algorithm to the certificate. In that case, BMj sends back an error message
to C. C will initiate a login authentication (described in Section 4.2.2.1) instead
of the IHAP. However, assuming clients with low to moderate mobility speeds, we
expect that this worst-case scenario will not happen often, and the inter-network
handover authentication protocol will be used in most cases.
(b) The inter-network handover authentication protocol does not use digital signatures
(public key cryptography), but rather a MAC algorithm, to minimize authentica-
tion latency during the handover process. (The comparison of computation costs
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between MAC operations and digital signatures is discussed in Section 3.2.2 discus-
sion (C)).
(c) Once client C and BMj successfully authenticate each other, BMj generates a
pairwise master key PMK. BMj encrypts the PMK using C’s public key and
sends to C. C uses its private key to decrypt the message and obtains the pairwise
master key PMK. The adjacent BMAP and the client will use the pairwise master
key PMK to compute a shared key called the pairwise transient key (PTK). The
PTK generation procedure follows the four-way handshake protocol defined in IEEE
802.11i [35] (see Section 3.2.3). The PTK will be used to encrypt packets exchanged
between two parities for subsequent secure communications.
(d) Since C may move to a next MAP that resides in the same network as BMj , upon
a successful authentication, BMj also generates a shared MAC key KMAC . BMj
encrypts KMAC with PMK (discussed in (c)) together using C’s public key and
sends to C. C uses its private key to obtain KMAC . C will use the MAC key KMAC
and the intra-network certificate ΘC for its subsequent roaming from one MAP to
another MAP in the network to which BMj belongs. C and the next MAP then
execute the intra-network handover protocol (HAP) discussed in Section 3.2.2.
(e) An inter-network transfer certificate and its associated shared key are recognized
only by the issuer and its adjacent BMAPs. The reason is that a BMAP knows only
its adjacent BMAPs (neighbors), and not those outside its one-hop communication
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range. If C moves into contact with a BMAP for the first time, after successfully
authenticating client C, BMj generates an inter-network transfer certificate λC
and a shared key CMK for C to roam to one of its adjacent BMAPs. If C visited
BMj before and the inter-network transfer certificate previously issued by BMj has
not expired, C can keep using it. If this previously issued inter-network transfer
certificate has expired, BMj creates a new inter-network transfer certificate for
client C.
(f) The life time of a shared key CMK is the same as that of the inter-network transfer
certificate associated with it because the key has to be used in conjunction with the
certificate.
(g) Additional costs are required in order to support fast inter-network handover au-
thentication, such as offline deployment of certificate agents, generation and main-
tenace of certificates, and high-performance BMAPs.
4.2.2.4 An Efficient Integrated Authentication System for Intra-network and
Inter-network Handovers
In Chapter 3, we propose two authentication protocols for supporting intra-network han-
dovers, namely the login authentication protocol (LAP) and the handover authentication
protocol (HAP). The LAP is an authentication protocol for supporting clients’ initial
login to a network. The HAP is an authentication protocol for supporting mobile clients’
fast intra-network handovers from one MAP to another. The focus of this chapter is on
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inter-network handover authentications when a client moves from one network to another
via adjacent BMAPs. We now discuss how the proposed intra-network (Chapter 3) and
inter-network authentication protocols (Chapter 4) work with each other.
We have presented a simple case of inter-network handover authentication in Sec-
tion 4.2.2, Figure 4.5. In this subsection, we present an example of our integrated authen-
tication system that involves both intra-network and inter-network handovers illustrated
by the flowchart in Figure 4.9. In this example, a mobile client roams from network X
to network Y , then to network Z as shown in Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.9: An integrated authentication system
When a mobile client C connects to a network X for the first time, client C and its
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(Dashed lines represent wireless links between access points)
Figure 4.10: A mobile client roams from network X to network Y , then to network Z
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connecting MAP Mi need to successfully authenticate each other through the LAP (see
Section 3.2.1). The MAP then generates an intra-network transfer certificate ΘCx for
client C’s future intra-network handovers in network X. When moving to the next MAP
Mj in network X, C needs to present the intra-network transfer certificate ΘCx toMj for
intra-network handover authentication through the HAP (see Section 3.2.2). Using the
intra-network transfer certificate ΘCx , C can seamlessly roam from one MAP to another
in network X. This process has been discussed thoroughly in Chapter 3.
If C connects to network X for the first time through a BMAP, e.g. BMAP1, C and
BMAP1 need to authenticate each other via the login authentication protocol through
a BMAP (see Section 4.2.2.1). After successfully authenticating client C, BMAP1 gen-
erates an inter-network transfer certificate λC1 for C’s future inter-network handover
authentication. Both C and BMAP1 also compute a shared key CMK1. Since adjacent
BMAPs need to know CMK1 to authenticate C in the future, BMAP1 also distributes
the key CMK1 to its adjacent BMAPs (e.g. BMAP2 as shown in Figure 4.10) through
the KDN protocol (see Section 4.2.2.2). This shared key CMK1 is used in conjunc-
tion with client C’s inter-network transfer certificate λC1 in the inter-network handover
authentication protocol (IHAP).
C now can roam either inside network X using the intra-network transfer certificate
ΘCx or to an adjacent network Y using the inter-network transfer certificate λC1 .
Case 1: If C stays inside network X, C needs to present the intra-network transfer
certificate ΘCx to the next MAP in network X, they execute the intra-network
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handover authentication protocol (HAP) (Section 3.2.2) to authenticate each other.
Case 2: If C roams to an adjacent BMAPBMAP2 in another network Y , C andBMAP2
need to mutually authenticate each other. C presents its inter-network transfer cer-
tificate λC1 to BMAP2. BMAP2 verifies λC1 and uses the shared key CMK1 to
authenticate client C through the IHAP (Section 4.2.2.3). BMAP2 then gener-
ates an intra-network transfer certificate ΘCY for client C’s future intra-network
handover authentication in network Y .
Case 2a: If C stays inside network Y and moves from BMAP2 to a neighboring
MAP Mi, by using the intra-network certificate ΘCY , C and the neighbor-
ing MAP Mi can perform the intra-network handover authentication protocol
(HAP) to mutually authenticate each other. As long as C stay inside network
Y , C can roam from one MAP to another by presenting the intra-network
certificate ΘCY .
Case 2b: C can roam to another network, e.g., network Z throughBMAP3 (BMAP3
belongs to network Y ). When C moves into contact with BMAP3 in network
Y , after successfully authentication through the HAP, BMAP3 generates and
sends to C an inter-network transfer certificate λC3 and a new shared key
CMK3 (see the flowchart in Figure 4.9). BMAP3 also sends the shared key
CMK3 to its adjacent BMAPs, BMAP4 and BMAP7 through the KDN pro-
tocol (Section 4.2.2.2). By presenting the inter-network transfer certificate
λC3 , C can roam to either network Z through BMAP3, or to network B
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through BMAP7. If C roams to network Z through BMAP4, BMAP4 will
use CMK3 to verify C’s inter-network transfer certificate λC3 . Once C and
BMAP4 successfully authenticate each other through the inter-network han-
dover authentication protocol (IHAP) (Section 4.2.2.3), BMAP4 generates an
intra-network transfer certificate ΘCZ for C’s future intra-network handover
authentication in network Z.
In existing inter-network authentication methods [9, 22, 50, 51, 52, 53], the authenti-
cation procedure requires several multi-hop round-trip message exchanges between either
a client and an authentication server, or a client’s home network and a foreign network,
which may result in long delay, low reliability and thus potential service interruptions.
In contrast, our integrated authentication system does not require multi-hop communi-
cations for authentication. A client and a MAP (or a BMAP) can mutually authenticate
each other using either an intra-network (or an inter-network) certificate through one-hop
communication, which significantly reduces the handover latency. Thus, this integrated
authentication system provides mobile clients seamless roaming from one MAP to an-
other, and from one network to another.
It is worth discussing the issue of how to implement a practical payment scheme
for our proposed integrated authentication system. In the home-foreign-domain model,
the payment schemes require a foreign network to contact a visitor’s home network to
negotiate for the services the visitor needs to pay for. Since clients are not bound to a
“home” network in our proposed architecture, the existing payment schemes used in the
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home-foreign-domain model are not applicable to our proposed integrated authentication
system. Instead, real-time payment methods [93, 94] are more suitable to our integrated
authentication system as these methods do not require a foreign network to communicate
with a user’s home network for the payment. In this case, a user’s payment account is
set up with a broker, a trusted third party. A user can roam to any network and pay for
network services if the network agrees to use the broker’s payment services. Following is
an overview of this payment approach:
• A mobile client pays for network services through a broker who is a trusted third
party. A mobile client first needs to buy pre-paid tokens from the broker (or estab-
lish credit with the broker).
• All participating networks agree to accept tokens as a payment method. A mobile
client can roam from one network to another and pay tokens to a network while
connecting to it.
• Each network reports the number of tokens it collected from the mobile client to
the broker in order to be reimbursed for the service(s) it provided.
In Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we present a security analysis and performance evaluations
of the proposed inter-network handover protocols, respectively.
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4.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we identify the security threats relevant to our proposed protocols and
discuss their countermeasures. The security threats related to the proposed security
protocols include identity privacy attack, impersonation attack, forgery attack, space-
time trade-off attack, replay attack, and DoS attack [16].
4.3.1 Overview
The proposed protocols are protected against various security threats thanks to the fol-
lowing security features:
• Digital signatures: to prevent forgery or unauthorized modifications to the message.
• Public key cryptography: to allow a BMAP to encrypt a message and securely
distribute the message to the BMAP’s neighbors (Section 4.2.2.2).
• Nonces: to combat replay attacks and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
• MAC algorithm and MAC keys: to enable a receiver to verify that a message or an
information unit (e.g., a nonce) in a message has not been altered in an unauthorized
manner. They also provide assurance that a message has been originated by an
entity in possession of the MAC key. A counterfeit message will not be paired with
the correct MAC value due to the attacker’s lack of knowledge of the MAC key.
The following rules apply to our proposed protocols, namely the adjacent BMAP
discovery (ABD), the key distribution to neighbors (KDN) protocols, and inter-network
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authentication protocol (IHAP):
[R1] A new message with nonces intended for a specific recipient r must use newly
generated nonces and not those previously sent to r. If a message with nonces was
lost or damaged and the message is retransmitted, the retransmitted message must
use newly generated nonces.
[R2] Each message is associated with a timer. If the timer expires before the sender
receives a response from the intended recipient of the message, the sender assumes
that the message has been lost or damaged.
[R3] If the key distribution or authentication procedure fails after a pre-determined num-
ber of tries, the BMAP will give up and send diagnostic information to the network
administrator, which will initiate an investigation to determine the cause of the
failure.
[R4] For the ABD protocol and the IHAP, if any message is lost, the protocol will restart
from step (1).
The IHAP is also required to follow the following rule:
[R5] When a receiver receives a message with a nonce and a corresponding MAC value,
it performs the MAC computation. If the resulting MAC value does not match the
MAC value in the message, the receiver assumes that this is a message from an
attacker.
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Note that message losses and retransmissions discussed in this chapter are meant to
be associated with the transport layer. (Loss detections and retransmissions may be done
at the data link layer [e.g., by the RTS/CTS/DATA/ACK exchange of the IEEE 802.11
medium access control], but are transparent to the authentication protocols and do not
follow the above rules.)
4.3.2 Security Analysis of the Proposed Security Protocols
In this subsection, we identify the security threats [16, 92] relevant to the adjacent BMAP
discovery (ABD), key distribution to neighbors (KDN) and inter-network handover au-
thentication protocol (IHAP). The threats include identity privacy attack, impersonation
attack, forgery attack, time-memory trade-off attack, replay attack, and Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attack. We also discuss the countermeasures against these threats.
4.3.2.1 Identity Privacy Attack
Most clients would like to remain anonymous while roaming in different networks for
privacy reasons. To protect a client’s privacy, the client ID in the inter-network transfer
certificate is a number or a string that is not related to the client’s real identity, much
like a bank account number or a social security number. Only the issuer of the certificate
knows the mapping between the client’s real identity and the client ID recorded in the
certificate.
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4.3.2.2 Impersonation Attack
Impersonation is an attack in which an attacker masquerades as a trusted node. IP
address spoofing is a form of impersonation attack, in which the IP address of the source
of an IP packet is forged in order to conceal the true identity of the sender. We use
digital signatures, message authentication codes (MACs), and encryptions to combat
impersonation attacks.
In the ABD protocol shown in Figure 4.4, digital signatures are used to prevent
impersonation attacks. The attacker may modify message (2), such as adding his ID and
public key, or signing the message using his private key. The attacker then sends the
modified message (2) to BMi. After applying BMj ’s public key on the modified message,
BMi can detect the bogus message because the message’s signature should be signed
using BMj ’s private key. If the attacker does not know BMj ’s private key, the attacker
cannot produce a valid signature on behalf of BMj .
The attacker may modify message (3) and attempt to impersonate BMi. For example,
the attacker may spoofBMi’s IP address, add his ID to the message, and sign the message.
The attacker can sign the message with any key other than BMi’s private key if he does
not know BMi’s private key. When applying BMi’s public key to the signature in the
modified message, BMj can detect that the message had been tampered with. Thus,
if the attacker does not know BMi’s private key, the attacker cannot produce a valid
signature on behalf of BMi.
Similarly, digital signatures are also used in the KDN protocol (shown in Figure 4.7)
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to prevent impersonation attacks.
In the IHAP protocol shown in Figure 4.2.2.3, message authentication codes (MACs)
are used to prevent impersonation attacks. The attacker may spoof C’s IP address,
modify message (1) or (3) with the intent of impersonating C. The attacker may also
spoof BMj ’s IP address or alter message (2) in order to impersonate BMj . However, any
change to these messages would be detected if the attacker does not know the shared key
CMK.
4.3.2.3 Forgery Attack
Forgery attack is an attack in which an attacker manipulates the content of a message
with the intent that it would be accepted as a valid message. For example, an attacker
may try to forge a BMAP certificate or an inter-network transfer certificate in order to
make the receiver believe that the forged certificate is a valid one. We prevent this type
of attack by using digital signatures and message authentication code (MAC) for data
integrity. Unauthorized changes to the content of a message will result in an incorrect
signature value if the attacker does not know the author’s private key.
The ABD protocol (Figure 4.4) uses digital signatures to combat forgery attacks.
For example, an attacker may change the content of message (2), such as nonce Ni,
Nj , a BMAP certificate TBMj . A receiver BMi can detect the modifications to the
message when verifying BMj ’s signature in message (2). Similarly, BMj can verify BMi’s
signature in the message (3) to detect any modifications to message (3). Unauthorized
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changes to the content of a message will result in an incorrect signature value if the
attacker does not know the private key of the sender.
The KDN protocol (Figure 4.7) also uses digital signatures to combat forgery attacks.
If an attacker modifies the encrypted message β (EPn(β)), a receiver can detect the mod-
ifications to the message. The reason is that BMi’s digital signature is used to detect
modifications of a message. Unauthorized changes to the content of a message will result
in an incorrect signature value if the attacker does not know the private key of the sender.
In the IHAP protocol shown in Figure 4.8, the integrity of an inter-network transfer
certificate λC = {ν, VCMK(ν)} is protected by the accompanying MAC value VCMK(ν).
Unauthorized changes to the content of the messages will result in an incorrect MAC
value if the attacker does not know the key CMK shared between client C and BMj
(rule [R5]).
Similarly, a receiver can detect an altered message when verifying the MAC value of
the message. For example, if an attacker changes nonce NC to N
′
C of message (1), BMj
can detect the changes in the message (1) if VCMK(N
′
C) 6= VCMK(NC). Thus, a modified
message will result in an incorrect MAC value if the attacker does not know the shared
key CMK.
4.3.2.4 Space-time Trade-off Attack
Space-time trade-off is a situation in which memory usage use can be reduced at the cost
of slower program execution (and, conversely, the computation time can be reduced at the
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cost of increased memory usage). It has been considered as a cost-effective way of solving
certain searching problems such as the knapsack and discrete logarithm problem [108].
The space-time trade-off attack is a type of cryptographic attack where an attacker
tries to recover a key when the plaintext and the ciphertext are known. This attack can
be applied to data encryption algorithms [109] to break the data encryption key. This
attack can also be applied to MAC algorithms where the attacker may try to recover the
MAC key of a hash-based MAC algorithm.
A space-time trade-off attack has two phases: the pre-computation phase and the
online phase. In the pre-computation phase, the attacker executes an exhaustive search
of the MAC keys and stores the hashing results. This is done offline and can take a
long time. Once this pre-computation is done, the attacker could quickly recover a key
using the pre-computed results stored in the memory. The time taken in the online phase
is shortened due to the pre-computation results stored in the memory. To combat this
type of attack, we use current state-of-the-art MAC algorithms based on SHA-2 in the
proposed IHAP (Figure 4.8), and periodically update MAC keys. (Space-time trade-off
attacks are not applicable to the ABD and the KDN protocols as there are no MAC
algorithms used in those protocols.)
4.3.2.5 Replay Attack
A replay attack occurs when an attacker intercepts a packet and forwards that packet to
a service or application as if the attacker were the user who originally sent the packet.
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One of the purposes of a replay attack is to gain access to the network as a valid network
entity. We prevent this type of attack by using message encryption, nonces and the
security rules listed in Section 4.3.1. We discuss how each of the proposed protocols
resists replay attacks.
4.3.2.5.1 The adjacent BMAP discovery (ABD) protocol (Figure 4.4)
Two adjacent BMAPs execute the ABD protocol to identify each other as trusted neigh-
bors. We discuss how each message in the ABD protocol resists replay attacks.
(1) BMi −→ ∗ : Hello, IBMi , Ni
(2) BMj −→ BMi : Ni, Nj , TBMj , Sigj(Ni, Nj , TBMj )
(3) BMi −→ BMj : Nj , TBMi , Sigi(Nj , TBMi)
Replaying message (1) An attacker may overhear and replay message (1) sent
earlier by BMi to impersonate BMi.
• If BMj had successfully received the original message (1) from BMi, it saved the
nonce Ni. When BMj receives the replayed message, it compares the nonce in the
message against the saved nonce Ni, and can detect that this is a replayed message
because a new message is supposed to contain a new nonce and not a repeated
nonce (rules [R1] and [R2]).
• If BMj did not receive the original message (1) from BMi, BMj may accept the
replayed message as a valid message (if the timer associated with message (1) has
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not expired yet) and reply with message (2). The attacker may create a message
(3) to send to BMj , but cannot produce a valid signature Sigi(Nj , TBMi) without
the private key of BMi. BMj will not continue to the next step and will disregard
the attacker as a trusted neighbor.
Replaying message (2) An attacker tries to impersonate BMj and replays mes-
sage (2) to BMi.
• If BMi had successfully received the original message (2) from BMj , it saved nonce
Ni (which was sent by BMi in message (1)) and Nj . When BMi receives the
replayed message, it compares the nonces in the message against the saved nonce
Ni and Nj , and can detect that this is a replayed message because a new message
should contains new nonces, and not repeated nonces (rules [R1] and [R2]).
• If BMi did not receive the original message (2) from BMj , BMi may accept the
replayed message as a valid message (if the timer associated with message (2) has
not expired yet) and reply with message (3). In this case, the attacker actually
helps to “retransmit” message (2) that BMi lost in the first place. BMi has to
verify that message (2) is indeed from BMj in order to authenticate BMj as its
neighbor. Message (2) contains BMj ’s digital signature that is used to prevent
unauthorized modifications. By verifying BMj ’s BMAP certificate TBMj and sig-
nature Sigj(Ni, Nj , TBMj ) in message (2), BMi can confirm that message (2) was
from BMj . BMi then successfully authenticates BMj as its neighbor. Since mes-
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sage (2) is protected by BMj ’s digital signature, by simply replaying message (2),
the attacker cannot impersonate BMj to become BMi’s neighbor. (BMi then sends
message (3) to BMj , so that BMj can authenticate BMi.)
Replaying message (3) An attacker replays message (3) sent earlier by BMi.
• If BMj had successfully received the original message (3) from BMj , it saved the
nonce Nj . When BMj receives the replayed message, it compares the nonce in the
replayed message against the saved nonce Nj , and can detect that this is a replayed
message because a new message should have a new nonce, not a repeated nonce
(rules [R1] and [R2]).
• If BMj did not receive the original message (3) from BMAPi, BMj may accept
the replayed message and consider it as a valid message (assuming that BMj re-
ceives the replayed messages before it times out on the lost message). Since BMj
authenticates BMi as its neighbor based on the BMi’s BMAP certificate TBMi and
BMi’s signature Sigj(Nj , TBMi), BMj can confirm that message (3) was originated
from BMi, not the attacker. Thus, the attacker cannot be authenticated by BMj
to become a neighbor by simply replaying BMi’s message (3).
4.3.2.5.2 The key distribution to neighbors (KDN) protocol (Figure 4.7)
A local BMAP needs to distribute a share key to the adjacent BMAPs in advance of a
client’s handover via the KDN protocol. The attacker may replay the message of the
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KDN protocol. We discuss how the KDN protocol resists replay attacks.
BMi −→ ∗ : {IBM1 , EP1(β)}, {IBM2 , EP2(β)}, . . . , {IBMn , EPn(β)},
Sigi({IBM1 , EP1(β)}, {IBM2 , EP2(β)}, . . . , {IBMn , EPn(β)})
where β = {IBMi , IC , Ni, CMK}
• If an adjacent BMAP had successfully received the original message from BMi, the
adjacent BMAP will drop the message because a new message should contain a new
nonce, not a repeated one (rules [R1] and [R2]).
• If the adjacent BMAP did not receive the original message from BMi, the adjacent
BMAP will consider the replayed message as valid (if the timer associated with
the replayed message has not expired). Digital signatures are used in the message
to prevent message tampering. By verifying BMi’s digital signature, an adjacent
BMAP can confirm that the message was originated from BMi, not from the at-
tacker. By decrypting the message β, the adjacent BMAP can further confirm that
the message was indeed generated by BMi as BMi’s identity IBMi is included in
the encrypted message β.
4.3.2.5.3 The inter-network handover authentication protocol (IHAP) (Fig-
ure 4.8)
When a mobile client C moves into contact with an adjacent BMAP BMj, C and BMj
execute the IHAP to mutually authenticate each other. We discuss how each message in
the IHAP resists replay attacks.
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(1) C −→ BMj : λC , NC , VCMK(NC)
(2) BMj −→ C : ΘC , NB, VCMK(NC , NB)
(3) C −→ BMj : NB, VCMK(NB)
Replaying Messages (1) An attacker overhears and replays message (1) sent ear-
lier by client C.
• If BMj had successfully received the original message (1) from C, it saved the
nonce NC . When BMj receives the replayed message, it compares the nonce in the
message against the saved nonces, and can detect that this is a replayed message
because a new message is supposed to contain a newly generated nonce (rules [R1]
and [R2]).
• If BMj did not receive the original message (1) from C, it may accept the replayed
message as a valid message and reply with a message (2). However, the attacker
will not be able to compute the correct MAC value VCMK(NB) in message (3) if it
does not know the key CMK, and thus fails the authentication in message (3).
Replaying message (2)
• If the client had successfully received the original message (2) from BMj earlier,
it can detect that this is a replayed message as a new message should contain new
nonces, not repeated ones.
• If the client did not receive the original message (2), it may accept the replayed
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message as a valid message and reply with a message (3) (before it times out
on the lost message). After C receives the replayed message (2), it computes a
MAC value V ′CMK(NC , NB), using CMK (a shared key between C and BMj). If
V ′CMK(NC , NB) = VCMK(NC , NB), C confirms that message (2) is originated from
BMj , not from the attacker. The protocol prevents the attacker from impersonat-
ing BMj if the attacker does not know the key CMK shared only between C and
BMj . Thus, client C has successfully authenticated BMj , who has the knowledge
of the shared key CMK, not the attacker.
Replaying message (3) An attacker may replay message (3) sent by client C.
• If BMj had successfully received the original message (3) from C earlier, it can
detect that this is a replayed message because it had seen nonce NB sent by C
before.
• If BMj did not receive the original message (3) from C, it may accept the replayed
message as a valid message (assuming that BMj receives the replayed message
before it times out on the lost message). Since only C and BMj know the shared
key CMK, by computing the MAC value V ′CMK(NB) using CMK and comparing
it with the one in the message (3), BMj can confirm that message (3) is originated
from C, not from the attacker. Thus, BMj has successfully authenticated client C
as C is the only client who knows CMK.
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4.3.2.6 Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack
An attacker may send bogus messages or replay past valid messages repeatedly to force
a BMAP to spend resources on processing a large amount of DoS attack messages. To
combat DoS attacks, our proposed protocols rely on the security features and rules stated
in Section 4.3.1.
We use the IHAP as an example to discuss how DoS attacks are combated. An attacker
may repeatedly send copies of message (1) to BMj . BMj interprets the duplicates of
this message as the losses of messages (2) it has sent. BMj then stops the authentication
procedure after a pre-determined number of failed attempts according to rule [R3] to save
resources. An attacker may sniff a valid message (3) from a successful authentication and
send the message repeatedly to the involved BMj in order to overwhelm it. When BMj
receives the replayed message, it compares the nonce in the message against the saved
nonces, and can detect that this is a replayed message because a new message is supposed
to contain new nonce (rules [R1], [R2] and [R3]). If the BMAP receives the same replayed
message several times, it can assume that it is under a DoS attack and take appropriate
actions to thwart the attack [78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87]. Note that an attacker
may flood a BMj with bogus copies of message (3) that the attacker creates itself, but
those bogus messages can be detected by BMj because the attacker cannot produce a
valid MAC value if the attacker does not have the knowledge of the MAC key shared
only by C, BMi and BMj . After processing a number of such bogus messages, the BMj
can assume that it is under a DoS attack and can take appropriate actions to prevent the
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attack [78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87].
Similarly, rules [R1], [R2], and [R3] are also applied to the ABD and the KDN proto-
cols to combat the DoS attacks. In addition, digital signatures are used in the ABD and
the KDN protocols to protect against forgery and unauthorized modifications. An at-
tacker cannot generate a valid message if the attacker does not know the sender’s private
key to generate the sender’s digital signature.
4.4 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of the proposed protocols, especially the efficiency of the key
distribution and inter-network authentication protocols discussed in Section 4.2.2, using
both numerical analysis and simulations. We use QualNet (version 5.2), a commercial
software that provides scalable simulations of wireless networks [102], for our experiments.
We compare our inter-network handover authentication protocol (IHAP) with the
adaptive protocol for authentication and key agreement (AP-AKA)[50]. The AP-AKA
is a representative of existing inter-network handover authentication protocols. The AP-
AKA and existing authentication protocols for inter-network handovers require multi-hop
wireless communications between a mobile client and a foreign network’s authentication
server, which may result in long delay and potential service interruptions. Our proposed
IHAP does not require multi-hop wireless communications for an inter-network handover
authentication between a client and a foreign network. Instead, a BMAP can directly
authenticate a mobile client through one-hop communication by verifying the client’s valid
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inter-network transfer certificate. A detailed description of the AP-AKA is provided in
Appendix B.
4.4.1 Numerical Analysis
We evaluate the latencies of the adjacent BMAP discovery (ABD) protocol, the key
distribution to neighbor (KDN) protocol, the IHAP and the AP-AKA via numerical
analysis.
The performance of the protocols is measured in terms of
• communication cost, which indicates the number of messages exchanged between
the entities involved in a protocol.
• computation cost, which is the latency (in milliseconds) incurred by the following
security operations: encryption using a public key (Epub); decryption using a pubic
key (Dpub); encryption using a shared key K (EK); decryption using a shared key
K (DK); generation of a digital signature (Gsig); verification of a digital signature
(Vsig); and computation/verification of a message authentication code (MAC).
4.4.1.1 The ABD Protocol
Two adjacent BMAPs execute the adjacent BMAP discovery (ABD) protocol to identify
each other as trusted neighbors. Table 4.2 shows the computation and communication
costs of the ABD protocol. The eliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) [100]
is used for generating and verifying digital signatures. The computational costs of one
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Gsig operation and one Vsig operation are 11.6 ms and 17.2 ms [100], respectively. These
values were obtained from a personal digital assistant (PDA) platform with an Intel Xscale
400MHz CPU, 64MB synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM) and 32MB
flash read-only memory (ROM) using the open-source Crypto++ library [100].
In the message (2) and (3) of the ABD protocol, a sender needs to generate a sig-
nature for the message it sends. Thus, there are two Gsig operations in the ABD pro-
tocol. Message (2) of the ABD protocol contains BMj ’s BMAP certificate TBMj , where
TBMj = {Γ, IBMj , IA, τexp, PBMj , SigA}. Thus, BMi needs to verify two signatures, one
for the signature of message (2) Sigj(Ni, Nj , TBMj ), and the other for the certificate
agent’s signature SigA. Similarly, message (3) contains two signatures that require verifi-
cations. Thus, a total of four Vsig operations are required in the ABD protocol. The total
computation cost of the ABD protocol is 92 ms, based on the data provided in Table 4.2
and incurred by two Gsig operations and four Vsig operations.
The numbers of messages exchanged in the ABD protocol is three. The total commu-
nication cost is 3d, where d is the average delay of a one-hop transmission incurred by a
message. Thus, the total latency of the ABD protocol is 92+3d as shown in the last row
of Table 4.2.
We run a Qualnet experiment to obtain the average delay d of a one-hop transmission,
which is 10.2ms. The average delay d is defined as the time interval between a sender’s
transmission of a 128-byte message and the receipt of the message by the intended re-
ceiver in the Qualnet simulation. We use IEEE 802.11a physical layer protocol for the
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simulation. The transmission rate is 54 Mbits/s at the physical layer. The transmission
range of each node is 315m. The distance between a sender and a receiver is 150m. A
sender sends a 128-byte message to a receiver every five seconds, for a total 100 messages.
We measure the latency of each message and average over 100 messages to obtain the
average delay d of a one-hop transmission.
Thus, the total latency of the ABD protocol is 122.6 ms (92+3d, where d = 10.2ms).
Since the ABD protocol is executed offline at the network initialization stage, its latency
does not affect the online efficiency of a mobile client’s inter-network handovers.
Table 4.2: Computation and communication costs of the ABD protocol
Operation Algorithm Time (ms) ABD
Gsig ECDSA [100] 11.6 2
Vsig ECDSA 17.2 4
Total computation cost (ms) 92
Number of messages 3
Latency (ms) 92 + 3d
4.4.1.2 Key Distribution to Neighbors (KDN) Protocol
In the key distribution stage, a local BMAP distributes a shared key CMK to its adjacent
BMAPs via the KDN protocol (Figure 4.7). The key distribution latency consists of
computation and communication costs.
Table 4.3 shows the computation and communication costs of the KDN protocol. In
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the second to eighth rows, the first two columns list the types of operations the KDN
protocols perform, and the corresponding algorithm implemented for each operation,
respectively.
The third column shows the computational latency each algorithm incurs [91]. These
latency values were obtained from a PDA platform with an Intel Xscale 400MHz CPU,
64MB SDRAM and 32MB flash ROM using the open-source Crypto++ library [91].
The fourth column list the number of times each operation is performed in the KDN
protocol. In the KDN protocol, The number of Epub operations is n, as there are n
adjacent BMAPs. We assume that all adjacent BMAPs perform the decryptions and
verify the digital signatures in parallel after receiving the message of the KDN protocol.
Therefore, the latency of the KDN protocol is equivalent to the sum of n Epub opera-
tions, one Dpub operation, one Gsig operation, and one Vsig operation (assuming parallel
decryptions and signature verifications).
By multiplying the latency of each operation (the third column) by the number of
times it is executed (the fourth column), and summing up the costs of all operations
executed, we obtain the total computation cost of the KDN protocols as shown in the
third last row.
The second last row of Table 4.3 lists the number of messages exchanged in the
KDN protocols. The last row shows the total latency as the sum of computation and
communication costs, where d is the average delay of a one-hop communication, and n
is the number of adjacent BMAPs. The average delay d = 10.2ms was obtained via
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simulations using Qualnet as discussed in Section 4.4.1.1.
Figure 4.11 shows the key distribution latency as a function of the number of adjacent
BMAPs. As the local BMAP needs to prepare for the client’s inter-network handover
authentication, the local BMAP executes the KDN protocol to securely distribute a shared
key CMK to its adjacent BMAPs.
Since a client may move in any direction, adjacent BMAPs need to receive the shared
key CMK before authenticating the client through the IHAP. Thus, the larger the number
of adjacent BMAPs, the longer the latency of the KDN protocol. We observe that the key
distribution latency increases linearly when the number of the adjacent BMAPs increases
from one to eight. To optimize the performance of inter-network handover authentication,
the number of adjacent BMAPs should be carefully considered. Too many adjacent
BMAPs may increase the key distribution latency, but too few adjacent BMAPs may
limit a client’s mobility and cause service disruptions.
Figure 4.11: Key distribution delay
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Table 4.3: Computation and communication costs of key distribution
Operation Algorithm Time KDN
(ms) (section 4.2.2.2)
Epub RSA [99] 1.42 n
Dpub RSA 33.3 1
Gsig ECDSA [100] 11.6 1
Vsig ECDSA 17.2 1
Total computation cost (ms) 1.42n+ 62.1
Number of messages 1
Latency (ms) 1.42n+ 62.1 + d
4.4.1.3 IHAP vs. AP-AKA
Table 4.4 provides a comparison of the inter-network handover authentication latency
between the IHAP and the AP-AKA. Both the IHAP and the AP-AKA implement MAC
operations, which is a HMAC algorithm. The computation time of the HMAC algorithm
is 0.015 ms [74, 91], which was obtained on a PDA platform with an Intel Xscale 400MHz
CPU, 64MB SDRAM and 32MB flash ROM using the open-source Crypto++ library. The
second row lists the number of MAC operations the IHAP and the AP-AKA execute.
The total computation costs of the IHAP and the AP-AKA are shown in the third row,
obtained by multiplying 0.015ms by the numbers of MAC operations shown in the second
row. The fourth row provides the numbers of messages exchanged in the IHAP and the
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AP-AKA. The IHAP requires three messages exchanged between a client and a BMAP.
The AP-AKA requires 4+2h messages: four messages are exchanged between a client and
a BMAP, and 2h messages are between the BMAP and the authentication server, where
h is the number of hops between the BMAP and the authentication server. The latencies
shown in the last row are the summations of the computation costs and communication
delays, where d = 10.2ms is the average delay of a one-hop transmission incurred by a
message. The average delay d was obtained via simulation using Qualnet as discussed in
Section 4.4.1.1.
Table 4.4: Computation and communication costs of authentication
Operation IHAP AP-AKA
(section 4.2.2.3) [50]
Number of MACs 8 10
Total computation cost (ms) 0.12 0.15
Number of messages 3 4 + 2h
Latency (ms) 0.12 + 3d 0.15 + (4 + 2h)d
Figure 4.12 shows the latencies of the IHAP and the AP-AKA for one client scenario
when the number of hops between a BMAP and an authentication server increases from
zero to six. In the IHAP, a client and a BMAP directly authenticate each other without
the involvement of an authentication server. Thus, the number of hop between the BMAP
and the authentication server is zero in the IHAP. If we assume that the BMAP also acts
as an authentication server in the AP-AKA (i.e., the number of hops h between a BMAP
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Figure 4.12: IHAP and AP-AKA
and an authentication server is zero), the latency of the IHAP and the AP-AKA is 30.72
ms and 40.95 ms, respectively. The IHAP improves the authentication delay by 10.23
ms or by 33.3% compared to the AP-AKA. However, when the number of hops between
the foreign BMAP and the authentication server increases from zero to six, the AP-AKA
requires multi-hop wireless communications, which results in much higher authentication
latency compared with one-hop wireless communications using the IHAP. For example,
when h = 6, the delay incurred by the AP-AKA is 163.35 ms or 5.3 times longer than
that by the IHAP (30.72 ms).
4.4.2 Simulation Results
We further evaluate and compare the performance of the key distribution, the IHAP
and the AP-AKA protocols under realistic network settings using simulations in Qualnet
223
version 5.2. (We did not simulate the adjacent BMAP discovery (ABD) protocol as it is
executed offline at the network initialization stage. The performance of the ABD protocol
does not affect the online efficiency of a mobile client’s inter-network handovers.)
4.4.2.1 Performance Metric
We use the following performance metrics:
(a) key distribution delay (latency), which is defined as the time when a local BMAP’s
transmission of a MAC key and the receipt of the MAC key by all adjacent BMAPs.
The local BMAP broadcasts the MAC key to its adjacent BMAPs through the KDN
protocol. We calculate the average key distribution delay (AKDD), averaged over
all clients and BMAPs participating in the experiment. We also keep track of the
maximum key distribution delay (MKDD), the maximum value among all clients and
BMAPs.
(b) message delivery ratio of the key distribution protocols, which is defined as the ratio of
successfully received messages over all transmitted key distribution messages. Since
the local BMAP broadcasts the shared key CMK to its adjacent BMAPs through
the KDN protocol, for each client’s shared key CMK, a total of NBMAP messages are
delivered to the adjacent BMAPs, where NBMAP is the number of adjacent BMAPs.
In this experiment, we recorded the number of messages that were lost during the
key distribution stage. We calculate the message delivery ratio of key distribution as
follows:
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ψ = NBMAP×NC−NlostNBMAP×NC ,
where ψ denotes the message delivery ratio of the key distribution protocols, NBMAP ,
NC and Nlost denote the number of adjacent BMAPs, the number of mobile clients,
the number of lost messages, respectively.
Each experiment was run ten times with different random seeds and we averaged the
message delivery ratio over ten runs.
(c) authentication delay (latency), which is the time interval between a client’s transmis-
sion of an authentication request to an adjacent BMAP (message (1) of the IHAP
shown in Figure 4.8) and the receipt of an acceptance confirmation (message (3) of
the IHAP shown in Figure 4.8). We calculate the average inter-network authentica-
tion delay (AIAD), averaged over all mobile clients participating in the experiment.
We also keep track of the maximum inter-network authentication delay (MIAD), the
maximum value observed by all mobile clients.
4.4.2.2 Simulation Parameters
In all experiments, one local BMAP is placed in the center of a 600m x 600m area. We
consider 3 scenarios: the local BMAP has one, four and eight adjacent BMAPs as shown
in Figure 4.13(a), Figure 4.13(b), and Figure 4.13(c), respectively. The transmission range
of the wireless routers is 315 m, according to the specifications of wireless routers manu-
factured by Tropos [103]. The transmission range of mesh clients is 304 m, according to
the specifications of wireless adapters manufactured by Cisco [105]. The transmission rate
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at the physical layer is 54 Mbits/s assuming IEEE 802.11a. The mobility speed of mo-
bile clients is 10 m/s and the mobility pattern follows the random waypoint model [106].
Each data point in the graphs is the average of 10 runs using different random seeds. In
each run, the simulated time is 150s. The graphs are plotted with a confidence interval
of 95%. The common simulation parameters for all experiments are listed in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Common simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Movement model Random way point
Speed 10 m/s
Propagation fading model None
Transmission range of MAPs 315 m
Transmission range of mesh clients 304 m
Transmission rate at physical layer 54 Mbits/s
Physical layer protocol PHY802.11a
Number of runs per data point 10
Confidence interval 95%
Simulation time 150s
4.4.2.2.1 Performance of the Key Distribution
We conducted three sets of experiments for the key distribution protocols by varying:
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(a) A local BMAP L with one adjacent BMAP
(b) A local BMAP L with four adjacent BMAPs
(c) A local BMAP L with eight adjacent BMAPs
Figure 4.13: Topologies of BMAPs
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(1) the number of adjacent BMAPs. We measured the average key distribution delay
(AKDD), the maximum key distribution delay (MKDD), and the message delivery
ratio of the key distribution protocols as a function of the number of adjacent BMAPs.
The number of adjacent BMAPs varied from one to eight. We conducted experiments
for two scenarios: 10 and 50 clients.
(2) background traffic load. Since the overall load of a local BMAP directly affects the key
distribution latency, we measured the AKDD, the MKDD and the message delivery
ratio of the key distribution protocols in the presence of background traffic to the
BMAP. In this experiment, an additional MAP is placed in the network as a source to
transmit background traffic to the local BMAP at a specific constant bit rate (CBR).
We vary the background traffic rate from 0 to 50 Mbits/s. There is no background
traffic when the data rate is 0. We simulated a topology with four adjacent BMAPs
as shown in Figure 4.13(b), and two scenarios: 10 and 50 clients.
(3) the number of clients. We measured the AKDD, the MKDD, and the message deliv-
ery ratio of the key distribution protocols as functions of the number of clients. In
each experiment, we used three BMAP topologies as shown in Figure 4.13(a), Fig-
ure 4.13(b), and Figure 4.13(c). All clients moved at the same speed of 10m/s. The
number of clients varied from 10 to 50.
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4.4.2.2.2 Performance of the Authentication Protocols
In this section, we compare the inter-network handover authentication protocol (IHAP)
with the AP-AKA. Since an authentication protocol is only executed between a client
and a BMAP, we used the BMAP configuration shown in Figure 4.13(a), in which the
local BMAP L has one adjacent BMAP M . An authentication server is located six hops
away from M . The use of the authentication server helps to illustrate the high overhead
of the multi-hop inter-network handover authentication approach used by the AP-AKA.
We conducted two sets of experiments for the authentication protocols by varying:
(1) background traffic load. We measured the average inter-network authentication delay
(AIAD) and maximum inter-network authentication delay (MIAD) incurred by each
protocol as functions of the background traffic. In this experiment, the BMAP that is
executing the IHAP or the AP-AKA is also receiving data (background traffic) from
another source (not shown in Figure 4.13(a)). The background traffic is transmitted
at a specific constant bit rate (CBR). We vary the background traffic rate from 0
to 50 Mbits/s. A data rate of 0 implies no background traffic. We conducted the
experiment for two scenarios: 10 and 50 clients.
(2) the number of clients. We compared the IHAP with the AP-AKA in terms of the
average inter-network authentication delay (AIAD) and the maximum inter-network
authentication delay (MIAD). The number of clients varied from 10 to 50. All clients
moved at the same speed of 10m/s.
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The simulation parameters specific to each experiment are summarized in Table 4.6.
In all experiments, the mobile clients were randomly placed in the networks. To test the
scalability of the protocols, we let all clients present in the network send key distribution
or authentication requests to their respective nearby BMAPs simultaneously (i.e., the
worst case scenario for the BMAPs).
4.4.2.3 Result Analysis
The results for the performance of the key distribution protocols are illustrated in Fig-
ures 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16. The results for the performance of the authentication protocols
are illustrated in Figures 4.17 and 4.18.
4.4.2.3.1 Performance of the Key Distribution
Experiment (1): Function of the number of adjacent BMAPs
The performance of the key distribution as a function of the number of adjacent
BMAPs is given in Figure 4.14.
• Key distribution delay
Figure 4.14(a) shows that the higher number of adjacent BMAPs, the higher
the AKDD and the MKDD. For example, the AKDD in the case of eight
adjacent BMAPs is 1.9 times (3.6 times) higher than that of one adjacent
BMAP for 10 clients (50 clients). A larger number of adjacent BMAPs implies
more key distribution messages to be transmitted by the local BMAP and
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Table 4.6: Simulation parameters for different experiments
Experiment Figure Network Clients
P
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
o
f
K
D
N
(1) Function Figure 4.14(a), key A local BMAP has 1, 4, 8 10 clients,
of number distribution delay adjacent BMAPs 50 clients
of adjacent Figure 4.14(b), message
BMAPs delivery ratio of the
key distribution protocols
(2) Function Figure 4.15(a), key A local BMAP has 4 adjacent 10 clients,
of distribution delay BMAPs. 50 clients
background Figure 4.15(b), message Background traffic rate:
traffic load delivery ratio of the 0-50Mbits/s
key distribution protocols
(3) Function Figure 4.16(a), key A local BMAP has 1 10 to 50
of number distribution delay adjacent BMAP clients
of clients Figure 4.16(b), message
delivery ratio of the
key distribution protocols
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(1) Function Figure 4.17, A local BMAP has 1 adjacent 10 clients,
of IHAP vs. AP-AKA BMAP. An authentication server 50 clients
background is located six hops away
traffic from each BMAP. Background
load traffic rate: 0-50Mbits/s
(2) Function Figure 4.18, A local BMAP has 1 adjacent 10 to 50
of number IHAP vs. AP-AKA BMAP. An authentication server clients
of clients is located six hops away
from each BMAP.
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(a) Key distribution delay
(b) Message delivery ratio of the key distribution protocols
Figure 4.14: Function of number of adjacent BMAPs
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adjacent BMAPs, resulting in longer key distribution delay.
The key distribution delay should be minimized so that an adjacent BMAP
could receive a shared key before the client associated with the key connects
to it. In the worst case scenario, the client and an adjacent BMAP may have
to execute the login authentication protocol (LAP) if the adjacent BMAP has
not received the shared key in advance.
In a WMN deployed by Cisco, typical MAP-to-MAP distances are 500 feet
(152.4m) to 1000 feet (304.8m) [107]. Given a mobile client moves at 60
km/hour (16.7 m/s) (e.g., a car running in the city), it takes 9.1 second to
18.3 second to travel from one MAP to another given a distance of 500 to 1000
feet. If a mobile client moves at 100 km/hour (27.8 m/s) (e.g., a car running
on highways), it takes 5.5 seconds to 11 seconds to cross a distance of 500 to
1000 feet between two MAPs.
In Figure 4.14(a), as the number of the adjacent BMAPs increases from one to
eight, the maximum latency of our key distributions for 50 clients ranges from
113.8ms to 406.9ms. The longest latency of our key distributions is much less
than the shortest time for a car crossing a 500 feet distance at 100 km/hour,
406.9ms vs. 5.5 seconds. Thus, our key distribution protocols allow a BMAP to
distribute a shared key to its adjacent BMAPs long before the client associated
with the key connects to one of the adjacent BMAPs.
• Message delivery ratio of the key distribution protocols
233
Figure 4.14(b) shows the message delivery ratio of the key distribution pro-
tocols as a function of the number of adjacent BMAPs. We observe that the
number of adjacent BMAPs does not have a big impact on the message de-
livery ratio of the key distribution protocols. When the number of adjacent
BMAPs increases from one to eight, the message delivery ratio for 10 clients
are 100% and 99.1%, respectively, a difference of 0.9%. For the 50 clients,
the message delivery ratio changes from 99.8% to 99.7% when the number of
adjacent BMAPs increases from one to eight, a difference of 0.1%.
In summary, the more adjacent BMAPs, the higher the key distribution latency.
However, too few adjacent BMAPs may limit the client’s mobility for inter-network
handovers. In practice, the optional number of adjacent BMAPs depends on several
factors such as the number of adjacent networks, the size of each network, and the
transmission range of an BMAP.
Experiment (2): Function of background traffic load
In this set of experiments, we examine how background traffic load may affect the
performance of the key distribution protocols.
An additional MAP was placed in the network as a source to transmit background
traffic to the local BMAP at a specific constant bit rate (CBR). We varied the data
rate of CBR from 0 to 50 Mbits/s. We simulated a topology with four adjacent
BMAPs as shown in Figure 4.13(b).
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(a) Key distribution delay
(b) Message delivery ratio of the key distribution protocols
Figure 4.15: Function of background traffic load
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• Key distribution delay
The graph in Figure 4.15(a) shows the AKDD and the MKDD as functions of
background traffic for both scenarios, 10 and 50 clients. As the background
traffic load increases, the AKDD and the MKDD increase as expected. The
AKDD with 50Mbits/s background traffic for 10 (50) clients is 41.8% (38.5%),
higher than the AKDD with 10 Mbits/s background traffic.
A larger number of clients also results in longer AKDD’s and MKDD’s. When
there is no background traffic, the AKDD (MKDD) of 50 clients is 24.1%
(37.2%) higher than that of 10 clients. More clients imply more requests to be
processed by the local BMAP, and more channel contention around the local
BMAP, resulting in longer key distribution delay.
In Figure 4.15(a), given the heaviest background traffic of 50 Mbit/s, the
highest latency of key distributions for 50 clients is 333.9ms. The latency is
much shorter than 5.5 seconds, the shortest time for a car crossing a 500 feet
distance between two BMAPs at 100 km/hour. Thus, even with the heaviest
background traffic of 50 Mbit/s, a BMAP is able to send a shared key to its
adjacent BMAPs before the client associated with the key moves into contact
with one of the adjacent BMAPs.
• Message delivery ratio
Figure 4.15(b) shows the impact of the background traffic load on the mes-
sage delivery ratio of the key distribution protocols. As the data rate of the
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background traffic increases, the message delivery ratio decreases. When the
background traffic increases from 0 to 50 Mbits/s, the message delivery ratio
for 10 (50) clients decreases from 99.1% (99.7%) to 97.9% (98.3%).
In summary, the latency of key distributions increases as expected when the back-
ground traffic load increases. The reason is the additional load imposed on the local
BMAP by the background traffic. However, in all simulation scenarios with light
to heavy traffic, the latency of key distribution is sufficiently short for shared keys
to be received by adjacent BMAPs before clients associated with the keys make
contact with the BMAPs.
Experiment (3): Function of number of clients
• Key distribution delay
The performance of the key distribution as a function of the number of clients
is shown in Figure 4.16(a). In this experiment, we simulated three topologies
with one, four and eight adjacent BMAPs as shown in Figure 4.13. As the
number of clients increases from 10 to 50, the AKDD ranges from 101.2ms
to 202.2ms, from 159.3ms to 241.7ms, and from 251.8ms to 417.2ms for the
network of one, four and eight adjacent BMAPs, respectively. All these key
distribution latencies are much shorter than 5.5 seconds, which is approximate
the time for a car to travel 500 feet from one BMAP to another at 100 km/hour.
In all three networks, the AKDDs of 10 clients are much lower than those
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(a) Key distribution delay
(b) Message delivery ratio of the key distribution protocols
Figure 4.16: Function of number of clients
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of 50 clients, approximately 49.9%, 34%, and 39.8% lower in the network of
one, four and eight BMAPs, respectively. More mobile clients imply more key
distribution messages to be processed by the local BMAP, and more channel
contention around the local BMAP, resulting in longer key distribution delay.
We also observe that a larger number of adjacent BMAPs results in longer
AKDD, which is consistence with the simulation results of Experiment (1)
shown in Figure 4.14(a).
• Message delivery ratio of the key distribution protocols
In this experiment, we examine how the number of clients affects the message
delivery ratio of the key distribution protocols. Figure 4.16(b) shows the mes-
sage delivery ratio of the key distribution protocols as a function of the number
of clients. We implemented three networks as above, which have one, four and
eight BMAPs, respectively.
In all three networks, the message delivery ratios are in the range of 99.1%
to 100%. As the number of clients increases from 10 to 50 in the networks
of one, four and eight adjacent BMAPs, the message delivery ratio decreases
0.2%, 0.6%, and 0.6%, respectively. We also observer that a larger number of
adjacent BMAPs leads to a lower message delivery ratio.
In summary, the key distribution latency is affected by all three factors, the number
of adjacent BMAPs, background traffic load and the number of clients. An adjacent
BMAP should receive a shared key in advance before authenticating a mobile client,
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so that the key distribution delay will not increase the inter-network authentica-
tion latency. The simulation results show that our proposed key pre-distribution
protocols are effective for use in real-world wireless mesh networks.
4.4.2.3.2 Performance of the Authentication Protocols: IHAP vs. AP-AKA
Experiment (1): Function of background traffic load
In this set of experiments, we compare the IHAP with the AP-AKA and examine
how background traffic may affect the inter-network handover authentication.
In this experiment, an additional MAP was placed in the network as a source to
transmit background traffic to the BMAPs at a specific constant bit rate (CBR). We
vary the CBR of background traffic from 0 to 50 Mbits/s. An authentication server
is located six hops away from a BMAP. The use of the authentication server helps
to illustrate the high overhead of the multi-hop wireless inter-network handover
authentication approach used by the AP-AKA.
Figure 4.17 shows the average inter-network authentication delay (AIAD) and the
maximum inter-network authentication delay (MIAD) of the IHAP and the AP-
AKA as functions of background traffic load. We observe that the background
traffic has less impact on the IHAP compared to the AP-AKA. For example, when
the number of clients is 10 and the background traffic rate increases from 0 to 50
Mbit/s, the AIAD (MIAD) of the IHAP increases approximately 1.75 (1.66) times
while the AIAD (MIAD) of the AP-AKA increases 2.71 (3.04) times.
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(a) IHAP vs. AP-AKA - AIAD
(b) IHAP vs. AP-AKA - MIAD
Figure 4.17: Function of background traffic load
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The IHAP outperforms the AP-AKA by a large margin in terms of the AIAD and
the MIAD. For example, when the background traffic rate is 50Mbits/s, the AIAD
of the AP-AKA for 50 clients is approximately six times higher than that of the
IHAP. This outperformance is the result of one-hop communications between the
client and the adjacent BMAP during an inter-network handover authentication
versus multi-hop communication between the client and the authentication server
done by the AP-AKA. Moreover, the AIAD and the MIAD of the IHAP is much
lower than that of the AP-AKA due to a reduction in the number of messages
exchanged, 3 vs. 4 + 2h (see the second last row of Table 4.4).
Compared with the AP-AKA, the IHAP offers significantly lower AIAD and MIAD
in both 10-client and 50-client scenarios, thanks to one-hop communication between
the client and the adjacent BAMP, and a reduction in the number of messages
exchanged in the IHAP.
Experiment (2): Function of the number of clients
In this set of experiments, we use the same network settings as above except there
is no background traffic transmitted to the adjacent BMAP. We vary the number
of clients from 10 to 50. We compare the IHAP with the AP-AKA in terms of the
AIAD and the MIAD for inter-network handover authentications.
The graph in Figure 4.18 shows the performance of the IHAP and the AP-AKA.
As the number of clients increases from 10 to 50, the AIAD and the MIAD of
both schemes increase as expected. The reason is that more clients implies more
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Figure 4.18: Function of number of clients
authentication messages transmitted to the adjacent BMAP, which results in higher
workload for and channel contention around the adjacent BMAP.
Given 10 mobile clients connecting to the same BMAP, the AIAD of the IHAP and
the AP-AKA are 51.5ms and 179.5ms, respectively. The IHAP improves the inter-
network authentication delay by 128ms or 71.3% compared with the AP-AKA. As
the number of clients increases, the performance gap between the IHAP and the
AP-AKA becomes larger. In the case of 50 clients, the AIAD of the IHAP is 78.03%
lower than that of the AP-AKA.
The graph also shows the MIAD of both protocols. The MIAD of the IHAP is
about 62.3% lower than the MIAD of the AP-AKA. The amounts of cryptographic
computation performed by the IHAP and the AP-AKA are very similar (0.12ms vs.
0.15ms as shown in the third row of Table 4.12). This shows that the gain of the
IHAP over the AP-AKA is mainly due to one-hop communication versus multi-hop
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communication, and due to the reduction of the number of messages exchanged
from 4 + 2h (AP-AKA) to 3 (IHAP).
In summary, both the numerical analysis and simulation results confirm that the
proposed security protocols outperform existing home-foreign domain solutions in
terms of authentication delay. Our proposed authentication framework thus con-
tributes towards the development of a faster inter-network handover process for
mobile clients using real-time services in WMNs.
4.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we present a novel inter-network authentication framework to minimize
the inter-network authentication delay. The framework includes an inter-network authen-
tication architecture, a trust model, certificates, and key distribution and authentication
protocols. A client and a foreign BMAP mutually authenticate each other using the
client’s inter-network transfer certificate via one-hop communications. The foreign BMAP
does not require to communicate with an authentication server through multi-hop wireless
communications. This approach allows the authentication delay to be minimized. Secu-
rity analysis shows that our proposed protocols are resilient to various types of attacks.
The numerical analysis and simulation results demonstrate that our security protocols are
effective with respect to minimizing authentication delay, and confirm that our proposed
solution outperforms the home-foreign domain authentication approach in terms of the
delay of authentication among multiple wireless mesh networks.
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In the next chapter, we present a new implementation of group key management at
the data link layer in order to reduce the key update latency from linear time as currently
done in IEEE 802.11 standards to logarithmic time. This contribution is to minimize the
latency of the handover process of members in a multicast or broadcast group.
245
Chapter 5
Efficient Group Key Management
for Wireless Mesh Access Points
Real-time applications need very fast rekeying so that changes in group membership are
not disruptive to the real-time applications. Group key management (GKM) refers to
the actions taken to update and distribute the group key upon a client joining or leaving
a multicast group. The scheme defined in the IEEE 802.11s standard for group key
management at the data link layer is not scalable, because the rekeying latency grows
linearly as a function of the mutlicast/broadcast group size.
To minimize the group key update latency, we propose a new implementation of group
key management at the data link layer in mesh access points (MAPs) of a WMN. (We
often use the term “data link” instead of “medium access control” in the dissertation
because the former is shorter, and the abbreviation “MAC” is used to denote “message
authentication code”.) Our new GKM implementation is based on the logical key hi-
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erarchy (LKH) [13] and one-way function tree (OFT) [14] algorithms. We evaluate the
performance of the proposed implementation via numerical analysis and simulations. We
present our simulation results obtained from various network conditions under realistic
settings. Numerical analysis and simulation results confirm that our proposed imple-
mentation of group key management reduces the rekeying latency from linear time (as
currently done in IEEE 802.11 standards) to logarithmic time.
In Section 5.1, we present an overview of the LKH and OFT algorithms. In Section 5.2,
we describe our new implementation of GKM at the data link layer, which is based on the
LKH and OFT algorithms. We analyze the performance of each group key management
scheme in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, we present simulation results and discuss the
findings. We summarize the chapter in Section 5.5.
5.1 Overview of LKH and OFT Algorithms
Both the LKH and OFT algorithms use a hierarchical key structure called a logical key
tree to ensure scalable key updates. In this section, we first describe the structure of a
logical key tree, along with definitions and notations to be used in this chapter. We then
describe the operations of the LKH and OFT algorithms.
5.1.1 Logical Key Tree
A key tree is a logical data structure used in hierarchical GKM schemes. A logical key
tree is not to be confused with the physical multicast routing tree of the same group [132],
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or the recovery tree used in reliable multicast for retransmissions of lost/damaged data
packets [133]. Logical key trees provide scalable computation, maintenance, and updates
of multicast group keys.
Logical key trees are generated and maintained by a group key server (GKS). For
group key management at the application layer, a GKS is a computing server located in
the Internet. A GKS is a trusted entity in charge of generating and maintaining logical
key trees for multicast groups in the network it serves. A GKS processes requests from
group members, updates group keys, and distributes new keys to members using rekeying
messages. The GKS can deliver rekeying messages to members using either unicast or
multicast communications.
Given a logical key tree, let Ki denote the content of the key stored in a node i in
the key tree. Every leaf node i is associated with a group member C, and contains the
member’s individual key, which is generated by the GKS and known only to member C
and the GKS. We say that “group member C owns node i” or “is associated with node
i”.
Consider a multicast group having six members CA, CB, CC ,CD,CE , and CF whose
logical key tree is shown in Figure 5.1. The leaf nodes 6, 7, ..., 11 contain the individual
keys K6,K7, . . . ,K11 of the six group members CA, CB, . . . , CF , respectively. Non-leaf
nodes are not associated with any members. The contents stored in non-leaf nodes are
keys called intermediate keys, which are used to compute the final group key in a scalable
manner. In the above example, nodes 2, 3, 4, 5 store intermediate keys.
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The content of the root, node 1, is the group key denoted by K1. The group key
is used by the source of the group to encrypt data packets before sending them to the
group members, and by the group members to decrypt the encrypted packets. The group
key K1 needs to be updated when a member joins (leaves) the group to ensure forward
(backward) secrecy. It also needs to be refreshed periodically even when there are no
membership changes to prevent an attacker from gathering sufficient time or resources to
compute the group key.
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Figure 5.1: A logical key tree
To simplify the discussions in this article, we assume logical key tress of the binary
form, although trees of higher degrees can be used with LKH, as discussed in [13]. Fur-
thermore, binary key tress used in OFT must be proper binary trees [14]; that is, every
non-leaf node must have exactly two children.
Given a proper binary tree, we use the following notation to identify the tree nodes.
The root of the tree has index 1. Given a non-leaf node with index i, the left child of node
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i has index 2i, and right child of node i has index 2i + 1. To simplify the discussions,
we assume that a logical key tree is a complete binary tree: A binary tree T with n
levels is complete if all levels except possibly the last. At the last level, all nodes must
be as far left as possible [112]. That is, nodes in a complete binary tree are added to
the key tree from top to bottom and left to right. Nodes are removed from the key tree
from right to left and bottom to top. Given a group with n members and a complete
binary tree, the height of the key tree is thus h = dlog2 ne, and the height of the root is
hroot = dlog2 ne − 1.
Following are the notations used in this chapter:
• Ki is the current content of node i and K ′i is a new key generated/computed to
replace Ki when there is a membership change which requires the key tree to be
updated.
• The notation {X}Y denotes the encryption of content X using key Y .
• sib(i) denotes the sibling node of node i.
– If i is an even number, sib(i) = i+ 1
– If i is an odd number, sib(i) = i− 1
When we say “node i performs an action,” we mean that “the group member owning
(associated with) node i performs the action.”
Following is a high-level description of how the structure of a logical key tree is updated
when a member joins or leaves the multicast group.
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5.1.1.1 Join
After receiving a join request from a client, the GKS first identifies the joining point. If
the current key tree is full, the joining point is the leftmost leaf node located at height 0
− the lowest level of the tree. If the key tree is not full, the joining point is the leftmost
leaf node located at height 1 of the key tree.
Let i be the index of the joining point. The GKS creates two new leaf nodes and
makes node i become the parent of the new nodes. The group member currently owning
node i will no longer be associated with node i, but rather with node 2i. With this
updated association, the GKS will assign the previous key Ki as key K2i to the member
now owning node 2i, i.e. though renamed the member will retain its previous key and
key contents. The new member joining the group will be associated with node 2i+1 as a
sibling of node 2i. The GKS will generate a new key K2i+1 for the newly joining member.
Node i will become a non-leaf node storing an intermediate key. The GKS generates an
intermediate key K ′i for node i. All the intermediate keys along the path from the joining
point i to the root and the group key at the root will be updated, as will be discussed in
Sections 5.1.2.1 and 5.1.3.2.
Consider an example illustrated by Figure 5.2 in which client CH joins the group by
sending a join request to the GKS. Upon receiving the join request, the GKS determines
the joining point as node 7, which is currently owned by member CG. The GKS creates
two new leaf nodes of node 7; node 14 and node 15 respectively. At this point, client
CH joins the group and is associated with node 15. After the join operation, member CG
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will change its ownership from node 7 to node 14. To prevent the newly joined client CH
from accessing past messages, all keys along the path from the joining point node 7 to the
root node 1 need to be changed. As shown in Figure 5.2, the group key server updates
the key K7, K3 and K1 to K
′
7, K
′
3 and K
′
1, respectively.  
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Figure 5.2: Client CH joins the group
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5.1.1.2 Leave
After receiving a leave request from a member, the GKS first identifies the leaving point.
The leaving point, node dj/2e, is the parent of the leaf node j owned by the member
that is leaving. The member currently owning node sib(j) will be moved to be associated
with node dj/2e, the parent node. The GKS copies the content of node sib(j) to node
dj/2e, and deletes both nodes j and sib(j) from the key tree. All the intermediate keys
along the path from the leaving point to the root and the group key at the root will be
updated as will be discussed in Sections 5.1.2.2 and 5.1.3.3.
Consider an example illustrated by Figure 5.3 in which member CH leaves the group.
The leaving point is node 7, the parent of node 15 owned by CH . The GKS deletes the
leaf node 15 from the key tree, and moves the content of node 14 to the location of the
parent, node 7. To prevent the leaving member CH from accessing future messages, all
keys along the path from the leaving point node 7 to the root node 1 need to be changed.
As shown in Figure 5.3, key K7, K3 and K1 are changed to the new key K
′
7, K
′
3 and K
′
1,
respectively.
5.1.2 LKH Operations
The LKH algorithm [13] is a tree-based GKM scheme using symmetric-key cryptogra-
phy. In the LKH algorith, the root node of the key tree stores the group key for data
encryption/decryption, which is shared by all members in the group.
Each group member is associated with a leaf node, which contains an individual key of
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each member. An individual key is shared only between the member owning the key and
the group key server, and is used for pairwise secure communication between the member
and the group key server. The non-leaf nodes, except the root node, store intermediate
keys that are used to encrypt other intermediate keys or the group key (not data) during
a rekeying process. Each member of the group stores the keys along the path from the
root to the leaf node assigned to that member (i.e., dlog2 ne keys, where n is the number
of group members). The storage requirement from each member is thus O(logn).
5.1.2.1 LKH Join Operation
After receiving a join request from a new member, the GKS performs the following actions:
• Identifying the joining point i as discussed in Section 5.1.1.
• Creating two new leaf nodes with indices 2i and 2i + 1, which are the children of
node i.
• Copying the content of node i to node 2i: K2i = Ki The member previously owning
node i is now associated with node 2i.
• Generating an intermediate key K ′i for node i.
• Assigning node 2i+ 1 to the new joining member and generating a new key K2i+1
for this leaf node (for the new member).
Consider the example illustrated by Figure 5.2 in which client CH joins the group.
After receiving a join request from CH , the GKS identifies a joining point, node 7, and
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creates two new leaf nodes, node 14 and node 15, which are the children of node 7. The
GKS then copies the content of node 7 to node 14 as member CG previously owning node
7 is now associated with node 14. An intermediate key K ′7 is then generated by GKS for
node 7. The GKS also assigns node 15 to the new joining member CH , and generates a
new key K8 for the new member CH .
The GKS then updates the key tree as follows.
1. The GKS updates all keys on the path from node i to the root: it generates new
keys K ′i,K
′
di/2e,K
′
di/4e, . . . ,K
′
1 for nodes i, di/2e, di/4e, . . . , 1, respectively. Given
the example in Figure 5.2, the GKS generates new keys K ′7, K ′3, and K ′1 for nodes
7, 3 and 1 (the shaded nodes), respectively.
2. The GKS sends the above new keys to the new member in a secure message en-
crypted with the new member’s individual key K2i+1:
{K ′i,K ′di/2eK ′di/4e, . . . ,K ′1}K2i+1 . After decrypting the message, the new member
obtains the intermediate keys associated with the nodes on the path from itself to
the root and the new group key K ′1. In the above example, the GKS sends the
following message to the new member CH : {K ′1,K ′3,K ′7}K15 .
3. The GKS encrypts the new keys K ′i,K
′
di/2e,K
′
di/4e, . . . ,K
′
1 using the current keys
Ki,Kdi/2e, Kdi/4e, . . . ,K1, respectively, to obtain {K ′i}Ki , {K ′di/2e}Kdi/2e , {K ′di/4e}Kdi/4e
. . . , K ′1. The GKS then sends each encrypted new key {K ′j}Kj to the existing mem-
bers associated with the leaf nodes in the subtree rooted at node j. In the above
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example, the GKS sends
• {K ′7}K7 to node CG;
• {K ′3}K3 to nodes CE , CF and CG;
• {K ′1}K1 to nodes CA, CB, . . . , CF and CG.
Upon receiving the above messages, the members decrypt them using the current
keys to obtain the new intermediate keys and the new group key K ′1.
Note that the GKS may combine multiple messages into a physical packet before
sending to the members in order to save network bandwidth. Each member will then
extract the rekeying message(s) it needs. In Section 5.2.1.2, we will discuss how this is
implemented when the LKH algorithm is applied to group key management in WMNs.
5.1.2.2 LKH Leave Operation
After receiving a leave request from a member associated with a leaf node v, the GKS
performs the following actions:
• Deleting the leaf node v from the key tree. The parent node i = dv/2e is the leaving
point.
• “Moving” the sibling of node v to the location of the parent node i. That is,
K ′i = Ksib(v).
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• Deleting the sibling of node v from the key tree (whose content had been copied to
node i in the previous step).
Consider the example illustrated by Figure 5.3 in which client CH leaves the group.
After receiving a leave request from CH , the GKS identifies a leaving point, node 7, and
deletes the leaf nodes 15 from the key tree. The GKS then copies the content of node 14
to node 7 as member CG previously owning node 14 is now associated with node 7. Node
14 is then deleted by the GKS from the key tree as its content had been copied to node
7.
The GKS then updates the key tree as follows.
1. The GKS updates all intermediate keys on the path from the leaving point i to
the root. That is, the GKS generates new keys K ′di/2e,K
′
di/4e, . . . ,K
′
1 for nodes
di/2e, di/4e, . . . , 1, respectively. (The leaving point i is now a leaf node containing
the individual key of a group member.) Given the example in Figure 5.3, the
GKS generates new keys K ′7, K ′3, and K ′1 for nodes 7, 3 and 1 (the shaded nodes),
respectively. Node 7 now contains the individual key of member CG.
2. For every new key K ′j generated in the above step, the GKS encrypts K
′
j using the
key of the left child of node j to obtain {K ′j}K2j . The GKS then sends {K ′j}K2j to
the leaf nodes in the left subtree rooted at node j (i.e., the subtree rooted at node
2i). Upon receiving {K ′j}K2j , these leaf nodes use the key K2j , which they know,
to decrypt the message to obtain the new key K ′j . When j = 1, that is the new
group key K ′1.
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In the above example, the GKS sends
• {K ′3}K6 to node CE and CF ;
• {K ′1}K2 to node CA, CB, CC and CD.
Similarly, the GKS encrypts K ′j using the key of the right child of node j to obtain
{K ′j}K2j+1 . The GKS then sends {K ′j}K2j+1 to the leaf nodes in the right subtree
rooted at node j. Upon receiving {K ′j}K2j+1 , these leaf nodes use the key K2j+1,
which they know, to decrypt the message to obtain the new key K ′j .
In the above example, the GKS sends
• {K ′3}K′7 to node CG;
• {K ′1}K′3 to node CE , CF and CG.
Upon receiving the above messages, the members decrypt them using the current
keys to obtain the new intermediate keys and the new group key K ′1. In practice,
the GKS can combine all the above messages into one single packet and broadcast
to all members in the group to save network bandwidth.
5.1.3 OFT Operations
The OFT [14] algorithm is a scalable centralized scheme based on the application of one-
way function trees and a bottom-up approach to calculate the group key of a multicast
group.
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5.1.3.1 OFT Overview
Each node i in an OFT logical tree is associated with three types of keys as follows:
• Ki: node secret
• f(Ki): blinded node key
• g(Ki): node key
If node i is a leaf node, the node secret Ki is known only to the GKS and the group
member owning node i. (The member’s node secret Ki in OFT plays the same role as a
member’s individual key used in LKH.) When the group member owning node i joins the
group, the GKS generates the node secret Ki and sends it to the new member (securely
using a shared key for one-to-one communications between the member and the GKS).
A blinded node key f(Ki) is defined as a one-way function of the node secret Ki.
Blinded keys are generated by a pseudo-random function f . (Pseudo-random functions
are used to generate random numbers.) It is blinded in the sense that a computationally
limited adversary may know f(Ki), yet cannot compute Ki. Group members use blinded
keys and node keys to compute the group key K1.
A node key g(Ki) is used to encrypt other keys such as blinded node keys. A pseudo-
random function g is used to compute node key g(Ki) for each node i. Every group
member knows the pseudo-random functions f and g.
Following is the sequence of operations performed by a group member associated with
a leaf node i in order to compute the group key, K1. We also provide an example, using
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the group in Figure 5.4, which shows how member CC associated with node 10 computes
the group key K1.
Action Output Example
Compute f(Ki), g(Ki) f(K10), g(K10)
Receive from GKS {f(Ksib(i))}g(Ki) {f(K11)}g(K10)
Decrypt the above message f(Ksib(i)) f(K11)
Compute parent’s node secret Kdi/2e = f(Ki)⊕ f(Ksib(i)) K5 = f(K10)⊕ f(K11)
Receive from GKS {f(Ksib(di/2e))}g(Kdi/2e) {f(K4)}g(K5)
Decrypt the above message f(Ksib(di/2e)) f(K4)
Compute grand-parent’s node secret Kdi/4e = f(Kdi/2e)⊕ f(Ksib(di/2e)) K2 = f(K4)⊕ f(K5)
Receive from GKS {f(Ksib(di/4e))}g(Kdi/4e) {f(K3)}g(K2)
Decrypt the above message f(Ksib(di/4e)) f(K3)
... ...
Compute group key K1 = f(K2)⊕ f(K3) K1 = f(K2)⊕ f(K3)
In the above sequence, node i receives from the GKS several encrypted values f(Ksib(j))
for j = i, di/2e, di/4e, . . . . In practice, the GKS can combine all these encrypted values
into one message as shown below and sends it to node i as follows:
{f(Ksib(i))}g(Ki), {f(Ksib(di/2e))}g(Kdi/2e), {f(Ksib(di/4e))}g(Kdi/4e), . . .
In summary, every leaf node i (the member owning node i)
1. needs to store only the blinded node keys of its sibling and the siblings of its ances-
tors (except the root) in the key tree: f(Ksib(i)), f(Ksib(di/2e)), f(Ksib(di/4e)), . . . .
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2. applies the following equation recursively to compute the node secrets of its ances-
tors, including the group key K1, from the bottom to the top:
Kdj/2e = f(Kj)⊕ f(Ksib(j)), j = i, di/2e, di/4e, . . . (5.1)
3. can compute the ancestors’ node keys g(Kdi/2e), g(Kdi/4e), . . . (which are used
by the GKS to encrypt the blinded keys of the ancestors’ siblings f(Ksib(di/2e)),
f(Ksib(di/4e)), . . . , respectively, when the GKS updates the key tree due to members
joining or leaving.)
In the following sub-sections, we describe in detail how the key tree is updated and a
new group key is computed when a member joins or leaves the group.
5.1.3.2 OFT Join Operation
After receiving a join request from a new member, the GKS performs the following actions:
• Identifying the joining point i as discussed in Section 5.1.1.
• Creating two new leaf nodes with indices 2i and 2i + 1, which are the children of
node i. Node i now becomes a non-leaf node storing intermediate keys.
• Generating a new individual key (node secret) K2i and computing a blinded node
key f(K2i) for the member previously owning node i, who is now associated with
node 2i.
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Figure 5.4: Client CH joins the group - OFT
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• Assigning node 2i + 1 to the new joining member, generating an individual key
(node secret) K2i+1 and computing a blinded node key f(K2i+1) for this leaf node
(for the new member).
Consider the example illustrated by Figure 5.4 in which client CH joins the group.
After receiving a join request from CH , the GKS identifies a joining point, node 7, and
creates two new leaf nodes, node 14 and node 15, which are the children of node 7. The
GKS then generates a new individual key K14 and computes a blinded node key f(K14)
for member CG who previously owned node 7 and now is associated with node 14. The
GKS also assigns node 15 to the new member CH , generates an individual key K15 and
computes a blinded node key f(K15) for this new leaf node 15.
The content of the key tree is then updated as follows.
1. The GKS re-computes the node secrets of the nodes on the path from node i to
the root, di/2e, di/4e, . . . , 1 recursively using Eq. (1), K2i, K2i+1 and blinded keys
remain unaffected by the membership change. The new node secrets are K ′i, K
′
di/2e,
K ′di/4e, . . . , K
′
1. For example,
K ′i = f(K2i)⊕ f(K2i+1),
K ′di/2e = f(K
′
i)⊕ f(Ksib(i)) and so on.
Given the example in Figure 5.4, the GKS re-computes the node secrets of node 7,
3 and 1 recursively using Eq. (1) as follows:
• K ′7 = f(K14)⊕ f(K15);
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• K ′3 = f(K6)⊕ f(K ′7);
• K ′1 = f(K2)⊕ f(K ′3).
2. The roup key server GKS computes the new blinded node keys f(K ′i), f(K
′
di/2e),
f(K ′di/4e), . . . , f(K
′
c) on the path from node i up to node c where c is a child of the
root (c = 2 if the joining point i is in the left subtree and c = 3 otherwise).
In the above example, the GKS computes the new blinded node keys f(K ′7) and
f(K ′3).
3. For each new blinded key f(K ′j) (j = i, di/2e, di/4e, . . . , c), the GKS encrypts it
using the node key of the sibling of node j: {f(K ′j)}g(Ksib(j)). The GKS then
sends {f(K ′j)}g(Ksib(j)) to the leaf nodes in the subtree rooted at node sib(j). Upon
receiving {f(K ′j)}g(Ksib(j)), these leaf nodes decrypt the message using g(Ksib(j)),
which they know because node sib(j) is one of their ancestors (see item (3) of the
summary at the end of Section 5.1.3.1).
In the above example, the GKS sends
• {f(K14), f(K6), f(K2)}g(K15) to node CH ;
• {f(K15)}g(K14) to node CG;
• {f(K ′7)}g(K6) to node CE and CF ;
• {f(K ′3)}g(K2) to node CA, CB, CC and CD.
4. After a leaf node receives all the necessary new blinded keys (sent by the GKS in
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the above step), it re-calculates the group key using Eq. (1), the new blinded keys,
and applicable keys that are unchanged.
In the example above, member CG and CH can compute the group key using Eq.
(1) recursively as follows:
• K ′7 = f(K14)⊕ f(K15);
• K ′3 = f(K6)⊕ f(K ′7);
• K ′1 = f(K2)⊕ f(K ′3).
Client CE and CF can re-calculate the new group key K
′
1 recursively as follows:
• K ′3 = f(K6)⊕ f(K ′7);
• K ′1 = f(K2)⊕ f(K ′3).
Client CA, CB, CC and CD re-calculate the new group key K
′
1 as follows: K
′
1 =
f(K2)⊕ f(K ′3).
5.1.3.3 OFT Leave Operation
After receiving a leave request from a member associated with a leaf node v, the GKS
performs the following actions:
• Deleting the leaf node v from the key tree. The parent node i = dv/2e is the leaving
point.
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• “Moving” the sibling of node v to the location of the parent node i. The member
previously owning node sib(v) is now associated with node i. The GKS generates
a new individual key K ′i for this member and stores it in node i.
• Deleting the sibling of node v from the key tree.
Consider the example illustrated by Figure 5.5 in which client CH leaves the group.
After receiving a leave request from CH , the GKS identifies the leaving point, node 7, and
deletes the leaf node 15 from the key tree. The GKS then copies the content of node 14 to
the location of node 7 because member CG previously owning node 14 is now associated
with node 7. The GKS then generates a new individual key (node secret) K ′7 for member
CG and stores it in node 7. Node 14 is then deleted by the GKS from the key tree.
The content of the key tree is then updated as follows.
1. The GKS re-computes the node secrets of the nodes on the path from i’s parent to
the root di/2e, di/4e, . . . , 1 recursively using Eq. (1), K ′i and blinded keys remain
unaffected by the membership change. The new node secrets are K ′di/2e, K
′
di/4e, . . . ,
K ′1. For example,
K ′di/2e = f(K
′
i)⊕ f(Ksib(i)) and so on.
Given the example in Figure 5.5, the following blinded keys are not affected by the
membership change: f(K2) and f(K6). The GKS re-computes the node secrets of
node 3 and 1 recursively using Eq. (1) as follows:
• K ′3 = f(K6)⊕ f(K ′7);
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• K ′1 = f(K2)⊕ f(K ′3).
2. The group key server computes new blinded node keys f(K ′i), f(K
′
di/2e), f(K
′
di/4e),
. . . , f(K ′c) on the path from node i up to node c where c is a child of the root (c = 2
if the leaving point i is in the left subtree and c = 3 otherwise).
In the above example, the GKS needs to compute the new blinded node keys f(K ′7)
and f(K ′3).
3. For each new blinded key f(K ′j) (j = i, di/2e, di/4e, . . . , c), the GKS encrypts it
using the node key of the sibling of node j: {f(K ′j)}g(Ksib(j)). The GKS then
sends {f(K ′j)}g(Ksib(j)) to the leaf nodes in the subtree rooted at node sib(j). Upon
receiving {f(K ′j)}g(Ksib(j)), these leaf nodes decrypt the message using g(Ksib(j)),
which they know because node sib(j) is one of their ancestors (see item (3) of the
summary at the end of Section 5.1.3.1).
In the above example, the GKS sends
• {f(K ′7)}g(K6) to node CE and CF ;
• {f(K ′3)}g(K2) to node CA, CB, CC and CD.
4. After a leaf node receives all the necessary new blinded keys (sent by the GKS in
the above step), it re-calculates the group key using Eq. (1), the new blinded keys,
and blinded keys unaffected by the membership change.
In the example above, member CE , CF and CG can re-compute the group key using
Eq. (1) recursively as follows:
269
• K ′3 = f(K6)⊕ f(K ′7);
• K ′1 = f(K2)⊕ f(K ′3).
Client CA, CB, CC and CD re-calculate the new group key K
′
1 as follows: K
′
1 =
f(K2)⊕ f(K ′3).
5.2 Implementing LKH and OFT in Mesh Access Points
We apply the LKH and OFT algorithms described above to group key management at
the data link layer in WMNs. The group key server is now the mesh access point (MAP)
and the group members are the clients associated with the BSS under the control of the
MAP. The MAP maintains and updates the logical key tree. As mentioned earlier, the
MAP may combine several rekeying messages for different members into one packet to
save network bandwidth. In this section, we describe how the LKH and OFT algorithms
are incorporated into group key management at the data link layer in mesh access points
of a WMN. The main design objective is to minimize the communication cost between
the MAP and the members during the rekeying process. The communication cost is the
amount of data sent by the MAP to the group members for the purpose of group key
updates.
5.2.1 LKH Implementation
In this section, we implement the LKH algorithm described in Section 5.1.2 for group
key management at the data link layer in WMNs. We propose a space-saving message
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structure for rekeying messages to minimize the communication cost between the MAP
and the members. We then apply this message structure to the group key rekeying process
for LKH implementation.
5.2.1.1 LKH Key Storage
Recall that each group member in the LKH algorithm is associated with a leaf node,
which contains the individual key of each member. The mesh access point maintains and
updates the intermediate keys, which are stored in the non-leaf nodes of the logical key
tree. Each intermediate key is used to encrypt other intermediate keys or the group key
during the rekeying process. Every member must know all the keys on the path from
the leaf node (with which the member is associated) to the root. This means that every
member needs to store O(log2 n) keys, since every path from leaf to the root is at most
log2 n + 1 long. Consider the example illustrated in Figure 5.2 in which a new member
CH joins the group. Table 5.1 (a) shows all keys that each existing member stores before
CH joins the group. Table 5.1 (b) shows all keys that each existing member and the new
member CH maintain after CH joins the group. For example, before the new member
joins the group, member CG stores its own individual keyK7 with node ID 7, intermediate
key K3 with node ID 3 and group key K1 with node ID 1. After CH joins the group,
as node 7 in the key tree is the joining point, two new nodes 14 and 15 are created (see
Section 5.1.1.1). Member CG’s individual key, currently denoted as K7, is copied to and
stored at node 14 and renamed to K14. After the GKS generates the new keys K
′
7, K
′
3,
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K ′1 for node 7, node 3 and node 1 respectively and distributes them, each member will
update its key table accordingly, as shown in Table 5.1(b).
Table 5.1: Each member’s key structure for LKH
(a) Before new member CH joins
CA CB CC CD CE CF CG
ID Key ID Key ID Key ID Key ID Key ID Key ID Key
8 K8 9 K9 10 K10 11 K11 12 K12 13 K13 7 K7
4 K4 4 K4 5 K5 5 K5 6 K6 6 K6 3 K3
2 K2 2 K2 2 K2 2 K2 3 K3 3 K3 1 K1
1 K1 1 K1 1 K1 1 K1 1 K1 1 K1 − −
(b) After new member CH joins
CA CB CC CD CE CF CG CH
ID Key ID Key ID Key ID Key ID Key ID Key ID Key ID Key
8 K8 9 K9 10 K10 11 K11 12 K12 13 K13 14 K14 15 K15
4 K4 4 K4 5 K5 5 K5 6 K6 6 K6 7 K
′
7 7 K
′
7
2 K2 2 K2 2 K2 2 K2 3 K
′
3 3 K
′
3 3 K
′
3 3 K
′
3
1 K ′1 1 K
′
1 1 K
′
1 1 K
′
1 1 K
′
1 1 K
′
1 1 K
′
1 1 K
′
1
5.2.1.2 LKH Message Structure
The GKS (mesh access point) can send out updated keys to each member individually.
It can also combine the updated keys into one message and broadcast to all members
to save network bandwidth. Because of the broadcast nature of a wireless transmission
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in a WMN, one message can reach many nodes within the transmission range of the
transmitter. Thus, in our design, the GKS broadcasts rekeying messages to all members
to save network bandwidth. A rekeying message contains every updated key and its
corresponding node ID. We use the same encryption algorithm as specified in the IEEE
802.11 standard, which is AES [101]. The size of a key is 16 bytes (128 bits). The size of
a node ID is 2 bytes (16 bits), which can represent 216 nodes in a key tree. A mesh access
point such as Motorola WPA 400 AP could support up to 256 (28) active clients [139],
which is much less than 216, the maximum number of nodes represented in the key tree.
The message structure is shown in Figure 5.6 and explained as follows:
• The first two bytes indicate the current node ID of the joining (leaving) point, which
is also the node ID of a member who currently occupies the joining (leaving) point.
• The next two bytes indicate the new node ID of the node previously occupying the
joining (leaving) point.
• The remaining bytes are divided into groups of 18 bytes each. Each 18-byte group
contains a 2-byte node ID and a 16-byte encrypted key value.
– The 2-byte node ID identifies the node storing the key K that is used to
encrypt one or more new keys.
– The 16-byte encrypted key value is obtained from encrypting one or more
newly generated keys using key K.
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The mesh access point stores and maintains the whole logic key tree. For a complete
binary tree, the index of each array element is also the index of each node in the key tree.
If we assume complete binary trees, there is no need for storing the new node ID. A node
in a complete binary tree is always added to the key tree from top to bottom and left
to right. Thus, the new node ID after the node addition is 2i + 1, where i is the index
of the joining point in the array. A node in a complete binary tree is always removed
from the key tree from right to left and bottom to top. Thus, the new node ID after the
node deletion is di/2e, where i is the index of last array element before removing a node.
However, in practice, the tree may not be a complete binary tree, and thus the mesh
access point needs to store both pieces of information (joining point or leaving point, new
node ID) explicitly to save array space.
2 bytes 2 bytes 2 bytes, 16 bytes . . . 2 bytes, 16 bytes
↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Node ID of Join/ New Node ID of Encrypted
Leaving Point Node ID Encryption Key Value
Key
Figure 5.6: Rekeying message format
Given the example illustrated in Figure 5.2, after a new member CH joins the group,
member CG changes its association from node 7 to node 14. The GKS then broadcasts a
LKH rekeying message to all existing group members (see Figure 5.2.1.2), and unicasts
another LKH rekeying message to the new member CH (see Figure 5.2.1.2). Both of these
274
messages are instances of the implementation of the message structure in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.2.1.2 shows the content of the LKH rekeying message broadcast by the GKS
after CH joins the group. The first two bytes indicate the node ID (7) of the joining
point, which is also the node ID of member CG who currently occupies the joining point.
The third and fourth bytes indicate that member CG’s new node ID is being changed to
14. The remaining bytes are divided into groups of 18 bytes each. Each 18-byte group
contains a 2-byte node ID and 16-byte encrypted key value. For example, “1, {K ′1}K1”
denotes that the newly generated key K ′1 is encrypted using key K1. The encryption key
K1 is located at node 1 in the key tree. Similarly, “14, {K ′7}K14” denotes that the newly
generated key K ′7 is encrypted using key K14. The encryption key K14 is located at node
14 in the key tree. When a member receives the message, it only extracts the updated key
it needs. In the above example, member CE and CF only need to get the updated keys
K ′1 and K ′3 from the message, while member CA, CB, CC and CD only need to extract
the updated key K ′1. Figure 5.2.1.2 shows the content of the LKH rekeying message the
MAP sends to the new member CH . The first four bytes are the same as those shown in
Figure 5.2.1.2. The first two bytes indicate the node ID (7) of the joining point. The third
and fourth bytes indicate the node ID (14) of new member’s sibling. The next 18 bytes
consist of CH ’s node ID (15) and the encrypted keys 0.00,0.00,1.00({K ′1,K ′3,K ′7}K15) CH
needs to know. When CH receives this message, it can use its individual key K15 to
decrypt the message and get the updated keys K ′1, K ′3, and K ′7.
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Given the example shown in Figure 5.3, after a member CH leaves the group, member
CG changes its association from node 14 to node 7. Figure 5.8 shows the content of a
LKH rekeying message sent by the GKS after member CH leaves the group. The first
two bytes indicate the current node ID (14), which is also the node ID of member CG
who currently occupies this node and whose sibling is leaving the group. The third and
fourth bytes indicates the node ID of the leaving point, which is also the new node ID
(7) of member CG. The remaining bytes are divided into groups of 18 bytes each. Each
18-byte group contains a 2-byte node ID and 16-byte encrypted key value. For example,
“3, {K ′1}K3” denotes that the newly generated key K ′1 is encrypted with key K3. The
encryption key K3 is located at node 3 in the key tree. Similarly, “6, {K ′3}K6” denotes
that the newly generated key K ′3 is encrypted with key K6. The encryption key K6 is
located at node 6 in the key tree. When a member receives the message, it extracts only
the updated keys it needs. In the above example, member CE , CF , and CG only need to
get the updated keys K ′1 and K ′3 from the message, while member CA, CB, CC and CD
only need to extract the updated key K ′1.
5.2.2 OFT Implementation
In this section, we apply the OFT algorithm described in Section 5.1.3 to group key
management at the data link layer in WMNs. Our objectives are low communication
cost and space saving between the MAP and the multicast members. We apply the same
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7 14 1, {K ′1}K1 3, {K ′3}K3 14, {K ′7}K14
CG’s node
ID is changed ←− Updated Keys −→
from 7 to 14.
(a) Broadcast message for client CA to CG after client CH joins the group
7 14 15, {K ′1,K ′3,K ′7}K15
CG’s node
ID is changed ←− Updated Keys −→
from 7 to 14.
(b) Unicast message for client CH after client CH joins the group
Figure 5.7: LKH message example after client CH joins the group
14 7 2, {K ′1}K2 3, {K ′1}K3 6, {K ′3}K6 7, {K ′3}K′7
CG’s node
ID is changed ←− Updated Keys −→
from 14 to 7.
Broadcast message for client CA to CG after client CH leaves the group.
Figure 5.8: LKH message example after client CH leaves the group
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rekeying message structure proposed in Section 5.2.1.2 (Figure 5.6) to the group key
rekeying process for OFT implementation.
5.2.2.1 OFT Key Storage
Using the OFT algorithm, a member C stores the following information:
• its own individual key Ki,
• the blinded node key of its sibling f(Ksib(i)),
• the blinded node key of the sibling of every ancestor of node i (except the root):
f(Ksib(di/2e)), f(Ksib(di/4e)), . . .
Each of the above keys is accompanied by the ID of the node where the key is stored.
Consider the example in Figure 5.4 in which a new member CH joins the group.
Table 5.2 shows the keys each member stores before and after CH joins the group.
For example, before CH joins the group, member CG stores its own individual key K7
(node ID 7), its sibling’s blinded node key f(K6) (node ID 6), and the blinded node key
f(K2) of its parent’s sibling (node ID 2). After CH joins the group, because node 7 in
the key tree is the joining point, two new nodes 14 and 15 are created as children nodes
of node 7. The MAP (the group key server) creates a new individual key K14 for member
CG and stores this new key at node 14. Since the keys along the path from the joining
point to the root are updated, the MAP sends the updated blinded node keys f(K ′7) and
f(K ′3) (accompanied by the corresponding node IDs) to all members. Each member will
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update its key table accordingly after receiving the new keys, as shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Each member’s key structure for OFT
5.2.2.2 OFT Message Structure
To apply the OFT algorithm to GKM in WMNs, we use the same rekeying message
structure proposed for the LKH algorithm in Section 5.2.1.2, as shown in Figure 5.6.
Given the example illustrated in Figure 5.4, after the new member CH joins the group,
member CG changes its association from node 7 to node 14. Thus, the individual key
of member CG also moves from node 7 to node 14. The GKS (MAP) then broadcasts a
OFT rekeying message to all existing group members, and unicasts another OFT rekeying
message to the new member CH as shown in Figure 5.9. The first two bytes records the
original node ID “7”, and the next two bytes represents the new node ID, “14”. In the
next 18 bytes, the first two bytes store the node ID of the encryption key followed by the
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16-byte encrypted key values.
Figure 5.2.2.2 shows the content of the OFT rekeying message broadcast by the GKS
after CH joins the group. The first two bytes indicate the current node ID of the joining
point (node 7 in this case), which is also the node ID of member CG who currently
occupies the joining point. The third and fourth bytes indicate that the member CG’s
new node ID changes to 14. The remaining bytes are divided into groups of 18 bytes
each. Each 18-byte group contains a 2-byte node ID and 16-byte encrypted key value.
The 2-byte node ID identifies the node storing the key K that is used to encrypt one
or more new keys. The 16-byte encrypted key value is obtained from encrypting one or
more newly generated keys using key K. For example, [2, {f(K ′3)}g(K2)] indicates that
the newly generated blinded node key f(K ′3) is encrypted with node key g(K2), where
g(K2) is the result of applying function g to the node secret K2 of node 2. Similarly,
[14, {K14, f(K15)}g(K7)] indicates that the newly generated node key K14 is encrypted
with client CG’s previous node key g(K7), where g(K7) results from applying function
g to client CG’s previous node secret K7. Each client extracts appropriate information
from the messages. For example, members CA, CB, CC and CD extract the new blinded
node key f(K ′3), while member CE and CF need to get the new blinded node key f(K ′7),
and member CG only needs to know the new blinded node key f(K15) from the message.
Figure 5.2.2.2 shows the content of the OFT rekeying message the MAP sends to the
new member CH . The first four bytes are the same as those shown in Figure 5.2.2.2. The
first two bytes indicate the node ID (7) of the joining point. The third and fourth bytes
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indicate the node ID (14) of the new member’s sibling. The next 18 bytes consist of CH ’s
node ID and the encrypted blinded node keys CH needs to know. When CH receives this
message, it can use its node secret (individual key) K15 to decrypt the message and get
the blinded node keys f(K14), f(K6), and f(K2).
Given the example illustrated in Figure 5.5, after a member CH leaves the group,
member CG changes its association from node 14 to node 7. Figure 5.10 shows the
content of a OFT rekeying message broadcast by the GKS after CH leaves the group.
The first two bytes indicate the current node ID (14), which is also the node ID of
member CG who currently occupies this node and whose sibling leaves the group. The
third and fourth bytes indicate the node ID of the leaving point, which is also the new
node ID (7) of member CG. The remaining bytes are divided into groups of 18 bytes
each. Each 18-byte group contains a 2-byte node ID and 16-byte encrypted key value.
The 2-byte node ID identifies the node storing the key K that is used to encrypt one
or more new keys. The 16-byte encrypted key value is obtained from encrypting one or
more newly generated keys using key K. For example, 6, {f(K ′7)}g(K6) indicates that the
newly generated blinded node key f(K ′7) is encrypted with node key g(K6), where g(K6)
is the result of applying hashing function g to the node secret K6 of node 6.
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7 14 2, {f(K ′3)}g(K2) 6, {f(K ′7)}g(K6) 14, {K14, f(K15)}g(K7)
CG’s node
ID is changed ←− Updated keys −→
from 7 to 14.
(a) Broadcast message for client CA to CG after client CH joins the group
7 14 15, {f(K14), f(K6), f(K2)}g(K15)
CG’s node
ID is changed ←− Updated keys −→
from 7 to 14.
(b) Unicast message for client CH after client CH joins the group
Figure 5.9: OFT message example after client CH joins the group
14 7 2, {f(K ′3)}g(K2) 6, {f(K ′7)}g(K6) 7, {K ′7}g(K14)
CG’s node
ID is changed ←− Updated keys −→
from 14 to 7.
Broadcast message for client CA to CG after client CH leaves the group.
Figure 5.10: OFT message example after client CH leaves the group
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5.3 Performance Evaluation
Real-time applications require very fast rekeying so that changes in group membership
are not disruptive. In this section, we analyze and compare the rekeying latencies of the
LKH and OFT algorithms with that of the IEEE 802.11 GKM scheme (which will be
denoted as 802.11 in the remainder of this section).
We recall that in the IEEE 802.11 GKM scheme, a MAP shares a pairwise key with
each mobile device, and additionally a group key with all the members of the multicast
group. When a client joins (or leaves) the WMN, the MAP has to update the group key
to ensure backward (or forward) secrecy. The MAP generates a new group key, encrypts
it using the pairwise key the MAP shares with each trusted member, and sends the new
group key to the members one by one. Thus, in this scheme the communication cost of
a group key update is O(n), where n is the number of associated members.
5.3.1 Computational Complexity
Let n be the number of members in a multicast group, and assume a proper binary key
tree. The computational complexity is measured in terms of the complexity of encryption,
decryption and hashing for a rekeying operation.
Table 5.3 summarizes the computational complexity of the 802.11, LKH and OFT
algorithms, which shows that 802.11 takes O(n) time while LKH and OFT both take
O(log n) time. Following is a brief explanation of how to derive the computation com-
plexities given in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.3: Computational complexity
Operation 802.11 LKH OFT
Encryption n log2 n+ 1 log2 n+ 1
Decryption 1 log2 n log2 n
Join Hashing − − 3 log2 n+ 1
n×E +D (log2 n+ 1)× E (log2 n+ 1)× E
Total + log2 n×D + log2 n×D
+(3 log2 n+ 1)×H
Complexity O(n) O(log2 n) O(log2 n)
Encryption n 2 log2 n log2 n+ 1
Decryption 1 log2 n 1
Leave Hashing − − 2 log2 n+ 1
Total n×E +D 2 log2 n×E (log2 n+ 1)× E
+ log2 n×D +D + (2 log2 n+ 1)×H
Complexity O(n) O(log2 n) O(log2 n)
284
In the 802.11 algorithm, every time the MAP updates the group key, it has to encrypt
the group key n times using each member’s individual key, and then each member per-
forms one decryption after receiving the group key, hence O(n) time for the join operation
and also for the leave operation.
In the LKH algorithm,
• when a client joins the group, the MAP updates log2 n keys along the path from
the joining point to the root. Thus, the MAP performs log2 n encryptions for
the existing members (step 3 in Section 5.1.2.1). The MAP also performs one
encryption using the new member’s individual key (step 2 in Section 5.1.2.1). Thus,
the MAP performs log2 n+1 encryptions. When performing the numerical analysis,
we assume that all members receive the message and decrypt it at the same time (in
parallel). We alleviate this assumption in simulations, when we consider realistic
conditions. Since the new member has to know all the keys along the path from
itself to the root, the new member needs to perform at most log2 n decryptions (step
2 in Section 5.1.2.1). The total computation latency is (log2 n+1)×E+log2 n×D as
shown in Table 5.3, where E is the computation time for one encryption operation,
and D is the computation time for one decryption operation.
• when a member leaves the group, the MAP updates log2 n keys along the path
from the leaving point to the root in order to prevent the leaving member from
accessing future keys. The MAP encrypts the updated key Ki using the key of the
left child of node i to obtain {Ki}K2i , and sends it to the leaf nodes in the left
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subtree rooted at node i. The MAP also encrypts the updated key Ki using the
key of the right child of node i to obtain {Ki}K2i+1 , and sends it to the leaf nodes
in the right subtree rooted at node i. Thus, the MAP performs 2 log2 n encryptions
for the remaining members (step 2 in Section 5.1.2.2). We assume all members
perform the decryption operations in parallel. Since log2 n keys are updated, each
member performs at most log2 n decryptions (step 2 in Section 5.1.2.2). Thus, the
total computation complexity is (2 log2 n)×E + log2 n×D as shown in Table 5.3.
In the OFT algorithm,
• when a client joins the group, the MAP updates log2 n keys along the path from
the joining point to the root. Thus, the encryption and decryption complexities are
same as those in LKH (step 2 and 3 in Section 5.1.2.1). However, OFT employs hash
functions f and g for the group key computation as discussed in Section 5.1.3.1.
We assume the clients and the MAP perform the hash operations in parallel. The
clients and the MAP perform a total of 3 log2 n+1 hashing operations as shown in
Table 5.4 when a new member joins the group. The total computation latency is
(log2 n+ 1)× E + log2 n×D + (3× log2 n+ 1)×H as shown in Table 5.3.
• when a member leaves the group, the MAP recalculates log2 n+ 1 node keys along
the path from the leaving point to the root. Since each member needs to know the
updated blinded node keys to recompute the new group key, the MAP preforms
log2 n+1 encryptions for the updated blinded node keys (step 3 in Section 5.1.3.3).
Each member only needs to decrypt once to get its required corresponding blinded
286
Table 5.4: Number of hash operations in OFT
Description f(K) g(K) Total
Client 1 1 2
Join MAP 2 log2 n log2 n+ 1 3 log2 n+ 1
Client 1 1 2
Leave MAP log2 n log2 n+ 1 2 log2 n+ 1
node keys (step 3 in Section 5.1.3.3). We assume the clients and the MAP perform
hash operations in parallel. The clients and the MAP perform a total of 2 log2 n+1
hashing operations as shown in Table 5.4. The total computation latency is (log2 n+
1)× E + 1×D + (2 log2 n+ 1)×H as shown in Table 5.3.
5.3.2 Communication Complexity
The communication complexity is measured in terms of the number of keys to be broad-
cast and unicast during a rekeying operation. More keys imply a longer message and thus
longer transmission time.
Table 5.5 summarizes the communication complexity of the join and leave operations
incurred by the 802.11, LKH and OFT algorithms. Following is an explanation of the
communication complexities given in Table 5.5.
In the 802.11 algorithm, every time the MAP updates the group key, it has to send
(unicast) the new key to the members one by one. Hence O(n) time is required for both
join and leave operations.
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Table 5.5: Communication complexity
Operation/ Unicast Broadcast Total Complexity
Algorithm (number of keys) (number of keys)
802.11 n − n O(n)
Join LKH log2 n log2 n 2 log2 n O(log2 n)
OFT log2 n log2 n+ 1 2 log2 n + 1 O(log2 n)
802.11 n − n O(n)
Leave LKH − 2 log2 n 2 log2 n O(log2 n)
OFT − log2 n+ 1 log2 n+ 1 O(log2 n)
In the LKH algorithm,
• when a client joins the group, the MAP broadcasts a message containing log2 n up-
dated keys to the group (step 3 in Section 5.1.2.1). The MAP also unicasts a message
containing log2 n updated keys to the new member (step 2 in Section 5.1.2.1). The
total number of updated keys is 2 log2 n.
• when a member leaves the group, the MAP broadcasts a message containing 2 log2 n
updated keys to the group (step 2 in Section 5.1.2.2). The total number of updated
keys is 2 log2 n.
In the OFT algorithm,
• when a client joins the group, the MAP broadcasts a message containing log2 n new
blinded node keys to the group (step 3 in Section 5.1.3.2). The new key assigned
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to the sibling node of the new member is also part of the broadcast message, which
therefore contains a total of log2 n+1 keys. In addition, the MAP unicasts a message
containing log2 n new blinded node keys to the new member. The total number of
updated keys is 2 log2 n+ 1.
• when a member leaves the group, the MAP broadcasts a message containing log2 n
new blinded node keys to the group (step 3 in Section 5.1.3.3). The new key assigned
to the modified leaf node is also part of the broadcast message, which contains a
total of log2 n+ 1 keys. The total number of updated keys is log2 n+ 1.
5.3.3 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we derive the group key update latency functions for the 802.11, LKH
and OFT algorithms.
The rekeying latency is defined as the interval starting when the MAP receives a
join/leave request from a member and initiates the rekeying process, and ending when
all members receive or finish computing the new group key.
5.3.3.1 System Model
Given the message format in Figure 5.6 and the number of keys K carried by the MSDU
(media access control service data unit) , the size of an MSDU in bytes is
MSDU(K) = 4 + 18K (5.2)
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The 802.11, 802.11a and 802.11b standards specify a maximum MSDU size of 2304
bytes [113, 114, 115]. One message can store at most 127 updated keys givenMSDU(K) =
4+18K for our message structure designed in Section 5.2.1.2, which means it can support
up to 2127 − 1 keys in a full binary key tree. Hence, 2127 − 1 as the maximum number of
members for a multicast group in a WMN is more than enough.
We use the IEEE 802.11 protocol with distributed coordination function (DCF) for
medium access control. Multicast and broadcast transmissions use CSMA/CA (Carrier
Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance). Unicast transmissions also use RTS/
CTS /DATA /ACK exchanges in addition to CSMA/CA. We consider two spread spec-
trum technologies: direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) and orthogonal frequency
division multiplexing (OFDM). DSSS supports data rates of 1 Mbit/s, 2 Mbits/s, 5.5
Mbits/s and 11 Mbits/s while OFDM can support data rate of up to 54 Mbits/s. In our
evaluation and experiments, we choose a transmission rate at the physical layer of 2 Mbit-
s/s for DSSS to represent a low speed network and 54 Mbits/s for OFDM to represent a
high speed network, respectively.
We also make the following assumptions in the numerical analysis:
• No bit error.
• No losses due to collision.
• No packet loss due to buffer overflow at receiver nodes.
• No fragmentation at the data link layer.
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• No management frame considered (e.g. beacon, association frames).
The contention window size (cw) does not increase exponentially since we assume
that there are no collisions. Thus, cw is always equal to the minimum contention window
size (cwmin) whose value depends on the spread spectrum technology. The backoff time
is selected randomly following a uniform distribution from (0, cwmin) according to IEEE
802.11, resulting in an expected value of cwmin/2 . The minimum size of the contention
window, as defined in the IEEE 802.11g standard, is dependant on the requestor’s char-
acteristic rate. For DSSS, the minimum size of the contention window cwmin is equal to
the length of 31 time slots as defined in IEEE 802.11b [116], where each slot length is
20µs. Thus, on an average, the number of back-off slots between successive transmissions
is 15.5, which when multiplied by the slot time of 20µs, yields 310µs. For OFDM, the
minimum size of the contention window cwmin is equal to the length of 15 time slots as
defined in IEEE 802.11g [117], where each time slot length is 9 µs. Thus, on average, the
number of back-off slots between successive transmissions is 7.5, which yields 67.5 µs.
The rekeying latency upon a join or leave operation consists of two costs: communi-
cation cost and computation cost. We discuss the calculations of these two costs next.
5.3.3.2 Communication Costs
Figure 5.11(a) shows the sequence of messages exchanged to complete a unicast trans-
mission at the data link layer. According to the diagram, the latency Tu(K) incurred by
a successful wnicast transmission is calculated as follows:
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(a) Unicast
(b) Broadcast
DIFS: distributed inter-frame space; SIFS: short inter-frame space;
RTS: request to send; CTS: clear to send; ACK: acknowledgment
Figure 5.11: Unicast and broadcast message exchanges at the data link layer
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Tu(K) = TDIFS + TBO + TRTS + TCTS + 3TSIFS + TData(K) + TACK
The definition and value of each variable in the above function is listed in Table 5.6.
The values are taken from [113]– [115]. As shown in this table, the latencies incurred
by the request to send (RTS), clear to send (CTS), distributed inter-frame space (DIFS),
short inter-frame space (SIFS), and acknowledgment (ACK) frames, and the average
back-off time are constant. TData(K) is the latency incurred by the rekeying message.
This latency depends on the size of the message, and thus on the number of keysK stored
in the message. The calculation of TData(K) will be shown in Section 5.3.3.5.
Broadcast messages in IEEE 802.11 media access control do not use RTS, CTS or
ACK [134]. Following is the latency Tb(K) incurred by a successful broadcast transmis-
sion, according to vhe diagram illustrating the timeline of a broadcast transmission at
the data link layer in Figure 5.11(b).
Tb(K) = TDIFS + TBO + TData(K)
5.3.3.3 Computation Costs
Let E, D and H denote the latency of an encryption, decryption and hashing operation,
respectively.
Using the encryption, decryption, and hashing costs listed in Table 5.3, we obtain the
computation costs of the join and leave operations for the three algorithms, which are
listed in Table 5.7.
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Table 5.6: Latency Components
Parameter Description Value
Spread spectrum OFDM DSSS
technology [113]– [115] [113]– [115]
TSIFS Latency of short 9 µs [138] 10 µs [138]
interframe space
TDIFS Latency of distributed 34 µs 50 µs
interframe space
TBO Latency of backoff 67.5 µs 310 µs
TRTS Latency of request to send 24 µs 352 µs
TCTS Latency of clear to send 24 µs 304 µs
TACK Latency of acknowledgement 24 µs 304 µs
TData(K) !Latency for transferring
K Number of keys −
E Encryption 2.1ms [101]
D Decryption 2.2ms [101]
H Hashing 0.009ms [73]
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Table 5.7: Rekeying Latency
Operation/ Communication Computation
Algorithm Unicast Broadcast Encryption Decryption Hashing
J
o
in
802.11 Tu(n) − n× E D ‘ −
LKH Tu(log2 n) Tb(log2 n) (log2 n+ 1)× E log2 n×D −
OFT Tu(log2 n) Tb(log2 n+ 1) (log2 n+ 1)× E log2 n×D (3 log2 n+ 2)×H
L
ea
ve
802.11 Tu(n) − n× E D −
LKH − Tb(2 log2 n) 2log2n× E log2 n×D −
OFT − Tb(log2 n+ 1) (log2 n+ 1)× E D (2 log2 n+ 2)×H
5.3.3.4 Total Rekeying Latency
Functions Tu and Tb are defined in Section 5.3.3.2 as the latencies incurred by a suc-
cessful unicast transmission and a successful broadcast transmission, respectively. The
arguments of the Tu and Tb functions are the numbers of keys stored in the messages
as listed in Table 5.5. Table 5.7 shows the communication costs incurred by the three
algorithms (see columns “Unicast” and “Broadcast” in Table 5.5).
The rekeying latency − a combination of computation and communication costs listed
in Table 5.7 − incurred by a join operation in each of the three algorithms is as follows:
J802.11 = Tu(n) + n× E + 1×D
JLKH = Tu(log2 n) + Tb(log2 n) + (log2 n+ 1)× E + log2 n×D
JOFT = Tu(log2 n) + Tb(log2 n+ 1) + (log2 n+ 1)×E + log2 n×D
+ (3 log2 n+ 1)×H (5.3)
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The rekeying latencies incurred by a leave operation are as follows:
L802.11 = Tu(n) + n× E + 1×D
LLKH = Tb(2 log2 n) + 2 log2 n× E + log2 n×D
LOFT = Tb(log2 n+ 1) + (log2 n+ 1)× E + 1×D + (2 log2 n+ 1)×H (5.4)
To increase the reliability of broadcast messages, we can broadcast a message multiple
times. In our implementation of the LKH and OFT algorithms, we borrow the idea
from the Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) [135, 136], where a message
is broadcast three times for enhanced reliability. We denote LKH and OFT with this
implementation as LKH-3 and OFT-3, respectively. Following are the rekeying latencies of
the LKH-3 and OFT-3 algorithms in the 3-time broadcast implementation. (In the 802.11
algorithm, the MAP unicasts the messages to each group member. Delivery reliability of
each unicast message is ensured by the RTS/CTS/DATA/ACK exchange.)
JLKH−3 = Tu(log2 n) + 3× Tb(log2 n) + (log2 n+ 1)×E + log2 n×D
LLKH−3 = 3× Tb(2 log2 n) + 2 log2 n×E + log2 n×D
JOFT−3 = Tu(log2 n) + 3× Tb(log2 n+ 1) + (log2 n+ 1)× E
+ log2 n×D + (3 log2 n+ 1)×H
LOFT−3 = 3× Tb(log2 n+ 1) + (log2 n+ 1)× E + 1×D
+ (2 log2 n+ 1)×H (5.5)
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5.3.3.5 Performance Graphs
To visualize the performance comparison of the three algorithms as given by the math-
ematical equations (3), (4), and (5), we plotted graphs of the above rekeying latency
functions J802.11, JLKH , JLKH−3, JOFT , and JOFT−3.
The numerical data for plotting the graphs are given in Table 5.6. We use the AES
encryption algorithm [137] with 128-bit keys. The wireless transmission delay components
such as DIFS, SIFS, RTS, CTS and ACK are from the IEEE 802.11 standards [113]− [115].
The transmission time TData(K) of an MSDU depends on its size (or the number of keys
it stores) and the data rate at the physical layer (which is determined by the spread
spectrum technology), and is calculated as follows [114].
For OFDM,
TData(K)OFDM = TPREAMBLE + TSignal + TSYM
× d16 + 6 + 8× (34 +MSDU(K))
NDBPS
e (5.6)
where the service field of the physical layer header is 16 bits long; the PSDU tail of the
physical layer header is 6 bits long; the maximum media access control header length is
34 bytes, andMSDU(K) is given by Eq. (2). By multiplying (MSDU(K)+34) by eight,
we convert the maximum media access control header length and MSDU from bytes to
bits. The values of TPREAMBLE , TSignal, TSYM , and NDBPS are from the IEEE 802.11
standards and provided in Table 5.8.
After substituting the above values into Eq. (6), we obtain:
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Table 5.8: Timing Related Parameters
Parameter Description OFDM DSSS
TPREAMBLE PLCP preamble duration 16 µs 144 µs
TSIGNAL Duration of the SIGNAL 4 µs 48 µs
BPSK-OFDM symbol − −
TSYM Symbol interval 4 µs −
NDBPS Data bits per OFDM 216 µs −
symbol − −
RData Data Rate 54 Mbits/s 2 Mbits/s
TData(K)OFDM = 20 + 4× d163 + 72K
108
e (5.7)
For DSSS,
TData(K)DSSS = TPREAMBLE + TSignal
+
8× (34 +MSDU(K))
RData
(5.8)
After substituting the appropriate values given in Table 5.8 into Eq. (8), we obtain:
TData(K)DSSS = 496 + 144K (5.9)
After substituting TData(K) (defined in Eq.(7) or Eq.(9)), Tu(K) and Tb(K) (defined
in section 5.3.3.2), and the appropriate values into the total rekeying latency functions
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Eq.(3)-(5) (defined in Section 5.3.3.4), we plotted the graphs as functions of n, where n
is the number of clients in a multicast/broadcast group controlled by a MAP.
Figures 5.12(a) and (b) illustrate the latency functions of the join operation using
DSSS and OFDM, respectively, on a log scale. To demonstrate the linear function of
802.11 and logarithmic behaviors of LKH and OFT functions, we magnify the above
graphs for n values from 1 to 50. The magnified graphs are shown in Figures 5.12(c) and
(d).
Similarly, the latency functions of the leave operation using DSSS and OFDM are
illustrated by the graphs in Figures 5.13(a) & (b), respectively. The corresponding mag-
nified graphs are given for n = 1 to 50 in Figures 5.13(c) & (d).
5.3.3.6 Discussion
From the above graphs, we draw the following conclusions.
• The join rekeying latencies of LKH and OFT are comparable, and much lower than
that of IEEE 802.11 algorithm when n > 5.
• The leave rekeying latency of OFT is slightly better than that of LKH. The reason
is that the OFT algorithm incurs 50% less bits to be broadcast for the key update
required by a leave operation [14]. Both algorithms, given their logarithmic running
time, perform better than the linear function of IEEE 802.11 when n > 7.
• Although a message is broadcast three times in the JLKH−3, JOFT−3, LLKH−3 and
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Figure 5.12: Rekeying latency incurred by a JOIN operation
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Figure 5.13: Rekeying latency incurred by a LEAVE operation
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LOFT−3 functions for enhanced reliability, the increase of the rekeying latency of
this implementation is very minor in the theoretical analysis.
5.4 Simulation Results
The above numerical analysis shows that the LKH and OFT algorithms can reduce the
rekeying latency of the current scheme used in the IEEE 802.11 GKM from linear time to
logarithmic time. We further evaluate and compare the performance of the 802.11, LKH
and OFT algorithms under realistic network settings using simulations. We use QualNet
version 5.2, a commercial software that provides scalable simulations of wireless networks
[102], for our experiments.
5.4.1 Performance Metric
The performance metric is the rekeying latency (delay), which is defined as the interval
starting when a MAP receives a join/leave request from a member and initiates the
rekeying process, and ending when all members receive and finish computing the new
group key. To enhance the reliability of rekeying messages, the MAP sends each broadcast
message three times. We will show how this approach affects the performance of rekeying
latency of LKH and OFT in comparison with the one time broadcast scheme. In addition,
our experiments demonstrate how background traffic can affect the rekeying latency of
the 802.11, LKH and OFT protocols.
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5.4.2 Simulation Parameters
A mesh access point such as Motorola WAP 400 AP could support up to 256 active
clients [139]. Thus, we conducted our simulation using two group sizes: one has 50
members and the other has 200 members, which are representatives of a moderately busy
and highly busy MAP, respectively. The simulation parameters of all experiments are
listed in Table 5.9. The simulated time is 150s. The transmission range of the wireless
router (MAP) is 315m, according to the specifications of wireless routers manufactured by
Tropos [103]. The transmission range of clients is 304m, according to the specifications of
wireless adapters manufactured by Cisco [105]. The node mobility is random way point.
The mobility speed of each member is 10m/s. Each data point in the graph is the average
of 10 runs using 10 random seeds. The graphs are plotted with a confidence interval of
95%. In all the experiments, the mobile clients are randomly placed in a 300m x 300m
area while a MAP is placed in the center of the area. Thus, any mobile client can reach
the MAP in the 300m x 300m area.
We use the IEEE 802.11b and IEEE 802.11a configurations specified in Qualnet to run
simulations for DSSS and OFDM, respectively. DSSS supports data rates of 1 Mbit/s,
2 Mbits/s, 5.5 Mbits/s and 11 Mbits/s while OFDM supports data rate of up to 54
Mbits/s. For comparison purposes, in our experiments we choose a low transmission rate
of 2 Mbits/s and a high transmission rate of 54 Mbits/s at the physical layer for DSSS
and OFDM respectively, as shown in Table 5.10.
For each type of spread spectrum technology, DSSS and OFDM, we conduct three
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Table 5.9: Simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Transmission range of MAPs 315m
Transmission range of clients 304m
Movement model Random way point
Client mobility speed 10m/s
Simulation time 150s
Network dimensions 300m x 300m
Number of runs per data point 10
Confidence interval 95%
Table 5.10: IEEE 802.11 standards used in the experiments
Spread spectrum Physical layer Transmission rate
technology Protocol at physical layer
DSSS PHY802.11b 2 Mbits/s
OFDM PHY802.11a 54 Mbits/s
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sets of experiments to measure the rekeying latency as a function of
(1) multicast group size. We measure the average rekeying latency of the protocols when
a new member joins or an existing member leaves a group. We conducted simulations
for both join and leave operations with group sizes of 50 and 200 clients. For each
group size S, we measure the average latency by: (a) varying S from 1 to 50 for
the smaller group, (b) varying S from 1 to 200 for the larger group. We repeat the
same experiments for the leave operation. For each data point in a graph, we ran an
experiment 10 times using 10 different random seeds and obtained the the average
rekeying latency.
(2) multicast group size with enhanced broadcast reliability. Unicast uses CSMA/CS and
RTS/CTS/ACK to enhance the reliability of a data transmission, while broadcast
does not use RTS/CTS/ACK. To enhance the reliability of broadcast, each rekeying
message is broadcast three times. We repeat the experiment (1) described above, but
broadcast each rekeying message three times.
(3) background traffic load. Since the MAP has to update the keys when a member join-
s/leaves the group, the total workload of the MAP directly impacts the group key
rekeying latency. Thus, we measure the average rekeying latency of the protocols in
the presence of background traffic send to the MAP, to get a more practical measure-
ment of realistic scenarios. In each experiment, an additional client outside the group
is placed in the network as a source to transmit background traffic to the MAP at a
307
specified constant bit rate (CBR). This client does not count as part of the group size
S. We vary the CBR from 0 to 2 Mbits/s for DSSS and 0 to 50 Mbits/s for OFDM
in our simulation. The data rate of standard video streams, such as MPEG-2, can be
up to 50 Mbits/s [140]. In this experiment, each members joins (or leaves) the group
one after another. For example, in the case of the smaller group with 50 members,
we measure the rekeying latency as a function of background traffic load when the
50th member joins the group. In the case of the larger group with 200 members, we
measure the rekeying latency when the 200th member joins the group.
Table 5.11 summarizes the important parameters and lists the figures containing the
graphs of the DSSS and OFDM experiments.
5.4.3 Simulation Results of DSSS
Following is a detailed discussion of the experimental results with DSSS.
5.4.3.1 Function of Multicast Group Size
The rekeying latency of the join operation of the protocols as functions of the group size
is given in Figure 5.14(a) for group size S varying from 1 to 50 and in Figure 5.14(b)
for group size S varying from 1 to 200. We observe that the join rekeying latencies of
LKH and OFT are comparable, and much lower than that of the 802.11 algorithm when
the number of members n > 5 because the rekeying latency of 802.11 increases linearly,
while that of LKH and OFT increases logarithmically. As the number of joining nodes
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Table 5.11: Simulation Results
Experiment DSSS OFDM Network
(1) Function of Join Figures 5.14 (a) Figures 5.17 (a) 300m x 300m
multicast group Figures 5.14 (c) Figures 5.17 (c)
size Leave Figures 5.14 (b) Figures 5.17 (b) 50 or 200 nodes
Figures 5.14 (d) Figures 5.17 (d)
(2) Function of Join Figures 5.15 (a) Figures 5.18 (a) Node mobility
multicast group Figures 5.15 (c) Figures 5.18 (c) is 10m/s
size with Leave Figures 5.15 (b) Figures 5.18 (b) DSSS transmission
enhanced Figures 5.15(d) Figures 5.18 (d) rate is 2 Mbits/s
reliability
(3) Function of Join Figures 5.16 (a) Figures 5.19 (a) OFDM transmission
background Figures 5.16 (c) Figures 5.19 (c) rate is 54 Mbits/s
traffic load Leave Figures 5.16 (b) Figures 5.19 (b)
Figures 5.16 (d) Figures 5.19 (d)
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increases, the performance gap between LKH (OFT) and 802.11 enlarges.
For example, in the case of the smaller multicast group of 50 nodes, the maximum
latencies of LKH, OFT, and 802.11 are 32.2ms, 32.8ms, and 110.7ms, respectively. In the
case of the larger group of 200 nodes, they are 38.1ms, 40.9ms, and 441.2ms, respectively.
The rekeying latency of the leave operation of the protocols as a function of the group
size is given in Figure 5.14(c) for group size S varying from 1 to 50 and in Figure 5.14(d)
for S varying from 1 to 200. The leave rekeying latency of OFT is approximately 18%
to 25% lower than that of LKH. The reason is that the OFT algorithm requires 50% less
bits to be broadcast for the key update caused by a leave operation [14]. Again, both
OFT and LKH rekeying latency is better than that of the 802.11 algorithm. The rekeying
latency of LKH is much lower than that of 802.11 when the number of members n > 7.
In Figure 5.14(c), LKH is approximately 3.1% to 61.8% lower than IEEE 802.11 when
the number of members n ≥ 7. OFT is approximately 0.9% to 79.8% lower than IEEE
802.11 when n ≥ 1.
Comparing with the numerical analysis in Section 5.3.3, both LKH and OFT, given
their logarithmic running time, perform better than the linear function of 802.11. Thus,
these simulation results are consistent with our numerical analysis.
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5.4.3.2 Function of Multicast Group Size with 3-time Broadcast
We repeated the above experiment, but each rekeying message was broadcast three times
for enhanced reliability.
Figure 5.15 (a) and Figure 5.15 (b) show the join rekeying latencies of 802.11, LKH,
and OFT. As 802.11 is unicast in nature, we transmit the 802.11 rekeying message only
one time. We transmit the broadcast messages of both LKH and OFT three times each
to enhance reliability. We observe that the join rekeying latencies of LKH and OFT
are comparable when the broadcast message is sent three times (denoted by LKH-3 and
OFT-3 in the graphs). The latency of LKH-3 (OFT-3) is obviously longer than that of
its one time broadcast counterpart denoted by LKH (OFT).
In Figure 5.15 (a), when the group size S varies from 1 to 50, the latency of OFT is
approximately 29% to 48% lower than that of OFT-3. The latency of LKH is approxi-
mately 25% to 47% lower than that of LKH-3. In Figure 5.15 (b), when the group size S
varies from 1 to 200, the latency of OFT (LKH) is approximately 25% to 37% (25% to
32%) lower than that of OFT-3 (LKH-3).
We observe that the latencies of LKH-3 and OFT-3 are much lower than that of
802.11 when the number of members n > 10. We observe here that when considering
smaller group sizes (i.e. n < 10), all 3 algorithms perform similarly. 802.11 observably
does a bit better due to less overhead. However, for larger group sizes the performance of
802.11 worsens and is not efficient because the communication overhead starts to become
greater than the computation overhead. As the number of joining nodes increases, the
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performance gap between the LKH-3 (OFT-3) and 802.11 enlarges. In Figure 5.15 (a),
the latencies of LKH-3 (OFT-3) is 43.3% (45%) lower than that of 802.11. In Figure 5.15
(b), LKH-3 (OFT-3) is 83.7% (83.1%) lower than that of 802.11.
The rekeying latency of the leave operation of the protocols using three-time broadcast
is given in Figures 5.15 (c) and (d) for group size varying from 1 to 50 and from 1 to
200 , respectively. Similar to the case of one-time broadcast shown in Figure 5.14 (c) and
(d), the rekeying latency of OFT-3 is slightly lower than that of LKH-3. The latency of
OFT-3 is approximately 18% to 23% longer than that of OFT. The latency of LKH-3 is
approximately 13% to 19% longer than that of LKH.
We observe that the latencies of LKH-3 and OFT-3 are much lower than that of the
802.11 when the number of members n > 20. As the number of leaving nodes increases,
the performance gap between the LKH-3 (OFT-3) and 802.11 enlarges. In Figure 5.15
(c), LKH-3 (OFT-3) is 53% (62%) lower than 802.11. In Figure 5.15 (c), LKH-3 (OFT-3)
is 84% (87%) lower than 802.11.
Thus, with 3-time broadcase, the rekeying latency for both join and leave operations
is slightly higher than that of one-time broadcast, but is still much better than that of
802.11 and additionally provides reliability in broadcasting messages.
5.4.3.3 Function of Background Traffic Load
As described in experiment (3) in Section 5.4.2, an additional node is placed in the
network as a source to transmit background traffic to the MAP at a specified CBR. The
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Figure 5.14: DSSS - Rekeying latency of Join/Leave operation
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(a) DSSS - Group size from 1-50 - Join
(b) DSSS - Group size from 1-200 - Join
315
(c) DSSS - Group size from 1-50 - Leave
(d) DSSS - Group size from 1-200 - Leave
Figure 5.15: DSSS - Each broadcast message is sent 3 times
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CBR varies from 0 to 2 Mbits/s for DSSS. In this set of experiments, each members
joins or leaves the group one after another. For the smaller (larger) group with 50 (200)
members, we measure the rekeying latency as a function of background traffic load when
the 50th (200th) member joins (leaves) the group.
The graphs in Figure 5.16(a) (Figure 5.16 (b)) shows the average rekeying latency
when the 50th (the 200th) member joins the smaller (larger) group with the data rate of
type CBR varying from 0 to 2Mbits/s. The latency is calculated as the interval starting
when the MAP receives a join request from the 50th (the 200th) member and initiates the
rekeying process, and ending when all members receive or finish computing the new group
key. As the data rate of the background traffic increases, the average rekeying latency for a
join operation in LKH, OFT and 802.11 increases slightly due to the increased background
traffic the MAP needs to process. We observe that the join rekeying latencies of LKH
and OFT are comparable, but much better than that of 802.11.
The graphs in Figure 5.16(c) (Figure 5.16 (d)) shows the average rekeying latency
when the 50th (the 200th) member leaves the smaller (larger) group with the data rate
varying from 0 to 2Mbits/s. As the data rate of the background traffic increases, the
average rekeying latency for a leave operation in LKH, OFT and 802.11 slightly increases.
We observe that the leave rekeying latency of OFT is slightly lower than that of LKH.
They both perform better than 802.11 rekeying.
In summary, both LKH and OFT, given their logarithmic running time, perform
better than the linear function of 802.11 when the group size increases. Experiments
317
show that the latency of 3-time broadcast for LKH and OFT is still much better than
that of 802.11. Also, with the increase in the background traffic to the GKS (MAP),
LKH and OFT perform better than 802.11.
5.4.4 Simulation Results of OFDM
The results are shown in Figure 5.17, Figure 5.18 and Figure 5.19.
5.4.4.1 Function of Multicast Group Size
Figure 5.17 shows the rekeying latency of the join and leave operations of the protocols
as a function of the group size. The group size in this set of experiments is varied from
1 to 50 for the smaller group of 50 nodes, and from 1 to 200 for the larger group of 200
nodes.
The rekeying latencies of the join operation are given in Figure 5.17(a) and Fig-
ure 5.17(b) for the 50-node group and the 200-node group, respectively.
• The rekeying latencies of LKH and OFT are comparable, and much lower than that
of the 802.11 algorithm when the number of members n > 5. We observe that the
average rekeying latency of 802.11 increases linearly, while that of LKH and OFT
increases logarithmically.
• As the number of joining nodes increases, the performance gap between the LKH
(OFT) and 802.11 enlarges. For example, in Figure 5.17(b), the performance gap
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Figure 5.16: DSSS - The impact of background traffic
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between LKH (OFT) and 802.11 enlarges from 81.43ms (80.71ms) to 384.27ms
(383.98ms) when the group size increases from 50 to 200.
Figure 5.17 (c) and (d) shows the rekeying latency of the leave operation of the
protocols, with the group size varying from 1 to 50, and from 1 to 200, respectively.
• In Figure 5.17(c), as the number of members increases from 1 to 50, the latency of
OFT is approximately 33% to 82% lower than that of LKH.
• In Figure 5.17(d), as the number of members increases from 1 to 200, the latency
of OFT is approximately 32% to 66% lower than LKH.
• Both OFT and LKH perform better than that of the 802.11 algorithm. The rekeying
latency of LKH is much shorter than that of 802.11 when the number of members
n > 7. In Figure 5.17(c), LKH’s latency is approximately 3.2% to 64.7% lower than
IEEE 802.11. OFT’s latency is approximately 2.8% to 76.8% lower than IEEE
802.11.
These simulation results are consistent with our numerical analysis. We observe that
the rekeying latencies of three algorithms for join and leave operations implemented in
OFDM are lower than those implemented in DSSS. For example, when the 50th member
joins (leaves) the group, the rekeying latencies of LKH, OFT, and 802.11 implemented in
OFDM are much lower than those implemented in DSSS, by 20.43% (13.06%), 17.85%
(24.77%), and 2.89% (2.98%), respectively. The main reason is that OFDM supports a
much higher data rate than that of DSSS (54 Mbits/s vs. 2 Mbits/s in our experiments).
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Figure 5.17: OFDM - Rekeying latency of Join/Leave operation
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5.4.4.2 Function of Multicast Group Size with 3-time Broadcast
Figure 5.18 shows the join and leave rekeying latencies of LKH and OFT when each
broadcast message is transmitted one time and three times. These results for OFDM are
consistent with those from the DSSS experiments. LKH and OFT perform better than
802.11 in both cases, one-time and three-time broadcast.
• In Figure 5.18(a), given the group size varying from 1 to 50, the latency of OFT
is approximately 8.6% to 9.7% lower than that of OFT-3. The latency of LKH is
approximately 6.5% to 14.6% lower than LKH-3.
• In Figure 5.18(b), when the group size changes from 1 to 200, the latency of OFT
is approximately 2.6% to 10.5% lower than that of OFT-3. The latency of LKH is
approximately 2.6% to 6.5% lower than that of LKH-3.
• The latencies of LKH-3 and OFT-3 are much better than that of the 802.11 when
the number of members n > 10. As the number of joining nodes increases, the
performance gap between the LKH-3 (OFT-3) and 802.11 enlarges. For example,
in Figure 5.18(b), the latency of LKH-3 is 73.4% (91.1%) lower than that of 802.11
for group size of 50 (200) nodes.
The rekeying latencies of the leave operation of the protocols using three-time broad-
cast are given in Figure 5.18(c) and Figure 5.18(d). These graphs show similar patterns
as those from the DSSS experiments.
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• In Figure 5.18(c), the latency of OFT (LKH) is approximately 4.6% to 6.7% (2.1%
to 19%) lower than that of OFT-3 (LKH-3).
• In Figure 5.18(d), the latency of OFT (LKH) is approximately 7% to 42% (7% to
22%) lower than that of OFT-3 (LKH-3).
• The latencies of LKH-3 and OFT-3 are much lower than that of 802.11 when the
number of members n > 20. As the number of leaving nodes increases, the per-
formance gap between the LKH-3 (OFT-3) and 802.11b widens. For example, in
Figure 5.18(d), the latency of LKH-3 (OFT-3) is 64.5% (74.7%) lower than that of
802.11 for group size of 50 nodes, and 87.6% (91.4%) lower than that of 802.11 for
group size of 200 nodes.
In general, the latency of three-time broadcast for both join and leave operations is
slightly higher than that of one-time broadcast, but is still much lower than that of 802.11.
We observe that the rekeying latency of three-time broadcast for join or leave operations
implemented in OFDM is much lower than that implemented in DSSS because of the
much higher data rate used in OFDM (54 Mbit/s vs. 2Mbit/s). For example, when the
200th member joins (leaves) the group, the OFT rekeying latency of three-time broadcast
for join (leave) operations for OFDM is 49.93% (35.88%) lower than that for DSSS.
5.4.4.3 Function of Multicast Traffic Load
The graph in Figure 5.19(a) (Figure 5.19(b)) shows the average rekeying latency when
the 50th (the 200th) member joins the smaller (larger) group with a background traffic
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(a) OFDM - Group size from 1-50 - Join
(b) OFDM - Group size from 1-200 - Join
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(c) OFDM - Group size from 1-50 - Leave
(d) OFDM - Group size from 1-200 - Leave
Figure 5.18: OFDM - Each broadcast message is sent 3 times
327
data rate varying from 0 to 50 Mbits/s. As the background traffic data rate increases
from 0 to 50 Mbits/s, the average rekeying latency of LKH (OFT) is approximately 26.7%
(26.9%) of that of 802.11 for the 50-node group, and 8.5% (8.7%) of that of 802.11 for
the 200-node group, respectively.
We observe that the pattern of the graphs for the join operation are similar to those
in the DSSS experiments. Due to the higher data rate used in OFDM experiments, the
rekeying latencies for all three algorithms are slightly lower than those in DSSS as shown
in Figure 5.16(a) and (b) of Section 5.4.3.3). For example, when the 50th (200th) member
joins the group with the background traffic data rate varying from 0 to 2 MBits/s, the
OFT rekeying latency in OFDM is 15.52% (30.87%) lower than that in DSSS.
The graph in Figure 5.19(c) (Figure 5.19(d)) shows the average rekeying latency when
the 50th (the 200th member) leaves the smaller (larger) group with a background traffic
data rate varying from 0 to 50 Mbits/s. When the 50th (200th) member leaves the
group, the average rekeying latency of LKH, OFT,and 802.11 increases as expected,
by 7.3%, 9.3%, and 4.7%, (6.1%, 8.8%, and 1.6%,) respectively, due to the increase in
background traffic load. The graph pattern and rekeying latency increase trend for the
leave operation of OFDM are consistent with those for DSSS shown in Figure 5.16(c)
and (d) of Section 5.4.3.3. The observed results indicate that the rekeying latency of
the leave operation in OFDM is lower than that of DSSS. For example, when the 50th
(200th) member leaves the group with the background traffic data rate varying from 0
to 2 Mbit/s, the OFT rekeying latency in OFDM is lower than that in DSSS by 28.98%
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(34.88%). The main reason is the higher data rate used in OFDM, 54 Mbits/s vs. 2
Mbits/s in DSSS.
5.5 Chapter Summary
The group key management scheme defined in the IEEE 802.11s standard is neither
efficient nor scalable because the rekeying latency grows linearly as a function of number
of the clients connected to a mesh access point. The objective of our work is to provide an
efficient and scalable rekeying method for group key management at the data link layer
in WMNs in order to support real-time applications such as VoIP, tele-conferencing, and
online HDTV.
We show how the LKH and OFT algorithms can be applied to group key management
(GKM) at the data link layer in WMNs in order to improve its performance. We evaluate
and compare the performance of IEEE 802.11 GKM, LKH and OFT algorithms under
realistic network settings using simulations. Our numerical analysis and simulation results
confirm that the LKH and OFT algorithms reduce the rekeying latency of GKM at the
data link layer from linear time to logarithmic time. Based on the numerical analysis and
simulation results, we provide insights into the performance of IEEE 802.11 GKM, LKH
and OFT algorithms in WMNs.
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Figure 5.19: OFDM - The impact of background traffic
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Research
Directions
In this chapter, we summarize the main results of the thesis, identify open issues, and
outline research directions for future work.
6.1 Summary
We extend the capabilities of the IEEE 802.11s standard to support fast intra-network
handovers for real-time applications such as VoIP, tele-conferencing, and stock quote
distributions. We propose a novel security framework consisting of a new trust model,
certificates and a suite of security protocols. Our authentication protocols support fast
login and intra-network handovers in IEEE 802.11s networks. A client and a MAP mu-
tually authenticate each other using one-hop communications. Fast authentication for
roaming from one MAP to another is supported by using intra-network transfer certifi-
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cates, which does not require an authentication server’s participation during the authen-
tication process. Instead, mobile clients and MAPs mutually authenticate each other
directly, avoiding multi-hop wireless communications. Numerical analysis and simulation
results show that our login authentication protocol improves the authentication latency
of IEEE 802.11s, and our authentication protocol supports fast authentication during the
handover process, which is lacking in IEEE 802.11s.
Our second contribution is a scalable security architecture, a trust model and cer-
tificates to support mobile clients roaming from one WMN to another. Our proposed
architecture and trust model eliminate the involvement of a client’s home network during
the inter-network handover process. Based on the proposed architecture and trust model,
we propose a suite of authentication and key distribution protocols. A mobile client and
a foreign access point authenticate each other via one-hop communications using the
client’s inter-network transfer certificate, minimizing the authentication latency. Our se-
curity analysis shows that our protocols are resilient to various types of attacks. Our
numerical analysis and simulation results demonstrate that our protocols dramatically
reduce the inter-network handover latency in comparison with the home-foreign domain
authentication approach.
Our third contribution is a new implementation of group key management at the data
link layer in mesh access points of a WMN to minimize the group key update latency.
Our proposed GKM implementation takes advantage of the logical key tree structure
to reduce the rekeying latency of IEEE 802.11 GKM from linear time to logarithmic
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time. The performance of the proposed implementation is evaluated via simulations
under realistic network settings. Numerical analysis and simulation results confirm that
the new implementation reduces the rekeying latency of GKM in WMNs from linear
time to logarithmic time. We also provide insights into the performance of IEEE 802.11
GKM, LKH, and OFT algorithms in WMNs as well as recommendations of suitable GKM
approaches to support fast handovers in WMNs.
6.2 Future Research Directions
In our future work on intra-network authentications, to take advantage of WMNs with
extended network coverage through multi-hop communications, to reduce data traffic in
the core network, and at the same time to satisfy the demand for mutual authentication
among neighboring mesh clients, we will identify the criteria to support authentication
and key distribution between clients via client certificates. We will further seek efficient
solutions based on our proposed trust model to support intra-network handover security
issues such as secure billing, secure routing, and access control.
Our designed security solutions for inter-network handovers are based on the as-
sumptions of the same technology used by all WMNs, such as IEEE 802.11s. To provide
more flexibility, we will further investigate the inter-network handover process/techniques
to support seamless roaming among heterogeneous WMNs. Different technologies can
be used to provide wireless connections to mesh clients moving freely in heterogeneous
WMNs. A mobile device may have more than one wireless communication interface, thus
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allowing the user to benefit from the advantages of different networking technologies. For
example, a user with a PDA supporting both general packet radio service (GPRS) and
Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) service can use a local area network with high data rates, and also
benefit from the large coverage area of a GPRS network. However, inter-network roaming
among the heterogeneous wireless mesh networks have several security challenges, such as
(1) defining trusts between heterogeneous network entities belonging to different network
operators; (2) minimizing the handover delay when users roam across multiple domains;
(3) enabling a mobile device and a foreign network to authenticate each other, and to
establish a shared key without any prior direct trust relationship. We will further ex-
plore how to extend our proposed architecture, trust models and certificates for providing
security solutions to these issues.
Mobile clients sometimes are located in somewhere the wireless signal cannot reach.
In this case, mobile clients may not be able to receive a new group key. Group key
updating messages may also get lost. If a client fail to receive a new group key, it will not
be able to continue decrypting the new multicast packets. We will further develop a key
recovery mechanism for reliable group key management. To achieve better reliability, it
is required that each mobile client will receive new group keys, no matter how large the
group size is.
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Appendix A
The Handover Authentication
Protocol by Kassab et al.
Before a client C moves from a serving MAP M1 to a target MAP M2, C generates a
certificate forM2 and forwards it toM1. M1 will forward the certificate toM2. Following
is the structure of the certificate:
EIAPPkey(IC ;EPMK(IC ;K))
The certificate contains C’s ID and a key K which C will share with M2 after a
successful authentication. Both C’s ID and K are encrypted using the pairwise master
key PMK shared by C and M2 and pre-distributed by the authentication server to C
and M2. The encrypted message is then concatenated with C’s ID. The content of the
certificate is encrypted again with an IAPP (Inter-Access Point Protocol) key [142] shared
by M1 and M2. After M2 receives the certificate from M1, it decrypts the message using
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the shared IAPP key and the PMK to obtain key K to prepare for future authentication
of client C.
Following is the authentication protocol (presented in the order of the messages ex-
changed):
(1) C −→M2: IC , IM
(2) M2 −→ C: ACK
(3) C −→M2: NC , IC , EKEK(KShare), VKMAC (NC , IC , EKEK(KShare))
(4) M2 −→ C: IM , VKMAC (IM )
(1) Client C submits its ID and M1’s ID to M2. When M2 receives this message, M2
generates two keys using the shared key K, a key-encryption key KEK and a MAC
key KMAC .
(2) M2 replies with an acknowledgment (ACK). After C receives the acknowledgment,
C generates the same two keys KEK and KMAC using the shared key K.
(3) Client C generates a nonce NC and Kshare. C encrypts a new key KShare with key
KEK. C sends NC , the encrypted key KShare, C’s ID and a message authentica-
tion code
VKMAC (NC , IC , EKEK(KShare)) to M2. When M2 receives this message, it com-
putes a MAC value V ′KMAC (NC , IC , EKEK(KShare)).
If V ′KMAC (NC , IC , EKEK(KShare))= VKMAC (NC , IC , EKEK(KShare)), M2 has suc-
cessfully authenticated the client C. M2 decrypts EKEK(KShare) and obtains the
key KShare.
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(4) M2 sends its ID IM along with the MAC value VKMAC (IM ) to C. Upon receiving
the message, C repeats the same MAC calculation on IM . If it obtains the same
message authentication code as VKMAC (IM ), then this proves M2’s identity since
M2 is the only party in the network that has the knowledge of key KMAC .
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Appendix B
Adaptive Protocol -
Authentication and Key
Agreement (AP-AKA)
The AP-AKA [50] is a key distribution and authentication protocol for the universal
mobile telecommunication system (UMTS). In the following diagram, a mobile user MS
roams from its home network HN to a foreign network SN . AP-AKA is a mutual
authentication protocol, which allows the foreign network SN to authenticate the mobile
user MS. Also, the user MS authenticates its home network HN to make sure that the
home network in the authentication process is a trusted one.
In the AP-AKA, each mobile device and its home network share a MAC key K and
two cryptographic algorithms, V and G. V is a message authentication algorithm, and
G is a key generation function. In practice, the MAC key K is usually generated by the
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home network and programmed into a mobile device when a user initially sets up services
with its home network.
The AP-AKA is executed as follows (presented in the order of the messages ex-
changed):
Figure B.1: AP-AKA
(1) A mobile user MS roams to a foreign network SN and requests to be connected
to SN . SN sends a user data request message to MS, which includes a random
number R.
(2) Mobile user MS generates a random number RN and computes a message authen-
tication code (MAC), denoted by V AC.
V AC = Vk(RN ||R||IDsn),
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where K is a key shared by the user MS and its home network HN . IDsn is the
ID of SN . MS then sends a user data response back to SN including the random
number RN and the MAC value V AC.
(3) Foreign network SN sends an authentication data request to home network HN ,
including the user’s ID denoted by IMSI, random number R and RN , and MAC
value V AC. Upon receipt of the authentication data request from SN ,HN retrieves
the user’s MAC keyK, and verifies the correctness of the received MAC value V AC.
(4) If the above verification is successful,HN generates a batch of authentication vectors.
Each authentication vector consists of four components RAND, XRES, SK, and
AUTH.
• RAND is a random number generated by HN .
• XRES = VK(RAND) is an expected response, generated from the random
number RAND.
• SK = GK(RAND) is a session key generated from the random number
RAND.
• AUTH = idx||RNidx||V AT is an authentication token, indexed by an integer
idx.
– idx is an index number to identify the order of an authentication token in
the batch.
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– RNidx = VK(idx||RN) is a MAC value generated from index number idx
and random number RN .
– V AT = VK(RAND||idx||RNidx) is a MAC value.
HN first allocates an index number idx for the authentication vector, and gener-
ates a random number RAND. HN then computes an expected response XRES,
a shared key SK and a authentication token AUTH. Finally, HN sends the au-
thentication vectors RAND,XRES, SK,AUTH to SN .
(5) After receiving the authentication vectors from HN , SN takes out one from the
batch of the authentication vectors. SN then sends a user authentication request
to the user, including RAND and the selected authentication token AUTH.
After receiving this message, the user verifies the correctness of V AT in the au-
thentication token AUTH. Since idx and RNidx are already in AUTH and RAND
is provided in message (5), MS then computes a MAC value RAND||idx||RNidx
and compare it with V AT in AUTH. If they are equal, the user authenticates the
home network HN .
(6) The user then generates RES = VK(RAND), where K is a key shared by HN and
the user.
After receiving this user authentication response fromMS, SN compares the RES
and XRES it received from HN in message (4). If they are same, SN can success-
fully authenticate user MS because only HN and MS know the key K.
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